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Résumé 
Cette thèse a pour objectif d’approfondir l’analyse des conditions d’émergence et d’incidence de la 
corruption dans le monde. Nous y soulignons une dimension importante mais jusque-là peu 
documentée des activités de corruption, à savoir, leur contribution aux stratégies informelles 
d’adaptation et de gestion du risque mises en place par les agents économiques pour se protéger 
contre l’instabilité de leur revenu. Le premier chapitre propose un état des lieux de la recherche sur 
les définitions, les mesures, les typologies et les déterminants de la corruption. Dans le deuxième 
chapitre, les méthodes usuelles de calcul de l’instabilité macroéconomique sont expliquées, sont 
appliquées aux données sur les recettes d'exportation d’un échantillon de pays développés et en 
développement, et sont comparées entre elles. Le troisième chapitre présente et analyse une base de 
données rétrospectives sur l’Indice de Vulnérabilité Economique, reflétant le risque pour un pays de 
voir son développement entravé par des chocs naturels et des chocs d’exportations, que nous avons 
calculée pour un échantillon de 128 pays en développement et couvrant la période 1975-2008. Dans 
le quatrième chapitre, nous analysons les effets de l'instabilité des exportations sur la corruption 
dans les pays développés et en développement. Ces effets sont décomposés en un effet ex post, 
résultant de l'expérience des agents économiques de l'instabilité des exportations, et un effet ex ante, 
résultant de leur perception de cette dernière. Nous testons empiriquement ces effets sur les 
perceptions de la corruption et sur les pots-de-vin payés par les entreprises. Nous mettons en 
évidence des effets robustes, significatifs et non linéaires, dont le signe dépend de la fréquence et de 
la taille des chocs d’exportations. Nos résultats suggèrent également que la contrainte de liquidité 
est un canal transmission clé de ces effets: lorsque la contrainte de liquidité est forte l’instabilité des 
exportations aggrave l’incidence la corruption, alors qu’elle la réduit lorsque cette contrainte se 
relâche. Ainsi, en l’absence d’Etat et de marchés financiers capables d’atténuer les effets de 
l’instabilité sur les performances économiques et le bien-être, il est probable que les agents 
économiques aient recours à la corruption pour se protéger contre les fluctuations économiques. 
 
Mots-clés: corruption, instabilité des exportations, vulnérabilité économique, contrainte de 
liquidité, adaptation au risque, gestion du risque. 
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Summary 
This thesis is an attempt to improve the understanding of the causes of corruption emergence and 
incidence around the world. It highlights an undocumented feature of corrupt transactions, that is, 
their contribution to informal risk-coping and risk-management mechanisms used by economic 
agents to protect against income fluctuations. We propose in a first introductory chapter a general 
state of art of researches on corruption definitions, measurements, typologies and determinants. In 
chapter two, we explain, apply and compare standard methods of computing instability indicators, 
using export revenue data from sample of developed and developing countries. In chapter three, we 
build a retrospective Economic Vulnerability Index – i.e. an index reflecting the risk for a country 
of seeing its development hampered by natural and trade shocks – for a sample of 128 developing 
countries over 1975-2008. In chapter 4, we analyse the effect of export instability on corruption in 
developed and developing countries. This effect is decomposed into an ex post effect, resulting from 
agents’ experience of export instability, and an ex ante effect, resulting from their perception of 
export instability. We test empirically these effects using data on corruption perceptions and on 
firms’ bribe payments. We find robust, significant and nonlinear ex post and ex ante effects of 
instability on corruption, and stress that their direction strongly depends on the frequency and size 
of export fluctuations. We show that the liquidity constraint is a key channel for these effects: when 
the liquidity constraint hardens, instability is found to foster corruption; while when it softens, 
instability is found to reduce it. Thus, corrupt strategies may act as a substitute for financial market 
imperfections and a low state capacity for mitigating the consequences of economic fluctuations on 
welfare. 
 
Keywords: corruption, export instability, economic vulnerability, liquidity constraint, risk-coping, 
risk-management. 
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General introduction 
“The monopolization of theft and the protection of the tax-generating subjects thereby eliminate anarchy. Since the 
warlord takes a part of total production in the form of tax theft, it will also pay him to provide other public goods 
whenever the provision of these goods increases taxable income sufficiently. […] Thus we have ‘the first blessing of the 
invisible hand’: the rational, self-interested leader of a band of roving bandits is led, as though by an invisible hand, to 
settle down, wear a crown, and replace anarchy with a government. The gigantic increase in output that normally arises 
from the provision of a peaceful order and other public goods gives the stationary bandit a far larger take than he could 
obtain without providing government.” 
Mancur Olson in “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development”, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol.87, No.3, September 1993, p.568. 
Research context 
Efforts to combat corruption at international, regional, national, and sector levels have intensified 
since the last decade. The increasing number of countries ratifying anti-corruption international 
conventions (e.g. United Nations Convention Against Corruption), the development of anti-
corruption international networks (e.g. the U4), as well as international initiatives in sectors 
vulnerable to corruption (e.g. the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative or the Kimberley 
process in the diamond sector) witness the increasing attention and resources mobilized to tackle this 
issue. Unfortunately, anti-corruption efforts at both local and global levels have encountered 
significant difficulties to concretize into observable progresses on the ground. In fact, standardized 
formulas that have been supported to combat corruption often abutted on the endogenous and 
contextual nature of the corruption phenomenon.  
Policy levers against bribery and other corruption offences are indeed usually confined to address 
superficial rather than deeply rooted causes of malpractices. In this regard, empirical research uses to 
distinguish distant causes from proximate causes of corruption. The former refers to the importance 
of social norms, legal culture, human capital, and other structural factors shaping countries’ 
institutional profiles. The later refers to temporary conditions under which corruption emerges, such 
as low salaries in the public administration, lack of oversight and enforcement mechanisms, or poor 
incentives in the public sector.  
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What make corruption such a singular and challenging economic issue are its various nested facets. 
First, the literature sometimes analyses corruption as an institutional arrangement, that is, a set of 
informal practices, norms, customs, codes of conduct and sanctions contributing to the stability and 
predictability of exchanges between economic agents, when other formal arrangements are 
dysfunctional (Andvig, 2006; Graeff, 2005; Blundo et al., 2006). Second, it is also common to 
consider corruption as an economic and social cost arising from market imperfections and state resource 
scarcity (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; Lambsdorff, 2002; Krueger, 1974). Last but not least, corrupt 
transactions are often seen as an expenditure or an investment made by private agents to obtain undue 
preferential treatments from the public administration/the legislature/the government, hence 
yielding important private payoffs (Martin et al., 2007; Lambsdorff, 2002; Bhagwati, 1982).  
This thesis is an attempt to improve the understanding of the complex motives underlying corrupt 
acts, by addressing an undocumented feature of corrupt transactions: we highlight how corruption 
may help economic agents protect against the hazards of economic activity. During economic 
upheavals, imperfect formal/informal financial markets may not enable agents to fully mitigate the 
consequences of economic fluctuations. In this context, engaging in corrupt deals may be an 
appealing strategy when it allows economic agents to relax their liquidity constraint and/or secure 
resource inflows over time. In what follows, we review the three major lenses of corruption analysis 
described above, and stress how the question of the effects of economic instability on corrupt 
transactions naturally arises from this literature. 
Corruption as an institutional arrangement 
Leaving aside the damaging effects of corruption on welfare, corruption can be holistically viewed as 
a system of informal practices, rules, constraints, and enforcement mechanisms governing market 
and non-market exchanges between individuals, and prevailing outside the realm of formal or legal 
institutions (Williamson, 2009). Some authors argue that corruption is an institutional arrangement 
arising from the lack, the inappropriateness, or the ineffectiveness of formal institutions reducing the 
uncertainty upon (or ensuring the predictability of) interactions between agents (Graeff, 2005; 
Andvig, 2006; Blundo et al., 2006; Williamson, 2009). This structuring role of institutional 
arrangements has been clearly pointed out by North (1991, p.97), who stresses that 
“[…] throughout history, institutions have been devised by human being to create order and reduce 
uncertainty in exchange.” 
This analytical lens may apply to various situations of corruption, when for instance the rule of law is 
undermined and bribe payments (or other corrupt arrangements) are made to enforce contracts. It 
may also apply to countries with weak democratic institutions, which do not reach political consensus 
upon resources allocation. In this context, parochial corruption may for instance be an accepted (but 
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non democratic) norm of redistributing resources among relatives at all levels of the government and 
the society. Another illustration is when new market-based coordination mechanisms are not fully 
integrated by economic agents after a rapid privatization process. Older but illegal kinship-based or 
hierarchy-based coordination mechanisms may instead be carried out to facilitate exchanges between 
economic agents (Andvig, 2006). The dubious repurchase by oligarchs of various state-owned 
enterprises at very obliging prices (far below market prices) in former centrally-planned economies 
illustrates this institutional configuration (Nellis, 2009). 
Olson’s (1993) analysis of the rise of autocratic and democratic systems gives interesting insights into 
the prevalence of systemic corruption patterns. The author suggests that selfish “warlords” are 
incited to replace anarchy by a social order, and to exert a monopoly power on theft. In this setting, 
stationary banditry ensures by authoritarian means the stability and the predictability of economic 
exchanges, thereby fostering saving and investment. Situations of systemic corruption may fall within 
this framework for the analysis of political regimes, when, for instance, private companies’ interests 
influence the law and rule the administration of public resources (referred to as contexts of “state 
capture”, illustrated by so-called “banana republics” in the developing world), and/or when 
patrimonial forms of corruption govern interactions between individuals at all levels of the society.  
Thus, in a context of institutional failure, widespread corruption norms and practices may hence 
contribute to the predictability of economic behaviours and ensure the reciprocity in market and 
non-market exchanges (Graeff, 2005).  
Corruption as a corollary of market regulations 
New Institutional Economics look at corruption through a more normative analytical framework, the 
principal-agent theory. According to principal-agent models, corrupt transactions result from market 
failures and represent a source of economic distortion (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Banerjee, 1997; 
Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). This approach considers that a government (the principal) intervenes 
to correct market failures by charging potential self-interested bureaucrats (the agents) with the duty 
of achieving collective goals. By giving bureaucrats discretionary powers over citizens and various 
opportunities to require extra-payments, state interventions are often presented as a “burden” that 
public agents can unduly exploit for their personal gain.  
Corruption occurs when agents deviate from the laws, rules, procedures and codes established by the 
government to achieve an optimal allocation of public goods (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Banerjee, 
1997). According to Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), when market failures justify state interventions (in 
forms of taxes and subsidies) and when public agents are corruptible, a certain amount of corruption 
may be a second-best optimum, since preventing all corruption would be too costly for governments 
(see also Banerjee, 1997). According to these studies, corruption is a problem of optimal control that 
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generates an overwhelming bureaucracy, excessive public wages, and a misallocation of the most 
productive economic agents.  
Limits of the analysis of corruption proposed by the agency theory have been pointed out by 
Lambsdorff (2002). The author stresses that the principal is not necessarily a welfare-maximiser, and 
does not have an absolute control over rules, incentives, and penalties governing agents’ behaviours. 
As an illustration, this framework may fail to explain political corruption and the capture of the state 
by private entities, that is, when the regulatory framework set and enforced by the government 
reflects the private interests of influential groups. 
The rent-seeking theory addresses this issue by providing a framework for the analysis of corruption 
from a welfare perspective. According to this approach, corruption refers to a set of expenditures 
aimed at influencing the distribution of resources through rent appropriation (Bhagwati, 1982; 
Lambsdorff, 2002). In this regard, Krueger (1974, p.291), cited in Drazen (2000, p.335), stresses that 
“[…] in many market-oriented economies, government restrictions upon economic activity are 
pervasive facts of life. These restrictions give rise to rents of a variety of forms, and people often 
compete for the rents. Sometimes, such competition is perfectly legal. In other instances, rent 
seeking takes other forms, such as bribery, corruption, smuggling and black markets.” 
According to Lambsdorff (2002), corruption is an illegal rent-seeking activity undertaken by 
economic agents to i) influence public regulations and thereby increasing the number and size of 
public rents (e.g. by supporting regulations restraining domestic competition in the telecom sector), 
and to ii) take control over them (e.g. to be awarded a telecom license). In this setting, corruption is 
likely to induce huge amounts of unproductive spending and foster inefficient political actions. It 
therefore represents a deviation from socially optimal solutions (Lambsdorff, 2002). 
Corruption as an investment 
From a welfare perspective, the rent-seeking theory presents corruption as an unproductive, even 
counterproductive, investment aimed at siphoning public resources into the pockets of a handful of 
private interests. However, some business studies see corruption as a productive investment. 
Speaking of firms’ inclination to bribery and other corruption offences, Martin et al. (2007, p.1403-
1404) state that 
“[…] beyond the dismantling of individual normative controls in the face of institutional barriers, 
normlessness may permeate the social structure of firms, exerting pressure on them to engage in 
nonconforming rather than conforming behaviour to achieve performance goals […] In anomic 
organizational contexts, pressure exists to take any path that leads to the achievement of 
performance goals, regardless of its acceptability or legitimacy. For these firms, bribery can be a path 
to the achievement of important goals.” 
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When the body of formal laws, rules and codes that are supposed to govern economics exchanges are 
failing, bribe payments made by firms represent key productive decisions with noticeable 
consequences on firms’ performances. This dimension of corrupt transactions is also outlined by 
studies on the effects of cultural orientations on corrupt schemes, which stress that business 
corruption may increase when other resources get scarce (Robertson and Watson, 2004), or that 
corrupt strategies find a fertile ground in cultures where the fear of uncertainty is stronger (Husted, 
1999; Søreide, 2009).  
 
These three nested dimensions of corruption – corruption as an institutional arrangement, a corollary 
of market regulations, and an investment – can all be inferred from Olson’s analysis of political 
regimes, when he points that,  
“the gigantic increase in output that normally arises from the provision of a peaceful order and 
other public goods gives the stationary bandit a far larger take than he could obtain without 
providing government.” 
Interestingly, when legal formal and informal safety net mechanisms are failing, corruption payments 
may be considered as key productive decisions, in so far as they can provide a stable or “peaceful” 
economic order. In a context of financial market imperfections, bribes can indeed be paid to alleviate 
the tax burden during adverse shocks, or to win long-term public contracts when future revenues are 
uncertain. Thus, in Olson’s words, we examine in this thesis the circumstances under which corrupt 
agents may move from simple ‘roving bandits’, who take advantage of any opportunity to unduly 
enrich, to ‘stationary bandits’, who engage in corrupt transactions to protect against economic 
fluctuations and to maintain their income stable. 
Thesis outline 
Building on the literature of the macro and micro consequences of economic fluctuations on 
households’ production and consumption decisions, we investigate the effects of export instability on 
corruption incidence. We emphasise the effects of instability in the constant value of export earnings, 
because exports are a major cause of a country’s economic vulnerability: on the one hand, it is an 
important and mostly-external source of output fluctuations, and on the other hand, it has severe 
destabilizing effects on trade, tax, and redistribution policy (Guillaumont, 2009; Jones and Olken, 
2010; Easterly et al., 1993; Bevan et al., 1993). This thesis, which includes four chapters, addresses the 
following three arrays of questions: 
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1. Where do we stand in the understanding of corruption incidence? What are the different 
typologies of corrupt acts? How do we measure corruption levels? (Chapter 1) 
2. What are the causes and consequences of output instability? How and to what extent does export 
instability contribute to economic vulnerability? What are the methods available for the 
measurement of export instability? (Chapters 2, and 3) 
3. How does corruption respond to export fluctuations? What are the mechanisms involved? 
(Chapter 4) 
Chapter 1: Insights into the emergence and incidence of corruption around the world 
Chapter 1 provides updated background knowledge on the conditions of emergence and prevalence 
of corruption. An extensive literature review is proposed, illustrated by a simple empirical analysis 
and some explicatory operational highlights. Many inputs of this chapter have been drawn from 
contributions made to a background paper prepared with Muzong Wanda Kodi for the European 
Commission (Europeaid, 2011). Thus, while arguments expounded are based upon a wide range of 
theoretical and empirical research materials, we sometimes illustrate them by providing operational 
highlights on specific corruption problems (e.g. risks of corruption in the procurement process) and 
anti-corruption strategies (e.g. anti-corruption virtues of public finance management reforms). 
First, different approaches to defining corruption and various typologies of public sector corruption 
are emphasised. We stress that the diversity of corruption definitions is reflected into the various 
approaches of measuring and assessing it. In this regard, the main organizations combating 
corruption and a number of academic scholars have developed over the last few years a wide range of 
measurement tools, which allow them to assess the extent of corruption at a given time, to identify 
areas that need remedial action and also to draw international comparisons.  
In a second stage, we provide an overview of corruption incidence in the public sector. We present 
the principal-agent framework, which is a very popular analytical framework explaining the 
mechanisms underlying corruption in the public sector. According to this framework, agent’s 
incentives for corruption are encouraged by opportunities for corrupt acts and discouraged by the 
presence of effective accountability mechanisms, so that corrupt deals result from a rational 
reasoning based upon the expected benefits and costs of corrupt acts. Based on this framework, we 
highlight country characteristics expected to influence corruption incidence, and provide illustrative 
empirical evidence of key corruption determinants.  
In a third stage, we address the private side of corruption by identifying its specific forms, causes and 
contexts of emergence. We stress the importance of norms of honesty and ethics in supporting good 
corporate governance within a given society.  
General introduction 
Page | 7  
This leads us to emphasise in a final stage cultural and anthropological factors explaining the 
pervasiveness and persistence of corruption in certain countries. We addressed how social capital, 
cultural orientations and the organization of powers that prevail in some societies may maintain them 
in a long-lasting state of impunity and widespread corruption.  
Chapter 2: Measuring export instability, applications to export revenue data, 1970-2008. 
Since 40 years, macro and microeconomic analyses of the causes and consequences of 
macroeconomic instability has greatly deepened our understanding of the handicaps faced by 
developing countries. This concern for economic instability is evidenced by the broad spectrum of 
indicators used by the literature. This second chapter provides an extensive review and a comparative 
analysis of usual macroeconomic instability measurements.  
The literature on economic instability uses a great range of instability indicators, based on the 
deviation of observed values of a given economic aggregate from a reference or trend value. 
Computational methods therefore vary according to the choice of said reference value and the ways 
in which deviations from it are summed. In general, there is little discussion on the choice of 
indicators, in particular on the trend computation method, advocating that the resulting instability 
indicators are closely correlated. Using export revenue data for 134 countries from 1970 to 2005, we 
find that this assertion may be true for variance-based indicators, measuring the average magnitude of 
deviations from the trend. However, we stress that great discrepancies arise between trend 
computation methods when one pays attention to the asymmetry or the occurrence of extreme 
deviations in a variable’s distribution around its trend. Thus, our purpose is to invite further 
discussions regarding the use of these indicators, and to consider other aspects of instability, namely 
the asymmetry of fluctuations and the occurrence of abrupt shocks. 
Chapter 3: Building a retrospective Economic Vulnerability Index, construction and 
analysis of annual series 
Following up on the previous chapter, the third chapter exposes the building and the analysis of a 
retrospective economic vulnerability index (EVI). The Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) is a 
composite index set up and applied by the United Nations Committee for Development Policy 
(UNCDP) since 2000 as a criterion for identifying the Least-Developed Countries (LDCs). This 
index reflects the risk for a country of seeing its development hampered by natural and trade shocks. 
Because a retrospective assessment of economic vulnerability was needed for research and policy 
purposes, we calculate a retrospective EVI on a yearly basis, covering 128 developing countries from 
1975 to 2008.  
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EVI scores proposed by the CDP 2009 and former reviews cannot be used to make intertemporal 
comparison of vulnerability levels. In fact, these reviews provide a “snapshot” of economic 
vulnerability around the world based on past available data on countries’ history of shocks and 
exposure to them. For a EVI retrospective calculation, one requirement was to meet with accuracy 
the method followed by the CDP in its 2009 review, while providing vulnerability scores comparable 
over time and across countries.  
We find a strong 94% rank correlation between scores of the UNCDP 2009 review and scores of the 
retrospective EVI in 2006. Calculation periods of components of the retrospective EVI in 2006 are 
indeed the closest to those of the 2009 review. According to this new retrospective index, 
vulnerability in developing countries slightly declined over the 1987-2008 period, but less rapidly in 
Low-Income and Least-Developed Countries (LICs and LDCs). A further analysis of trends in EVI 
components stresses that the export instability component is the greatest driver of time variations in 
vulnerability scores.  
Chapter 4: When corruption is a response to export instability 
The fourth chapter builds on previous chapters to examine empirically the effects of export 
instability on corruption. Considering that corruption strategies can be undertaken by economic 
agents to protect against fluctuations in their income, we assume that export instability may have ex 
ante and ex post effects on corruption. Regarding the ex post effects of instability on corruption, i.e. the 
effect of instability through agents’ experience of shocks, we invoke two main corruption responses, 
acting in opposite ways:  
• “opportunistic corruption”, which feeds on the mechanical ups and downs in opportunities for 
corruption following ups and downs in economic activity; and  
• “survival corruption”, which spreads when resources become scarcer and when formal and 
informal risk coping mechanisms cannot fully absorb economic shocks.  
As for the ex ante effect of instability on corruption, i.e. the effect of instability through agents’ 
perception of shocks, we draw a parallel between corruption strategies and risk-management strategies 
aimed at reducing the risk in the income process. In this regard, we posit that agents perceiving their 
economic environment as unstable may engage in “resource-locking” corrupt transactions, which 
consist in reducing ex ante the variance of their income by securing future resource inflows through 
bribery.  
We conduct empirical estimations of the ex ante and ex post effects of export instability by respectively 
using measures based on the 16-year rolling standard deviation and the 6-year rolling skewness of the 
distribution of exports around a 16-year rolling mixed trend. We expect the long-run standard 
deviation of exports to reflect perceptions of export instability, and the short-run skewness of 
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exports to reflect a country experience of shocks. Ex ante and ex post effects of instability are tested 
on two corruption datasets: i) panel data on corruption perceptions from the International Country 
Risk Guide, covering 68 countries over the period 1985 to 2005; and ii) cross-sectional data on firms’ 
informal payments from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, covering more than 9000 firms 
clustered in 23 countries.  
Despite dissimilarities between perception-based and experienced-based indicators of corruption, and 
in spite of sample differences between macro and micro corruption datasets, we find robust, 
nonlinear but opposite ex post and ex ante effects of export instability on corruption, both depending 
on the frequency and size of export fluctuations. On the one hand, export instability is found to have 
a deterrent ex post effect on corruption when fluctuations are moderate and frequent, and a boosting 
ex post effect when fluctuations are large and infrequent. On the other hand, we find evidence of a 
strong, significant and robust boosting ex ante effect of instability on corruption when export 
instability is perceived as “normal” (resulting from moderate and frequent fluctuations). Evidence of 
a deterrent ex ante effect of perceptions of “abnormal” instability (resulting from large and infrequent 
fluctuations) is also found but should be taken with caution. Finally, we highlighted that the liquidity 
constraint is a key channel for the direction of both ex post and ex ante effects of instability on 
corruption: when it hardens export instability is found to increase corruption; while when it softens, 
export instability is found to decrease it. 
Thus, by addressing the modalities by which export fluctuations affect corruption levels, this chapter 
hopefully opens new rooms for anti-corruption policies. First, our findings point out the damaging 
institutional effects of export instability in fragile states, since corrupt strategies may spread as a 
substitute for imperfect financial markets and/or a low state resilience to external fluctuations. We 
provide an additional argument in support to the reinforcement of state capacity for mitigating the 
consequences of shocks and policies lowering country’s exposure to them. Moreover, improving 
access to formal and informal financial markets should yield important anti-corruption outcomes, 
since the liquidity constraint appears in our estimations as a key determinant of the direction of the ex 
post and ex ante effects of export instability upon corrupt transactions. Finally, evidence of boosting ex 
post and ex ante effects of export instability on corruption strategies highlights the role played by 
external factors of output stability, such as aid and remittances (Guillaumont and Le Goff, 2010; 
Guillaumont, 2005), in improving the quality of governance. 
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Chapter 1  
Insights into the emergence and incidence of 
corruption around the world1 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
It is widely believed that corruption is a major obstacle to the achievement of the 2015 Millennium 
Development Goals, and that more intensified anti-corruption efforts are needed for various 
developing countries to move out of a low-level development trap. The body of evidence collected 
over the last two decades by various researchers, institutions, and non-state actors reveals that not 
only corruption hinders the growth process, but it also represents a critical impediment to the 
democracy, the rule of law and the respect of human rights.  
Corruption is a symptom of dysfunctional governance and weak institutions. In fact, resources that 
are meant to address the basic needs of millions of poor people around the world are diverted for 
the private gains of a handful of politicians, corrupt officials, and private companies. A great deal of 
work has been undertaken by researchers, governments and donor agencies with the purpose of 
building up state capacities for combating public and private malpractices worldwide. International 
efforts against corruption have therefore been devoted to support key sectors expected to yield 
anti-corruption outcomes, such as the justice and the democratization process, the public 
administration and the management of public finances, the decentralization process, or the capacity 
of non-state actors. 
                                                          
1 Many components of this chapter have been drawn and adapted from my contributions to a background paper prepared 
with Muzong Kodi for the European Commission, DG Europeaid. This paper has been used as a major input to the 
European Commission anti-corruption concept paper: Europeaid (2011) “Supporting Anti-Corruption Reform in 
Partner Countries” Europeaid Tools and Methods Series, Concept Paper N°2, European Commission. 
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This introductory chapter is a modest contribution to these efforts, as it examines crucial 
dimensions of corruption and provides analytical tools for the understanding of corruption 
prevalence and persistence. It reviews some key aspects of corruption which have been widely 
documented by the literature – e.g. its many forms, its theoretical foundations, and country 
characteristics explaining the extent of public sector corruption – and relates them to other 
significant issues which are far less documented – notably, the private side of corruption and the 
anthropological foundations of corruption prevalence. Arguments developed along this chapter are 
supported by an extensive and updated literature review, illustrated by various empirical evidence 
and highlights on operational corruption issues. 
In the next section, we propose a critical analysis of the definitions and measurements of 
corruption. We emphasise in section 3 how corruption manifests in some key areas of public action 
and how it flourishes within the scope of private transactions. We then highlight in section 4 the 
contribution of social capital to corrupt exchanges, and underline cultural orientations and 
institutional schemes that are expected to foster pervasive and systemic corruption. Section 5 
concludes.  
2. Definitions and measurements of corruption 
Defining corruption is a complex task because of its multidimensional nature. The legal approach 
to defining corruption places the emphasis on individual responsibility in corruption affairs, with 
the explicit goal of punishing corrupt acts. Before prosecuting and condemning individuals 
involved in corrupt transactions, legal systems must provide precise definitions of corruption 
offences – by stating the nature, scope and meaning of corrupt acts – so that individuals are aware 
of and able to foresee prohibited acts.2  
The socio-economic approach to defining corruption, presented along this section, differs from the 
legal approach in that it develops tools and concepts for the analysis of corruption prevalence, and 
delimits scopes for anti-corruption policies. It also provides a basis for the measurement and 
assessment of corruption at international, national, and sector levels.  
2.1. The socio-economic approach to defining corruption 
The socio-economic approach of corruption, illustrated by the principal-agent theory, considers 
corrupt acts as the result of individual rational decisions. Socio-economic definitions of corruption 
usually refer to the motivation for engaging in corruption, the nature of powers giving individual 
opportunities for corrupt transactions, and sometimes the modus operandi of corrupt actors.  
                                                          
2  National legal frameworks must follow the principle, incorporated into international criminal law, stating that “no 
crime, no punishment without a previous law”.  
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Let us begin with an interesting socio-economic definition of corruption, proposed by Tanzi (1998, 
p.564). According to him, corruption is 
 “the intentional non-compliance with the arm’s-length principle aimed at deriving 
some advantage for oneself or for related individuals from this behaviour”.  
This definition of corruption considers three necessary conditions for corrupt acts to be treated as 
such. The first refers to the arm’s length principle, which states that personal or other relationships 
should play no part in economic decisions involving more than one party. Any bias towards 
particular economic agents would violate this principle. The second condition requires that this bias 
must be intentional. And the third condition implies that there must be some advantages for at least 
one party in violating intentionally the arm’s length principle. 
Another set of narrower definitions focuses on public sector corruption. For instance, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993, p.599) provide a very popular definition of corruption, which is 
“the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain”. 
This definition refers to the modus operandi – a pecuniary transaction –, the location of power – an 
agent of the public sector –, and the motivation underlying corrupt acts – a personal gain. In the 
same vein, the World Bank’s definition of corruption extends public sector corruption to non-
pecuniary transactions by referring to 
“the abuse of public office for private gain”. 
This definition is very similar to that proposed by Shleifer and Vishny, the only difference being 
that it also refers to non-pecuniary abuses of public office – such as favouritism or influence 
peddling – or illegal acts which do not necessarily involve more than one party – such as theft, 
fraud, forgery or embezzlement (annex 1.A proposes definitions of these corrupt offences).  
The United Nations Development Program further specifies the modus operandi of public agents, by 
defining corruption as  
“the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit – through 
bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or 
embezzlement”.  
By ignoring the private side of corruption, previous definitions do not consider private corrupt 
transactions like, for instance, corporate fraud, tax evasion, or the bribery of foreign officials by 
domestic private companies. Transparency International’s (2009b, p.24) definition of corruption,   
“the misuse of entrusted power for private gain”, 
circumvents this drawback by referring to any legitimate formal authority, either public or private. 
Chapter 1 – Insights into the emergence and incidence of corruption 
Page | 14  
The above definitions present two main weaknesses. First, they only focus on acts of corruption 
committed by individuals motivated by “private gain”, and ignore holistic causes of corruption. 
Second, socio-economic definitions of corruption generally limit their scope to formal 
manifestations of authority, whereas corruption can also be considered as a deviation from deep-
rooted customs or social norms (Andvig, 2006).  
This issue has been considered by the Norwegian development agency, the Norad (2008, p.11), 
which defines corruption as:  
“the abuse of entrusted authority for illicit gain”. 
The term “entrusted authority” refers to formal and informal manifestations of power, thus 
encompassing individual as well as systemic corruption under neo-patrimonial states and state 
capture (see section 4). The term “illicit” indicates that all corrupt acts are not necessarily illegal, 
and that corruption may also arise when transactions are in contradiction with morals, customs or 
other informal rules. For instance, in former soviet countries, newly introduced but formerly 
prohibited Market Economy’s mechanisms were perceived by the population as corrupt, while 
persistent old practices, inherited from the soviet system, were not (Andvig, 2006). Another 
example is when private groups or political elites manipulate formal laws and rules for rent 
appropriation motives. Thus, in a context of ‘state capture’ by private interests, corruption may 
flourish within the framework of the law (Kodi, 2008).  
As for the term “abuse”, it refers to a personal outcome, thereby ignoring that corruption is not 
necessarily individually-driven but may depend on how well-accepted or legitimized are 
coordination modes within a community. Andvig (2006, p.329) takes into account this limit and 
defines corruption as a deviation from norms of behaviours prevailing in a group of individuals: 
“[Corruption is] a set of transactions that involve a member of a body or an 
organization and a non-member that for some reason is considered illegitimate” 
According to this definition, corruption is an exchange between one “insider” and one “outsider” 
which is perceived by other “insiders” as illegitimate. This definition makes corruption a relative 
and inconstant notion, since individuals may belong to different groups based on different ties 
(friendship, ethnicity, citizenship, etc.).  
Finally, Baker et al. (2008) propose a definition of corruption, which embraces many aspects 
addressed before: 
“Corruption is the abuse of public interest and the undermining of public 
confidence in the integrity of rules, systems and institutions that promote the 
public interest.”  
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Baker et al. (2008) not only focus on individual aspects driving corruption, but also emphasises 
systems, processes, and consequences of corrupt acts. This definition does not strictly restrain the 
consequences of corruption to pure monetary losses, but also refers to its negative effects on public 
confidence and institution building.  
Now that we grasp the very blurring of frontiers between honesty and corruption, we logically 
address in the next sub-section a related challenging issue, that is, the measurement of corruption. 
2.2. Measuring corruption3 
Measuring corruption is a complicated task, first, because of the secretive nature, the many 
definitions and the various forms of corrupt acts; and second, because of the multiple existing 
approaches to measure it, reflecting a variety of scopes for anti-corruption interventions and 
academic research.  
Corruption measurement tools’ overall objective is to inform efforts to analyse and combat 
corruption, by documenting the following areas of analysis: 
 Transnational benchmarking: identifying relative changes in corruption prevalence over time and 
between countries.  
 Diagnosis: understanding country most important drivers of corruption and identifying sources 
of bottlenecks for anti-corruption reforms; 
 Capacity gaps: identifying capacity gaps in the areas of institution building, institutional 
development and strengthening, human resource development, and public resources 
management/administration; 
 Monitoring: assessing the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms and monitoring the 
implementation of anti-corruption strategies, as well as anti-corruption international legal 
frameworks; 
 Costs assessment: understanding and, when possible, quantifying the impact of corruption on 
service delivery, businesses, and social welfare. 
To achieve these sub-objectives, several measurement tools are available to analysts, who can 
combine them to draw a global and comprehensive picture of corruption in a given country.  
It is first important to understand the distinction made between corruption indicators and corruption 
assessment tools:  
                                                          
3 This sub-section is based on the UNDP (2008)’s user guide to measuring corruption, as well as inputs provided by the 
European Commission. 
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“[While indicators of corruption] point out something about the state of governance or a 
about a particular aspect of corruption in a country, [an assessment tool] is a broader 
contextual analysis of the state and drivers of corruption, often relying on multiple 
indicators of corruption”.4  
Some assessment tools also propose a global or partial evaluation of a country anti-corruption 
framework, by focusing on aspects of country systems which are expected to be strong corruption 
deterrents. 
Second, as corruption flourishes in the secrecy, it cannot be measured accurately by simply looking 
at objective measures, such as court verdicts, unpaid parking tickets (Fisman and Miguel, 2007), or 
leakages in public service delivery (Gauthier and Reinikka, 2007) and in infrastructure projects 
(Olken, 2007, 2009); nor by only using subjective measures, based on perceptions or experiences of 
corruption. Another difficulty in measuring corruption is the fact that acts as different as excessive 
hospitality between representatives of private firms, petty bribery of health officials or nepotism 
among the highest levels of government fall together under the (many) definitions of corruption. 
Thus, given the complexity of this phenomenon, one should be aware that a single and definitive 
measurement of corruption does not exist.  
2.2.1. Subjective versus objective indicators of corruption 
The most well-known method of measuring corruption is to enquire about subjective opinions and 
perceptions of corruption in a given country. Some of enquiries have targeted the wider public (e.g. the 
Global Corruption Barometer5) and different kinds of experts and surveys (Bribe Payer Index6, 
Worldwide Governance Indicators…). Another similar approach is to enquire about the experience of 
corruption. These surveys, also be called ‘victim studies’, often provide a quantitative assessment of 
the burden of corruption, by for instance enquiring about the annual amount or share of informal 
payment paid by a standard enterprise or a household (e.g. the World Bank Enterprise Surveys7, 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys8, or the UNODC International Crime 
Victim Surveys9).  
These indicators are pretty convenient to make international comparisons of national corruption 
scores, but they cannot be considered as an objective measure of actual corruption levels. First, 
                                                          
4 The United Nations Development Program, “A User Guide to Measuring Corruption”, the United Nations 
Development Program and Global Integrity, September 2008, p.5. 
5 http://www.transparency.org/research/gcb/  
6 http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/  
7 http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/  
8 http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/surveys/beeps.shtml  
9 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/Crime-Victims-Survey.html  
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given the secret and illicit nature of corrupt acts, respondents are usually reticent to openly discuss 
it. As a consequence, they are likely to underreport it, or even provide false responses (Olken, 2009; 
Jensen et al. 2010). In a comparison between Indonesian villagers’ perceptions of corruption and 
actual amounts of missing expenditure in a road-building project, Olken (2009) stresses that 
perceptions of villagers were somewhat underreported as local officials were inflating project inputs 
to hide dubious leakages of expenditure. The author also shows that high perceptions of corruption 
may lead to increased monitoring of behaviours which may reduce objective corruption levels. 
Second, there is a tendency for perceptions of corruption to persist over time, or conversely, to be 
influenced by transitory events not directly related to corruption prevalence, such as the business 
climate (Kaplan and Pathania, 2010). For these reasons, perception-based corruption indicators do 
not properly capture actual changes in the incidence of corruption. 
Some studies provide objective measures of corruption prevalence based on estimations of public 
resource leakages in specific areas of public interventions (e.g. extractive industries, infrastructure 
projects, and health or education sectors). One well-known contribution is that made by Olken 
(2007, 2009) who resorts to a team of engineers and surveyors to estimate actual road projects’ cost 
and compare it to official projects’ cost reported in Indonesian villages. The gap between the two 
costs therefore corresponds to stolen funds. Another study conducted by Gauthier and Zeufack 
(2009) estimates the oil rent captured by the Cameroon’s government between 1977 and 2006 and 
the proportion of this oil revenue “saved” abroad, the latter being an estimation of the share of oil 
revenue stolen by the government. Survey instruments have also been developed by the World 
Bank to gather information on public service delivery systems and performances (Gauthier and 
Reinikka, 2007). One of these surveys, the Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS), is a useful 
tool which tracks the flow of public resources in a given sector (such as health or education) 
through all the layers of the bureaucracy, with the purpose of establishing how much of the original 
earmarked amount reaches each of these levels and their intended final beneficiaries.10 Another 
tool, the Quantitative Service Delivery Survey (QSDS), is also used to assess the efficiency of public 
spending, incentives and various qualitative aspects of service delivery. Because PETS and QSDS 
can bring together data on inputs, outputs, user charges, quality, and other characteristics directly 
from the service-providing unit, more can be learned about the way public spending is transformed 
into public goods and services. Obviously, it is worth keeping in mind that evidence-based data on 
corruption are i) partial as they reflect the extent of corruption in particular areas of public 
interventions, ii) are subject to measurement errors, and iii) are not free from subjective 
interpretation from surveyors and researchers. 
                                                          
10 See Gauthier and Reinikka (2007) for an overview of the methodological approaches of assessing public service delivery 
efficiency. 
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2.2.2. Composite versus single-source indicators of corruption 
Limitations of the above corruption indicators also reflect a lack of consensus on corruption 
definitions. In this regard, using composite indexes of perceptions and experiences of corruption, made 
up of various data sources encompassing distinct dimensions of corruption, is convenient because 
it encapsulate many facets of corrupt deals. According to the UNDP, a composite indicator  
“…or aggregate indicator is one which combines different measures of a similar thing 
into a single measure”.11  
These tools are often a combination of corruption-related concepts, such as ‘bribery’, ‘governance’, 
‘democracy’, ‘transparency’ or ‘accountability’. It is worth noting that composite indexes with 
similar labels may measure distinct aspects of corruption, reflecting different scopes, units of 
analysis, or methodologies. For instance, in 2007, fourteen sources were used to compute the 
Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International), while twenty-five sources were used to 
create the Control of Corruption indicator (World Bank). The same confusion arises when 
comparing composite indexes with single-source and/or country specific indicators since, contrary to the 
former, the latter usually provide more contextualized information. Thus, the logical drawback of 
composite indicators is their lack of precision regarding what is actually measured, which is less the 
case of single-source database (e.g. the International Country Risk Guide, which provides a measure 
of country perceived risks of corruption for investors). 
2.2.3. Disaggregated and targeted indicators of corruption 
Disaggregated indicators reflect a heterogeneous picture of the experience/perception/impact of 
corruption among the population, considering that marginalized groups may experience or perceive 
corruption differently. For instance, ‘pro-poor indicators’ differentiate experiences and perceptions of 
corruption according to different income levels, while ‘gender sensitive indicators’ distinguish corruption 
perceptions and experiences by gender. 
As disaggregated indicators do not take into account elements of anti-corruption frameworks which 
are of importance for specific social groups, it may by insightful to combine disaggregated 
indicators with targeted indicators. Targeted indicators indeed address specific corruption issues in a given 
category of the population. They may explicitly refer to the social group – by for instance specifying 
the number of cases implying female victims of corruption prosecuted in courts –, or may be 
implicitly relevant for these groups – by for instance looking at the incidence of corruption in 
                                                          
11 The United Nations Development Program, “A User Guide to Measuring Corruption”, The United Nations 
Development Program and Global Integrity, September 2008, p.6. 
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public agencies of particular relevance to women, such as public free school or public water utilities 
in rural areas.12 
2.2.4. Anti-corruption framework assessments 
Apart from the survey-type of studies on corruption building on perceptions or experiences, a 
complementary approach is to assess the ability of a state, institutions and sectors to prevent or 
curb corruption. These measurement tools are not aimed at measuring the level of corruption, but 
rather at assessing State/institutions/sectors’ ability to prevent or combat corruption. These 
measures include integrity indicators, as opposed to corruption indicators, which reveal country 
resistance to corruption and/or capacity to combat it. Some integrity indicators look at these issues 
holistically within a country (National Integrity Survey13), others look at the quality of the 
administrative/legal anti-corruption frameworks (UNCAC gap analyses14), or focus on specific 
corruption deterrents, such as financial accountability in public finances (Public Expenditure 
Financial Accountability methodology15 or Country Financial Accountability Assessment16) or the 
quality of national procurement systems (Country Procurement Assessment Reviews17 or OECD-
MAPS18). In addition, Political economy analytical tools are indispensable to conduct an in-depth analysis 
of how concrete positive changes in corruption prevalence can be reached, by examining country 
structural features, political systems and institutions that could drive improvements in governance 
quality19 (see DFID’s Drivers of Change, SIDA’s Power Analysis).  
2.2.5. Input/de jure versus output/de facto indicators 
Finally, it can also be useful to combine input/de jure corruption indicators with output/de facto indicators. 
Such an approach allows the identification of gaps between the quality of formal institutions and 
actual governance’s deliverables. Indeed, improvements in anti-corruption institutions may not 
materialize systematically into lesser corruption, because of possible bottlenecks or delays in the 
concretization of anti-corruption outcomes. As an illustration, improvements in the anti-corruption 
legal framework – ‘the input’ measured by, for example, the degree of implementation of the 
                                                          
12 See the UNDP Framework for Selecting Pro-poor and Gender Sensitive Governance Indicators, available at: 
http://gaportal.org/sites/default/files/Framework%20paper%20-%20entire%20paper.pdf  
13  Available at: http://gaportal.org/country-initiatives  
14 Examples of  UNCAC gap analyses undertaken in East Asia and Pacific countries can be found at: 
http://go.worldbank.org/0SJ5N0NBL0  
15  http://www.pefa.org/  
16  http://go.worldbank.org/M3MCU5ZHT0  
17  http://go.worldbank.org/RZ7CHIRF60 
18 See the OECD, Methodology for assessing procurement systems (MAPS), February 2010. Available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/33/45181522.pdf  
19  The EC reference document on analysing and addressing governance in sector operations is available at: 
http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/analysing-and-addressing-governance-sector-operations  
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UNCAC – may not result in actual positive change if corrupt behaviours are not investigated, 
prosecuted and sanctioned – ‘the output’ measured by, for example, the number of corruption 
brought to trial. Similarly, perceptions of corruption, which may be seen as an output of the anti-
corruption framework, may lag behind anti-corruption reforms. 
2.3. Concluding remarks 
In this section, we provided a general overview of corruption definitions as well as a typology of 
corruption measurement tools. It appeared that the wide array of measurement tools reflects the 
multifaceted nature of corruption and the difficulty to give precise definitions of it. In fact, 
corruption is a global long-lasting phenomenon but inconstant in its appreciation, so that measures 
aimed at making international and inter-temporal comparisons are necessarily imprecise and/or 
incomplete. It is nevertheless possible for researchers and analysts wishing to measure accurately 
the level of corruption in a specific country at a particular point in time, to combine corruption 
measurement tools in a way that allows a precise representation of corruption prevalence. Notably, 
the incidence of corruption at country or sector levels can be reliably approximated by 
complementing “numbers” produced by global indicators with contextual tools (using for isntance 
political economy analysis tools and holistic assessment tools) and tools focusing on certain 
determinants of corruption (procurement systems, accountability mechanisms, rules of 
transparency, etc.).  
Box No.1. Corruption indicators: UNDP definitions. 
Corruption indicator: refers to discrete, often quantitative, measurements of a particular aspect of corruption 
(including the level of corruption). 
Objective indicator: indicator constructed from undisputed facts, e.g. the existence of anti-corruption laws or the 
funding received by the national anti-corruption agency. 
Composite indicator: indicator combining different measures of a similar thing into a single measure. 
Perception-based indicator: indicator based on the opinions and perceptions of corruption in a given country 
among experts and citizens. 
Experience-based indicators: indicators measuring citizens’ and firms’ actual experience with corruption. 
Proxy indicators: indicators assessing corruption indirectly by aggregating symptoms and signals of corruption, 
or by measuring its opposite, that is, anti-corruption, good governance, political competition, public accountability 
mechanisms, etc. 
Pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators: pro-poor indicators focus on population living in poverty while 
gender sensitive indicators reveal women’s experience of corruption. 
Input-based/de jure indicator: Indicators measuring the existence and the quality of de jure anti-corruption 
institutions, rules and procedures. 
Output-based/de facto indicators: Indicators measuring the impact of corruption on the quality of life and public 
service delivery. Such indicators measure de facto outcomes of the governance system, often through proxy 
measures.  
Source: The United Nations Development Program, “A User Guide to Measuring Corruption”, The United Nations Development 
Program and Global Integrity, September 2008, p.7, 9, 14. 
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3. Main patterns of corruption  
Although corruption is perceived differently from a place to another and feeds on heterogeneous 
environments, regular patterns of public and private sector corruption emergence and incidence 
have been highlighted. The purpose of this section is to improve the economic understanding of 
corruption prevalence in both public and private sectors.  
3.1. The demand side of corruption: public sector issues 
It is common to analyse corruption in the public sector within the framework of the principal-agent 
theory, provided by the New Institutional Economics. From this framework, it is possible to 
represent public agents’ decisions to engage in corruption as the result of a cost-benefit analysis.  
We then emphasise some regular features of developed and developing countries expected to affect 
these costs and benefits, and thereby the incidence of public sector corruption in these countries.  
3.1.1. A theoretical explanation of public sector corruption: the principal-agent theory 
Public sector corruption has been widely explained through the lens of the principal-agent models. 
According to the principal-agent theory, public sector corruption results from the interaction of 
three types of actors, persons or abstract entities:  
• the one who governs, called the principal;  
• another who is governed, i.e. who acts on behalf of the principal, called the agent; and  
• a third party who stands “to gain or lose by the action of the agent”.20  
Agency problems arise in a context of incomplete information and when the agent and the principal 
pursue diverging or antagonist goals (Banerjee, 1997; Drazen, 2000). In fact, agent’s private 
interests may be in contradiction with the task he has been contracted for. In a context of perfect 
information, the agent has no incentives to misbehave, since in this case, he would inevitably be 
detected and sanctioned by the principal. In a context of imperfect information, agent’s 
characteristics or actions cannot be perfectly observed, so that the principal has to hold him 
accountable in some manner (see figure 1.1). The literature on agency problems identifies two main 
sources of imperfect information; the adverse selection (Akerloff, 1970) and the moral hazard (Shapiro 
and Stiglitz, 1984). The adverse selection occurs when the principal ignores agent’s inner 
characteristics. An example of adverse selection is when a minister (the principal) does not know if 
the public official (the agent) he is about to hire is honest or dishonest, because honesty is 
individual’s private information. And when bureaucrats’ remunerations are set according to average 
                                                          
20 Banfield, E.C. (1975), “Corruption as feature of governmental organization”, The Journal of Law and Economics, 
Vol.18,No.3, p.587.  
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staff performance, the presence of dishonest officials may lower the salaries, which in turn incites 
honest and performing employees not to apply for positions. As a result, only dishonest officials 
may join the public administration. The moral hazard occurs when the principal cannot perfectly 
observe the way agents behave. For instance, a fraudulent enterprise may lie to the central 
administration by not declaring workers, or public officials may accept undue informal payments 
not to do what they have been contracted for. 
Figure 1.1. Principal-agent relationship  
 
Source: author. 
 
The agency problem may apply to several contexts. The most popular one is when a benevolent 
government agency (the principal), which objective is to correct market failures, charges potentially 
money-maker or bribe-maker bureaucrats (the agent) with the duty of achieving collective goals 
(Banerjee, 1997, Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). In Banerjee’s (1997) theory of misgovernance, 
corruption arises from the government’s efforts to reduce wasteful red tape. In this setting, 
corruption occurs when agents deviate from the laws, rules, procedures and codes established by 
the government to achieve an optimal allocation of public goods (see also Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993). In a complementary approach, Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) stress that when market 
failures justify state interventions, a certain amount of corruption resulting from those interventions 
may be a ‘second-best’, since preventing all corruption would be too costly for governments.  
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Other theoretical models have refined the analysis by considering the opportunity for the principal 
to hire a supervisor or a regulatory agency charged with collecting information on the agent. These 
models, called ‘hierarchical agency models’ or ‘principal-agent-supervisor’ models (Tirole, 1986), 
examine interactions between three parties that are hierarchically tied. The supervisor is expected to 
reduce agent opportunities to misbehave by revealing to the principal hidden information on the 
agent’s type and/or actions. However, when supervisor’s interests diverge from those of the 
principal, there are additional opportunities for corruption between the agent and the supervisor. In 
this case, the latter may misreport information on the agent’s type/actions in exchange of extra-
payments (see figure 2). This model may be relevant, for instance, for explaining corruption in 
customs (Dequiedt et al., 2012; Yang, 2008). A government (the principal) seeking to use customs 
duties to fund public expenditures needs information on imports volume, value, and classification. 
Importers (the agent) benefit from an informational advantage since the government cannot 
perfectly check the veracity of their declarations. The government may hence delegate the task of 
controlling what enterprises have actually imported to the customs administration (the supervisor). 
However, the supervisor’s interests may not match with those of the principal, which leaves 
additional rooms for corrupt transactions, as illustrated in figure 1.2. Indeed, an enterprise may 
bribe a customs officer so that the latter underreports the value of its imports. Alternatively, a 
customs officer may extort money from an enterprise by threatening it to over-report the value its 
imports (Dutt and Traca, 2010). In this context, “supervisor of supervisor” structures charged with 
the supervision, inspection or gathering of information on supervisor’ acts, as it exists in the police 
and the custom sectors (Dequiedt et al., 2012, Yang, 2008), can be very conducive to reduce 
corruption. 
Agency models have been widely used to explain corruption in the public administration, but 
political corruption has also been explained in the light of the agency paradigm (Kunicova and 
Rose-Ackerman, 2005), when voters (the principal) entrust politicans (the agent) monopoly and 
discretionary powers over public resources. In these models, political corruption arises when 
politicians abuse their public positions to enrich, inasmuch such a misconduct does not jeopardize 
their chance of being re-elected. 
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Figure 1.2. The hierarchical agency model 
 
Source: author. 
 
The Cost-Benefit analysis 
The economic approach of corruption higlights a range of country characteristics that are likely to 
shape the incentives for agents entrusted with public responsibilities to engage in corrupt 
transactions: the price and scarcity of goods/services delivered by the government, the amount of 
maximum red tape afforded, the level of public sector salaries, the existence of democratic 
institutions, the degree of domestic and foreign competition, the degree of competition between 
and within government agencies, or the establishment of effective dissuasive 
detection/prosecution/sanction mechanisms. By asserting that the likelihood of engaging in 
corrupt activities depends on the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms implemented by the 
principal to get the agent act in the public interest, the principal-agent framework presupposes that 
corruption will take place if public officials expect to derive a net benefit from a corrupt 
transaction. Following Huther and Shah (2000), agents accept or refuse to engage in corruption if, 
and only if, the expected utility of engaging in corruption outweighs the utility of staying honest, i.e. 
when: 
(1 – p) × (w + n × b) + p × (w – s) > w + θ (1.1) 
where p is the probability of being caught and sanction, w is the wage rate in the public sector, s is 
the average penalty, b is the average bribe, n is the number of corrupt transactions, and Ө the agent 
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preference for honesty or the moral cost for corruption. From the regulator’s point of view, 
corruption increases if the expected benefit of corrupt transactions is positive, i.e. if the expected 
gain exceeds the expected cost of corruption. Thus, the dilemma in (1) can be rewritten as: 
Expected benefit = n × [(1 – p) × b] – [(p × s) – θ] > 0 (1.2) 
From this corruption equation can be derived four mechanisms by which corruption is expected to 
increase or decrease: 
• the number of opportunities for corruption transactions, n; 
• the average scope for gain from corrupt transactions, b; 
• the probability of getting caught, p; and 
• the moral and economic costs associated to corruption transactions, Ө and s respectively. 
For instance, complex administrative rules/procedures give corrupt public officials opportunities to 
requiring third parties extra-payments to get things going faster/easier. Similarly, higher tax rates 
allow tax officers to ask for higher amount of money when a third entity wants to evade taxation, 
which hence raise the expected gain obtained from corrupt transactions. Conversely, strong check 
and balances on corrupt acts are likely to increase the probability for corrupt officials of getting 
caught and punished; while, the intolerance of the public toward corruption, combined with severe 
legal/administrative sanctions and high public salaries, are likely to raise the moral and economic 
costs of engaging in corruption.  
From this rational microeconomic framework can be derived a general economic background for 
the analysis of the drivers underlying public agents’ decisions to engage in corruption. Drivers or 
deterrents of public sector corruption have been put in a simple equation by Klitgaard (1988), 
which assumes that factors influencing corruption are those reducing the number of corrupt 
transactions, limiting the scope for gains from each transaction, and increasing the penalty and the 
probability of paying it: 
Corruption (C) = Monopoly power (M) + Discretionary power (D) – Accountability (A) (1.3) 
From this formula, one can deduce that country characteristics and policies curbing corruption are 
those reducing the monopoly and discretionary powers of officials, and supporting accountability 
mechanisms. According to this schematic framework, enlarged state interventions and the lack of 
competition between and within public sector agencies may increase public agents’ monopoly power 
over public rents, hence shaping the size and number of opportunities for corrupt transactions. For 
instance, a heavy tax burden is likely to increase officials and taxpayers inclination to bypass 
taxation in exchange of illegal extra-payments or arrangements, while an increased competition 
Chapter 1 – Insights into the emergence and incidence of corruption 
Page | 26  
between agencies charged with granting business licenses may decrease the amount of extra 
payments expected by officials for this service.  
The number, complexity and blurriness of state regulations and procedures, as well as the 
delegation of strong responsibilities at different layers of the public administration may foster 
corrupt activities by increasing public official’s discretionary powers (Banerjee, 1997; UNODC, 2002). 
Indeed, complex or unclearly set laws and regulations create rooms for their misinterpretation in 
exchange of dubious extra payments. For instance, when laws do not explicitly and clearly define 
corruption offences, a judge may be prone to bribery or extortion for obliging judgments of legal 
cases.  
Finally, the moral, social, economic and legal costs for public officials to engage in corruption will 
strongly determine the accountability of politicians and public officials by encouraging an honest use 
of their position. These costs and constraints are supposed to be positively related to the 
transparency in political decisions and administration proceeding, adequate working conditions in 
the public sector, and the effectiveness and capacity of law enforcement institutions and watchdog 
entities (e.g. Supreme Audit Institutions, non-state actors, etc.). Potential factors or drivers of 
corruption in the public sector are more formally addressed in sub-section 3.1.2.  
Typologies of public sector corruption 
When monopoly and discretionary powers prevail over accountability mechanisms in the public 
sector, corrupt acts are likely to occur and may materialize in various forms and contexts. The 
UNODC (2002) and the European Commission (Europeaid, 2011) identify a range of corrupt 
practices that encompass acts of bribery, extortion, fraud, favouritism, embezzlement, or illegal 
political contributions (see Annex 1.A). Such corrupt acts may be classified into specific categories, 
sharing common features or feeding on similar contexts. Those typologies of public sector 
corruption have been widely addressed by the literature on corruption and anti-corruption practices 
and generally refer to: 
• the scale of corrupt transactions, by opposing petty to grand corruption (Europeaid, 2011). Petty 
corruption involves small sums and low-level officials, while grand corruption refers to 
substantial amounts of money and usually involves high-level officials or politicians.  
• the institutional location of actors, by opposing upper level to lower/street level corruption (Morris, 
2011), centralized to decentralized corruption (Bardhan, 1997), or by distinguishing 
administrative/bureaucratic corruption from  political corruption and state capture (Rose-Ackerman, 2004). 
Administrative/bureaucratic corruption often results from the interaction with a bureaucrat or 
low-level public official (e.g. police or custom officer), altering the implementation of 
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regulations and policies. Political corruption and State capture are however less documented. 
The U4 Anti-Corruption Centre defines the former as  
“the misuse of entrusted power by political leaders”, 
and the latter as  
“the phenomenon in which outside interests (often the private sector, mafia networks, etc.) are able 
to bend state laws, policies and regulations to their (mainly financial) benefit through corrupt 
transactions with public officers and politicians”.21  
The rent-seeking literature22 analyses political corruption and State capture as long-lasting 
phenomena contributing to the persistence of inefficient states and social injustice (Acemoglu et 
al., 2011), driven by rent appropriation by the ruler (politician or decision-maker) or outside 
groups. In this context, political corruption and State capture occur  
“when [high level officials and other] groups are able to influence [and/or exploit] the rules 
and regulations set by the State in ways that allow them to extract undue economic and/or 
political benefits”.23 
• the costs of corruption, by opposing corruption with theft and corruption without theft (Shelifer and 
Vishny, 1993), or distinguishing corruption to do what officials are supposed to do from corruption to do 
what officials are not supposed to do (Bardhan, 2006). While the former case corresponds to a 
situation where officials charge private agents an additional fee to accomplish or to fasten their 
professional duty (‘speed money’), the second case represents a loss for the State implying 
greater collusion between corrupters and corruptees (Bardhan, 2006). For instance, extorting 
bribes from exporters is different from accepting bribes to let exporters evading trade barriers, 
as in the latter situation the government loses control over exchanges (Dutt and Traca, 2010). 
This point has been addressed by the recent literature focusing on the respective costs of bribery 
and extortion (Khalil et al. 2010; Dutt and Traca, 2010).  
• the motivation behind corrupt acts, by distinguishing corruption driven by need from corruption 
driven by greed. This distinction has been suggested by Tanzi (1998) and emphasised during the 
Warioba “Presidential Commission of Enquiry into Corruption” of Tanzania. According to the 
Warioba Commission, corruption motivated by need refers to street-level petty corruption, and 
                                                          
21 http://www.u4.no/glossary/  
22 Unlike the principal-agent models who emphasise the mechanisms underlying corrupt acts, the rent-seeking literature 
on corruption is rather aimed at measuring the social costs induced by corrupt activities. See Drazen (2000) for a review 
of the main features of rent-seeking models. 
23 Norad (2008), “Anti-Corruption approaches”, Evaluation Department, study 2/2008, p.10. 
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is viewed by public agents as a complement of insufficient resources. Conversely, corruption by 
greed usually refers to large scale transactions, motivated by wealth accumulation, and spreads in 
contexts of political and economic uncertainty, where agents’ time-horizon is low (Mauro, 2004; 
Olson, 1993).  
• the frequency and scope within of corrupt transactions, by distinguishing incidental corrupt 
transactions – which are occasional and individually driven –, institutional corrupt transactions – which 
are systematized within a given institution (e.g. the justice) –, and systemic corrupt transactions – 
which are widespread coordination mode throughout the whole society (Morris, 2011; 
Europeaid, 2011). In the latter context, administrative corruption and political corruption/state 
capture coexist and feed each other, petty corruption stokes large networks of corruption 
(Cadot, 1987), while cupid politicians and high-level public officials expose to everyone their 
dubious affairs and fuel a global climate of impunity (see section 4). 
How and where bribes are paid 
Typologies of public sector corruption are non-exclusive. Indeed, grand corruption is usually 
associated with high-level or political corruption, when for instance private interests illegally fuel 
with huge amount of money networks of politicians or legislators to unduly influence laws and rules 
satisfying their interest in trade protections or favourable economic regulations. In contrast, petty 
corruption generally involves low-level public officials and results from small and frequent 
transactions. 
Grand corruption is often attributed to poor accountability and transparency, generally feeds on 
large-size and complex transactions, and is positively influenced by the immediacy of rewards, since 
the possibility of receiving the bribe within two or three years is not very enticing. Applying these 
criteria, grand corruption is expected to occur in the following sectors: public and private 
construction, telecommunications equipment, extractive industries, arms and defence contracts, 
large infrastructure contracts in health and water sectors, and technical expertise (see sub-section 
3.2). Public or State enterprises may be an important vector of grand corruption, especially political 
corruption, when these companies are used to finance activities of a political party or to provide 
jobs to the “clientele” of political groups. Private monopoles may also be a source of grand 
corruption when for instance the government is bribed by a private group to sell a public enterprise 
below its market value, or when private groups bribe legislators or illegally fund political parties to 
obtain/maintain a monopolistic position. The 2010 Global Corruption Barometer survey published 
by Transparency International shows that political parties are perceived by 79% of respondents as 
the most corrupt institution (see figure 1.3iii)), thereby highlighting the extent and the prejudices 
caused by grand/political corruption around the world.  
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Figure 1.3. Some insights into bribe payments – the 2010 Global 
Corruption Barometer. 
i) motivations for bribe-payments 
 
ii) sector location of bribe payments 
  
iii) institutional location of bribe-payments 
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If scandals of political corruption monopolize media attention, petty corruption is more discrete 
and alters the daily life of the ordinary (poorest) citizen. Petty corruption can be as damaging as 
grand or political corruption by impacting directly the welfare of citizens and the business 
environment. As a striking illustration, the 2009 Global Corruption Barometer survey finds that 
40% of interviewed people reported to have spent in average between 1% and 10% of their annual 
income into bribes (Transparency International, 2009b, p.12). Notably, figure 1.3i) stresses that 
petty corruption mostly occurred when citizens and companies seek to get rid of the state burden, 
that is, either to avoid problems with public officials (44% of bribes paid) or to speed things up 
(22% of bribes paid). It also shows that at least 40% of the respondent paid bribes to get things 
done (17% of bribes paid), or done faster (22% of bribes paid), suggesting that public agents 
frequently charge additional fees to do (or do better) what they were expected to do. Finally, petty 
corruption uses to prevail in sectors most solicited by the population, such as customs, taxation, 
police, judiciary, land services, registry and permit services, health, education, and utilities (water 
and electricity). This fact is salient in figure 1.3ii), which shows that during 2010, 30% and 20% of 
respondents reported paying a bribe when interacting with the police and the registry and permit 
services, respectively. Figure 1.3ii) also supports that bribery in the most corrupt sectors – i.e. the 
police, the registry and permit services, and customs – hurts the poorest segments of the 
population. It can be indeed observed that corruption in these sectors displays the strongest 
disparities between the lowest and the highest income quintile of the respondents. 
3.1.2. Expected drivers of public sector corruption 
As stressed in the previous sub-section, the economic approach of corruption considers that 
corrupt acts flourish wihtin systems where there are weak incentives for behaving honestly, and 
where the frequency of and the scope for corrupt transactions are high. Therefore, various 
characteristics of country economic, political and social environments are likely to influence the 
likelihood of engaging in corruption. Notably, societies where public sector corruption finds a 
fertile ground are usually those with badly designed and poorly enforced anti-corruption 
regulations, and an inappropriate distribution of powers, responsibilities, and constraints among 
bureaucrats and politicians. Following the corruption framework established by Klitgaard (1988), 
we propose below a (non-exhaustive) review of some key drivers and deterrents of corruption in 
the public sector, supported by a very illustrative empirical analysis.  
The development process 
Treisman (2000) highlighted the deterrent effect of the economic development process on 
corruption levels. According to him, differences in the logarithm of the per capita GDP explain at 
least 73% of the country variation in the 1990 Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI).  
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Figure 1.4i) illustrates a strong negative cross-country correlation between the log GDP per capita 
and corruption perceptions in 2005, as measured by the Transparency International’s “Corruption 
Perceptions Index” (CPI), the World Bank’s “Control of corruption” indicator (CoC), and the 
International Country Risk Guide’s corruption perception indicator (ICRG).24 It is commonly 
argued that wealthier countries undergo lesser corruption, because corruption driven by need 
decreases with improved life standards; and also because of the many institutional, sociological, and 
demographic changes which usually accompany the development process and which are usually 
associated with lower corruption levels. Figure 1.4ii) plots the evolution of the average world per 
capita GDP against the evolution of the world average ICRG corruption score from 1984 to 2005. 
It depicts a negative time correlation starting 1990 (short-dashed line), and clearly illustrates the 
important decline in the world average corruption perception which followed the surge in the world 
average GDP per capita income since 1994 (long-dashed line). 
However, the same figure shows that below a per capita income threshold of around 3000 dollars a 
year (corresponding to a logarithmic value of 8), income exhibits very little correlation with 
corruption perceptions. It even shows a positive correlation between the average world income and 
the average world corruption perception levels before 1990, suggesting that the worldwide 
enrichment of nations may have been associated with increased corrupt practices.  
In table 1.1, we further illustrate the link between economic development and corruption by 
running Ordinary Least Square (OLS) cross-section estimations of the relationship between 
corruption perceptions (the dependent variable) and explanatory variables approximating the level 
of economic development: the logarithm of per capita income as a measure of wealth per habitant,  
and the growth of the population as a measure of human capital level (higher demographic growth 
rate corresponding to lower human capital levels). Each variable is averaged over the period 1995-
2005, and corruption is proxied by our three measures of corruption perceptions (CPI, ICRG, and 
CoC indicators).  
First, a robust and significant negative partial correlation between per capita income and corruption 
is evidenced in all regressions. Second, to check whether the relationship between wealth and 
corruption is non-monotonic, we add the quadratic value of the GDP/capita in corruption 
regressions (columns (4), (5), and (6)). We observe a 1%-significant hump-shaped relationship 
between GDP/capita and corruption, as well as an important rise in the explanatory power of 
regressions. These empirical evidence therefore suggest that an increase in per capita income in the 
poorest countries may translate into higher corruption levels, and that the negative association 
between the development process and corruption operates beyond a certain level of per capita 
income (between 150$ and 600$, depending on the corruption indicator). Third, concerning the 
                                                          
24 An increase in corruption scores correspond to a decrease in corruption perceptions. 
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correlation between human capital (proxied by the demographic growth rate) and corruption, we 
find in columns (7), (8) and (9) a 1%-significant positive partial correlation, suggesting that lower 
human capital is associated with higher corruption levels. 
Thus, the correlation between wealth and corruption is not as straightforward as surmised. It is 
likely that the growth process creates new opportunities for corrupt transactions at early stages of 
development, when institutional safeguards against malpractices are dysfunctional. But it is worth 
considering that the positive association between corruption perceptions and income, which is 
apparent at low income levels, may reflect the emergence of new coordination/interaction modes 
associated with the modernization process but still perceived as illegitimate by the public (see 
Andvig (2006) and sub-section 4.3). Last but not least, the strong negative correlation between 
income and corruption perceptions observable beyond a certain level of income may also reflect a 
global optimism, arising from improved standards of living, rather than a de facto reduction of 
corrupt practices. In fact, it can be noted that the GDP per capita explains much more variations in 
CPI and CoC scores than in ICRG scores, as shown by the important difference between the latter 
and the formers’ R-squared. It is plausible that because they encompass a broad spectrum of 
governance-related concepts, perceptions of corruption reflected by composite indicators such as 
CPI and CoC are less precise and maybe more sensitive to improvements or declines in global 
living conditions than perceptions reflected by single source indicators such as the ICRG indicator. 
Thus, the correlation between economic development and the incidence of corruption is 
observable but difficult to explain, because of the simultaneity bias between the two variables, and 
also because of the many economic and socio-political unobserved changes inherent to the 
development process. A better understanding of factors shaping the incentives, disincentives, and 
opportunities for corruption is therefore necessary to explain cross-country differences in 
corruption levels.  
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Figure 1.4. Cross-country and time correlations between the log GDP per capita 
and corruption levels 
i) Cross-country comparisons, 2005. 
 
ii) World time trend* 
 
*ICRG scores have been reversed, so that a decrease reflects lower corruption perceptions. 
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Table 1.1. Corruption and per capita income, OLS estimations 
Dependent variables : CPI 
(1) 
ICRG 
(2) 
CoC 
(3) 
 CPI 
(4) 
ICRG 
(5) 
CoC 
(6) 
 CPI 
(7) 
ICRG 
(8) 
CoC 
(9) 
Log GDP per capita -1.08*** 
(0.00) 
-0.44*** 
(0.00) 
-0.50*** 
(0.00) 
 3.26*** 
(0.00) 
1.36*** 
(0.01) 
1.00*** 
(0.00) 
 3.63*** 
(0.00) 
1.92*** 
(0.01) 
1.18*** 
(0.00) 
Log GDP per capita2     -0.28*** 
(0.00) 
-0.11*** 
(0.00) 
-0.10*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.30*** 
(0.00) 
-0.15*** 
(0.00) 
-0.11*** 
(0.00) 
Population growth         0.15** 
(0.04) 
0.22*** 
(0.001) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
Constant 4.14*** 
(0.00) 
0.53 
(0.16) 
3.86*** 
(0.00) 
 -11.88*** 
(0.00) 
-6.23*** 
(0.00) 
-1.71* 
(0.07) 
 -13.63*** 
(0.00) 
-8.87*** 
(0.00) 
-2.59** 
(0.02) 
Observations 151 131 177  151 131 177  151 131 177 
R2 0.68 0.44 0.69  0.79 0.51 0.75  0.80 0.56 0.76 
Annual GDP/cap threshold:    337$/cap 483$/cap 148$/cap  424$/cap 602$/cap 221$/cap 
Nb of countries < income threshold    26 26 5  33 30 12 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. P-value are between parentheses. ***significant at 1% **significant at 5% *significant at 10% †significant at 15%. 
Variables are averaged over the period 1995-2005. Corruption scores have been reversed, so that a negative coefficient reflects a negative association with 
corruption perceptions. 
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Features of the public sector affecting the costs and benefits of corruption 
Public sector corruption is expected to be lower in countries where the public administration and the 
political arena provide incentives to stay away from corruption. Two main features of the public 
sector are generally found to affect corruption, namely, public sector’s working conditions and public 
sector’s size. 
Public sector working conditions 
Motives for public agents to engage in corruption may arise from poor working conditions, generated 
by low salaries (Tanzi, 1998; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Cadot, 1987), or the uncertainty 
prevailing upon public offices in unstable political environments (Campante et al., 2009; Mauro, 
2004; Cadot, 1987). Good working conditions increase the opportunity cost of engaging in 
corruption, by inducing substantial loss of benefit for the corrupt official detected and dismissed. In 
the same way, political stability lengthens public officials’ time-horizon, improves career 
opportunities, and increases the value of public office, which should prevent them from stealing or 
embezzling public funds.  
On the contrary, it has been contended that public office stability may allow corrupt public agents 
building trustworthy and constant relationship with their clients (Campante et al., 2009; Treisman, 
2000). Or, as stressed by Tanzi (1998), high public salaries may increase the value of public office, 
which may in turn intensify bribery to get positions in the public administration. A non-monotonic 
relationship between public sector working conditions and corruption has also been suggested by 
Macchiavello (2008). The author hypothesizes the existence of agents heterogeneous in terms of 
public sector motivation, and argues that setting public salaries at a lower level than those of the 
private sector allows the screening of motivated public servants, while not providing sufficient 
monetary incentives against opportunistic behaviours. By contrast, he shows that when public sector 
salaries are higher, non-motivated public servants who would have worked in the private sector 
otherwise are hired and are likely to divert public resources. In these settings, public sector wages 
should not be too high, so that only true public servants apply to public sector positions, but should 
be sufficiently high to prevent from opportunistic behaviours of motivated agents. Thus, a qualitative 
working environment in the public sector, while being an incentive to behave honestly, may in certain 
situations represent a rent for public agents and get the expected gain from corrupt transactions 
bigger. 
In table 1.2, we conduct OLS cross-section estimations of the relationship between public sector 
working conditions and corruption perceptions, by inserting into the previous regressions measures 
of bureaucratic salary and career opportunities proposed by Rauch and Evans (2000).25 It appears 
                                                          
25 drawn from Teorell, J., Samanni, M., Holmberg, S., and B. Rothstein, The Quality of Government Dataset, University of 
Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, 2011. 
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that better relative salary or career opportunities in the bureaucracy tend to be negatively associated 
with corruption perceptions, but not at the usual confidence levels (except for the 5%-significant 
correlation between career opportunities and the CoC indicator). This relationship may however 
suffer from multicolinearity with GDP per capita (and important data losses), which certainly inflates 
estimated standard errors.  
Table 1.2. Corruption and public sector working conditions, OLS estimations 
Dependent variables : CPI 
(1) 
ICRG 
(2) 
CoC 
(3) 
 CPI 
(4) 
ICRG 
(5) 
CoC 
(6) 
Log GDP per capita 1.54* 
(0.10) 
1.35* 
(0.08) 
0.15 
(0.72) 
 1.66* 
(0.09) 
1.41** 
(0.04) 
0.19  
(0.65) 
Log GDP per capita2 -0.17*** 
(0.00) 
-0.11** 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
 -0.18*** 
(0.01) 
-0.11*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05* 
(0.10) 
Population growth -0.25 
(0.35) 
0.04 
(0.82) 
0.02 
(0.84) 
 -0.32  
(0.23) 
0.05 
(0.76) 
-0.04  
(0.75) 
Bureaucratic relative 
salary 
-1.20 
(0.31) 
-0.29 
(0.65) 
-0.58 
(0.35) 
    
Public sector career 
opportunities 
    -1.10  
(0.30) 
0.25 
(0.65) 
-0.94** 
(0.05) 
Constant -4.49 
(0.19) 
-6.62** 
(0.04) 
1.79 
(0.30) 
 -4.55  
(0.18) 
-6.96** 
(0.02) 
-1.71* 
(0.07) 
Observations 33 33 33  33 33 33 
R2 0.72 0.48 0.75  0.71 0.48 0.77 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. P-value are between parentheses. ***significant at 1% 
**significant at 5% *significant at 10% †significant at 15%. Variables are averaged over the period 1995-2005. 
Corruption scores have been reversed, so that a negative coefficient reflects a negative association with 
corruption perceptions. 
 
Public sector size 
Excessive size of the state has been considered over the last decades as an important source of 
monopoly powers for public officials and politicians. By contrast, increased domestic and foreign 
competition, through trade openness, deregulation, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
has been viewed as a lever for dragging firms’ profits down and therefore discouraging bribe 
payments (Lambsdorff, 2005; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000; Ades and Di Tella, 1999).  
Public sector corruption may arise from the strong monopoly and discretionary powers state 
interventions give to individuals entrusted with public responsibilities. Indeed, state interventions are 
seen by many authors, and in different ways, as a burden inciting private and public agents to exploit 
it or to get rid of it through sometimes questionable practices. Notably, red tape26 may foster the 
bribery of bureaucrats to ‘get things done’ or ‘to make things going faster’, thereby feeding a vicious 
                                                          
26 red tape refers to excessive and/or poorly-designed bureaucratic rules that imply non-pecuniary costs for agents dealing 
with bureaucracy (Banerjee, 1997). 
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circle where additional red tape is created by public agents to increase opportunities to demand extra 
payments (Guriev, 2004; Lambsdorff, 2002; Tanzi, 1998). In the same way, excessive taxation or 
trade barriers are often seen as opportunities for corruption and state capture. Indeed, higher tax rate 
may increase the amount of bribes required by bureaucrats for tax exemption (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Tanzi, 1998), while high tariff and non-tariff trade barriers may create opportunities for politicians 
and custom officers to extort money or to sell favourable treatments to domestic and international 
private companies (Dutt and Traca, 2010; Dutt, 2009; Gatti, 2004; Hellman, et al., 2003).  
However, several arguments in support to a negative association between public sector size and 
corruption can be invoked. Indeed, it has been contended that increased state intervention often 
tracks the long run growth process (Peacock and Scott, 2000), generally accompanies the openness of 
economies (Rodrik, 1998), and sometimes results from improved economic and democratic 
institutions (Rodrik, 2000). Moreover, red tape does not systematically create opportunities for 
corruption since it may also be associated with better screening and higher internal administrative 
controls (Wilson, 1989). Last but not least, as further addressed in the next section, it is argued that 
the growth of the private sector worldwide has created new forms and opportunities of corruption 
(Transparency International, 2009a ; Rose-Ackerman, 2007; Pope, 2000), which makes the link 
between public sector size and corruption ambiguous. 
To illustrate the empirical link between government size, protectionism and corruption, we re-
estimate the corruption equation by adding government size and trade openness variables to 
economic and human development variables (see table 1.1). Results are presented in table 1.3. We 
first insert the share government expenditures in the GDP (columns (1), (2), and (3)), and find little 
evidence of a negative partial correlation between this variable and corruption levels. Suspecting that 
standard errors are inflated by a high correlation between public spending and GDP per capita, we 
replace the variable of government expenses by a variable of government revenue in the corruption 
equation. We find strong empirical evidence of a significant negative partial correlation between 
government revenue and corruption perceptions in columns (4), (5), and (6), which does not support 
the hypothesis that increased state interventions translate into higher corruption levels. In a third set 
of regressions (columns (7), (8), and (9)), we test the relationship between trade openness and 
corruption by adding a variable of total trade in GDP to economic and human development 
variables. The resulting estimates show a negative but not significant partial correlation between 
openness and corruption perceptions. In a fourth set of regressions (columns (10), (11), and (12)), we 
introduce government revenue and trade openness variables together and do not find any significant 
changes in estimated coefficients and standard errors. 
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Table 1.3. Corruption, government size and trade openness, OLS estimations 
Dependent 
variables : 
CPI 
(1) 
ICRG 
(2) 
CoC 
(3) 
 CPI 
(4) 
ICRG 
(5) 
CoC 
(6) 
 CPI 
(7) 
ICRG 
(8) 
CoC 
(9) 
 CPI 
(10) 
ICRG 
(11) 
CoC 
(12) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
3.49*** 
(0.00) 
2.13*** 
(0.00) 
1.28*** 
(0.00) 
 3.46*** 
(0.00) 
1.96*** 
(0.00) 
1.30*** 
(0.00) 
 3.69*** 
(0.00) 
1.89*** 
(0.00) 
1.37*** 
(0.00) 
 3.50*** 
(0.00) 
1.94** 
(0.04) 
1.32***  
(0.00) 
Log GDP per 
capita2 
-0.29*** 
(0.00) 
-0.16*** 
(0.00) 
-0.11*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.29*** 
(0.00) 
-0.15*** 
(0.00) 
-0.11*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.30** 
(0.00) 
-0.15*** 
0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.29*** 
(0.01) 
-0.15*** 
(0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.00) 
Population growth 0.11   
(0.24) 
0.21** 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.39) 
 0.08    
(0.34) 
0.17* 
(0.06) 
0.04  
(0.29) 
 0.15** 
(0.04) 
0.21*** 
(0.01) 
0.08** 
(0.02) 
 0.08   
(0.33) 
0.17* 
(0.06) 
0.04  
(0.28) 
Gov expenses (% 
of GDP) 
-0.11  
(0.37) 
-0.01 
(0.45) 
-0.01** 
(0.05) 
            
Tax revenue (% of 
GDP) 
    -0.05*** 
(0.00) 
-0.04*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
     -0.05*** 
(0.00) 
-0.04** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
Total trade (% of 
GDP) 
        -0.003† 
(0.14) 
-2e-04 
(0.81) 
-0.001 
(0.16) 
 -0.001  
(0.51) 
0.001 
(0.38) 
-4e-04 
(0.64) 
Constant -12.83*** 
(0.00) 
-9.47** 
(0.00) 
-2.70*** 
(0.01) 
 -12.29*** 
(0.00) 
-8.51** 
(0.00) 
-2.71** 
(0.01) 
 -13.71*** 
(0.00) 
-8.73*** 
(0.00) 
-3.19*** 
(0.00) 
 -12.36***  
(0.00) 
-8.47*** 
(0.00) 
-1.71* 
(0.07) 
Observations 120 107 129  121 108 130  150 130 172  121 108 130 
R2 0.81 0.60 0.81  0.83 0.63 0.82  0.80 0.55 0.77  0.83 0.63 0.82 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. P-value are between parentheses. ***significant at 1% **significant at 5% *significant at 10% †significant at 15%.Variables are averaged 
over the period 1995-2005. Corruption scores have been reversed, so that a negative coefficient reflects a negative association with corruption perceptions. 
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Thus, state regulation of the economy, proxied by the government size and trade openness, is 
not necessarily positively associated with corruption levels. On the contrary, long term 
relationships estimated in cross-country regressions tend to support a negative correlation 
between the extent of public intervention and perceptions of corruption, which advocates the 
views according to which an increased involvement of the state in the economy goes hand-in-
hand with improved governance outcomes. In this regard, introducing public sector size 
variables in regressions strongly lowers the significance of demographic growth rate coefficients, 
suggesting that the negative correlation between public sector size and corruption might be 
partly attributable to improvements in human capital levels. Nevertheless, one should abstain 
from drawing clear-cut conclusions based on this evidence, as it probably reflect omitted 
structural and institutional country characteristics underlying the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of 
state interventions. 
Country structural characteristics influencing the monopoly and discretionary powers of 
public officials and politicians 
There actually exist structural country characteristics which strongly influence the extensiveness 
of corruption by giving numerous opportunities for corrupt acts. Amongst these characteristics, 
endowments in natural resources and the size of country have often been considered by analysts 
as critical factors of corruption. 
Natural resource endowments 
Large endowment in natural resources without adequate accountability and control 
mechanisms27 is considered by numerous analysts to be a “curse”, by generating large inflows of 
money prone to rent-seeking and state capture (van der Ploeg, 2011; Kodi, 2008; Robinson et 
al., 2005; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Treisman, 2000). A large body of researches and international 
initiatives emphasise the potential risks of abuses in the management of natural resources, and 
support a range of norms of transparency in various sectors prone to bribery, such as extractive 
industries (Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative28), the forest industry (Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade29), or the diamond sector (The Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme30). It is worth noting that corruption vulnerabilities in natural resource 
sectors are related to the exploitation of natural resources on the one hand, and the management 
of the public revenues arising from this exploitation on the other hand (see Gauthier and 
                                                          
27  As an example, Nygren (2005) addresses the issue of forest resource management in context of decentralization 
and community appropriation in Honduras. The author stresses that community-based resource management 
strongly improved social and economic outcomes in a context of decentralization. 
28  http://eiti.org/  
29  http://www.euflegt.efi.int/portal/  
30  http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/  
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Zeufack, 2009). Figure 1.5 illustrates the risks of corruption prevailing along the value chain of 
the petroleum sector. 
In table 1.4, we regress corruption indicators over a measure of natural resource endowments 
(in % of the GDP) drawn from the 2010 World Development Indicators, along with variables 
of GDP per capita, demographic growth rate, government tax revenue, and trade openness 
(columns (1), (2), and (3)). A significant positive partial correlation is evidenced, supporting that 
natural resource endowments may lead to pervasive corruption by lining the pockets of avid 
public and private agents.  
 
Figure 1.5. Corruption vulnerabilities in the petroleum sector value chain 
 
Source: McPherson, C., and S. MacSerraigh, “Corruption in the petroleum sector”, in eds. Edgardo Campos, J., 
and S. Pradhan, The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking the Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level, The World 
Bank, 2007, p. 214. 
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Country size 
Another structural determinant of corruption often emphasised by the literature is the courty 
size. As stressed in Banerjee (1997), a low quantity of public goods and services per capita gives 
discretionary power to officials. For this reason, larger countries (in terms of population) may 
produce lower quantities of public per capita, which may tempts citizens to bribe public agents to 
“jump the queue” (Fisman and Gatti, 2002). The importance of country size has also been pointed 
in analyses of the effect of natural openness on corruption. According to Wei (2000), small 
domestic population increases trade openness, which in turn may incite policy-makers to invest 
in good institutions, since corruption is likely to discourage foreign companies from investing in 
their country.  
On the contrary, it has been argued that larger country can benefit from scale economies in the 
provision of public goods and services (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998), so that officials can extract 
lower rents per-capita. Finally, some empirical researches show that the positive link between 
country size and corruption disappears if the sample country coverage is widened, suggesting 
that this relationship is not straightforward (Knack and Azfar, 2003). OLS estimates in table 1.4 
(columns (4), (5), and (6)) do not provide clear-cut evidence of a significant relationship between 
the logarithm of the population and corruption perceptions.  
Country institutional features affecting the accountability and the transparency of public 
decisions and policy-making 
Third, the lack of accountability mechanisms – such as financial/economic regulations and 
administrative rules, transparent procedures, effective law-enforcement institutions and poorly 
empowered watchdog and oversight bodies31 – are seen as common features of corrupt 
countries. Because it is often associated with effective transparency and accountability 
mechanisms, democracy is considered as a strong corruption deterrent. Democratic institutions 
indeed reduce opportunities for corrupt transactions, by allowing an improved scrutiny of voters 
upon political decisions, fostering political competition and supporting the freedom of media 
(Lambsdorff, 2002; Treisman, 2000, 2007; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000). According to 
Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000), this virtuous effect of democracy on governance depends on 
how well institutionally established norms of democracy are. This idea is also supported by 
Treisman (2000), who shows that only democracy older than 40 consecutive years are 
significantly associated with lower corruption levels.  
 
  
                                                          
31 the parliament, civil society organizations, the media, or supreme audit institutions. 
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Table 1.4. Corruption and structural country characteristics, OLS estimations 
Dependent variables : CPI 
(1) 
ICRG 
(2) 
CoC 
(3) 
 
CPI 
(4) 
ICRG 
(5) 
CoC 
(6) 
Log GDP per capita 3.37*** 
(0.00) 
1.49*** 
(0.00) 
1.36*** 
(0.00) 
 3.36*** 
(0.00) 
1.49*** 
(0.00) 
1.36*** 
(0.00) 
Log GDP per capita2 -0.28*** 
(0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.28*** 
(0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.00) 
Population growth 0.03 
(0.67) 
0.10 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.78) 
 0.02 
(0.70) 
0.10 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.78) 
Tax revenue (% of 
GDP) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.07) 
 -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.02) 
-0.01* 
(0.09) 
Total trade (% of GDP) -0.001 
(0.54) 
0.001 
(0.51) 
-4e-04 
(0.66) 
 -0.002 
(0.47) 
0.001 
(0.51) 
-4e-04 
(0.69) 
Natural resources (% of 
GDP) 
0.02* 
(0.06) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
 0.02* 
(0.06) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Log population     -0.03 
(0.66) 
0.01 
(0.86) 
-1e-04 
(0.99) 
Constant -11.99*** 
(0.00) 
-6.71*** 
(0.00) 
-3.02*** 
(0.00) 
 -11.44*** 
(0.00) 
-6.88*** 
(0.00) 
-3.02*** 
(0.00) 
Observations 114 100 121  114 100 121 
R2 0.84 0.67 0.84  0.84 0.67 0.84 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. P-value are between parentheses. ***significant at 1% 
**significant at 5% *significant at 10% †significant at 15%.Variables are averaged over the period 1995-
2005. Corruption scores have been reversed, so that a negative coefficient reflects a negative association with 
corruption perceptions. 
 
Democracy and polity durability 
Therefore, it can be advanced that both democracy and/or the stability of the polity may reduce 
the incidence of corruption. We address separately these issues in table 1.5, using measures of 
democracy and polity durability provided by the polity IV.32 Cross-country estimates presented 
in columns (1), (2), (3) display little evidence of a relationship between democracy and 
corruption, as a 5%-significant negative correlation is found with the ICRG indicator only. 
Adding the durability variable in the corruption equation yields interesting results (columns (4), 
(5), and (6) of table 1.5). First, 1%-significant and negative partial correlations between the polity 
stability and corruption perception indicators are evidenced. Second, it seems that the stability 
of political institutions is a significant channel for the hump-shaped relationship between per 
capita wealth and corruption. Estimates in table 1.5 show that, once inserting the durability 
variable in regressions, the strength of the relationship between GDP per capita and corruption is 
                                                          
32 The democracy variable ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The polity durability 
variable is the number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three point change in the 
democracy variable score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of 
stable political institutions. 
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considerably lowered. The positive correlation between wealth and corruption at an early stage 
of the economic development process evidenced previously even becomes non-significant when 
using the ICRG indicator.33 According to our estimations, it is hence likely that the deterrent 
effect of the development process on corruption pass through the emergence of durable 
political institutions (whether democratic or not). 
 
Table 1.5. Corruption and country institutional features 
Dependent variables : CPI 
(1) 
ICRG 
(2) 
CoC 
(3) 
 CPI 
(4) 
ICRG 
(5) 
CoC 
(6) 
Log GDP per capita 3.33*** 
(0.00) 
1.47*** 
(0.01) 
1.36*** 
(0.00) 
 2.44*** 
(0.00) 
0.844 
(0.19) 
0.982*** 
(0.00) 
Log GDP per capita2 -0.28*** 
(0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.21*** 
(0.00) 
-0.07* 
(0.10) 
-0.09*** 
(0.00) 
Population growth 0.01 
(0.89) 
0.07 
(0.31) 
-0.005 
(0.89) 
 0.001 
(0.98) 
0.06 
(0.34) 
-0.01 (0.75) 
Tax revenue (% of 
GDP) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.03) 
-0.01* 
(0.08) 
 -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.02) 
-0.01* 
(0.08) 
Total trade (% of 
GDP) 
-0.003 
(0.21) 
4e-05 
(0.97) 
-9e-04 
(0.36) 
 -0.003† 
(0.13) 
-3e-04 
(0.81) 
-0.001† 
(0.15) 
Natural resources (% 
of GDP) 
0.02** 
(0.04) 
0.01† 
(0.14) 
0.01*** 
(0.01) 
 0.02** 
(0.04) 
0.01* 
(0.10) 
0.01*** 
(0.01) 
Log population -0.005 
(0.94) 
-0.008 
(0.87) 
0.02 
(0.63) 
 0.06  
(0.35) 
0.03 
(0.49) 
0.04 (0.25) 
Democracy -1e-04 
(0.99) 
-0.03* 
(0.06) 
-0.005 
(0.64) 
 -4e-04 
(0.98) 
-0.02* 
(0.06) 
-0.01 (0.38) 
Polity durability     -0.01*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01** 
(0.02) 
-0.01*** 
(0.01) 
Constant -11.58*** 
(0.00) 
-6.43*** 
(0.01) 
-3.27*** 
(0.01) 
 -11.44*** 
(0.00) 
-6.88*** 
(0.00) 
-3.02*** 
(0.00) 
Observations 105 94 108  105 94 108 
R2 0.83 0.64 0.83  0.85 0.66 0.85 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. P-value are between parentheses. ***significant at 1% 
**significant at 5% *significant at 10% †significant at 15%.Variables are averaged over the period 1995-
2005. Corruption scores have been reversed, so that a negative coefficient reflects a negative association with 
corruption perceptions. 
 
 
                                                          
33 It seems that the ICRG indicator is more sensitive to the polity, while CPI and CoC indicators appear much more 
sensitive to the per capita wealth. 
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Patterns of democracy 
Other studies show that many institutional features lie behind the umbrella concept of 
democracy, and that these features vary according to their ability to deter corruption and to 
promote transparency and accountability. As Persson and Tabellini (2004) point out about the 
relationship between democratic institutions and corruption, “the evil is in the details”. They stress 
the many ways country constitutional rules can affect systems of checks and balances over the 
executive, and how such systems affect political rents and corruption.  
Notably, the effects of electoral rules and forms of government on political corruption are an 
on-going debate among economists and political scientists.34 Concerning electoral rules, the 
plurality (or majoritarian) rule of representation has often been opposed to the proportional rule 
of representation in terms of anti-corruption outcomes, the former being theoretically and 
empirically associated with higher accountability of incumbents and hence higher incentives to 
perform well and behave honestly (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 
2004; Persson et al., 2003; Persson, 2002). Regarding the forms of government, the same 
literature opposes theoretically presidential to parliamentary regimes, the former being 
associated with stronger checks and balances and hence less incentives to misbehave.35 
However, empirical findings tend support the inverse relationship. Parliamentary forms of 
government are indeed associated with better policy outcomes, while the empirical literature is 
not unanimous concerning the effect of presidentialism on corruption (Kunicova and Rose-
Ackerman, 2005). If Persson and Tabellini (2004) find a positive effect of presidential systems 
on corruption in countries with weaker democratic institutions, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 
(2005) stress the role of electoral rules in this relationship by showing that corruption finds a 
fertile ground in presidential systems with rules of proportionality and low district size. These 
findings are partly corroborated by Gerring and Thacker (2004), who emphasise the effects of 
parliamentarism and unitarism on political corruption.36 These authors find both institutional 
features to lower political corruption through multiple channels: the availability and 
transparency of information about the functioning of the polity, competition between political 
parties, competition between government units, local accountability, rules of decision-making, 
                                                          
34  Political scientists generally address two categories of electoral rules, those determining the electoral formula – 
namely the plurality and proportional rules – and those determining the district size – i.e. the number of 
legislators acquiring a seat by voting district.  While under the plurality rule seats are granted to candidates with 
the highest share of districts vote, proportional representation grants seat according to incumbents’ share of vote. 
35  In presidential regimes, the executive is directly elected by the voters, and the powers of the legislature and the 
executive are clearly separated. In parliamentary regimes, the executive is appointed by the parliament, which 
makes their respective power more nested.  See for instance Persson and Tabellini (2004), Persson et al. (2003) 
for further details on these forms of governments. 
36  In this study, unitarism refers to the relative sovereignty of the central government with respect to local 
governments. The degree of unitarism depends on the degree of independence between central and local 
governments (federalism) and the balance of legislative powers between central and local governments 
(bicameralism). 
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and the bureaucratic quality. The effect of federalism on corruption is however more 
controversial, as Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) and other empirical works suggest that 
federalism may give local politicians and bureaucrats higher monopoly and discretionary powers. 
One highly controversial aspect of the unitarism/federalism paradigm which received a wide 
attention from researchers and development practitioners is the political and fiscal 
decentralization process. Theoretically, decentralization is expected to yield anti-corruption 
outcomes by i) creating competition in the provision of public services between sub-
jurisdictions and between levels of government, and thereby reducing the bribes officials could 
demand (Bardhan, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993); and by ii) facilitating the grass-rooted 
scrutiny of the general public and non-state actors upon local political and administrative elites 
(Lessmann and Markwardt, 2010; Olken, 2007). In certain circumstances, it has nonetheless 
been observed that decentralization can increase low-level bribery or local elite capture by giving 
more power to local government and allowing for greater intimacy and frequency of interactions 
between individuals and corrupt officials (Lessmann and Markwardt, 2010; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2006; Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Tanzi, 1998). Lessmann and Markwardt (2010) 
investigate this issue and test whether the devolution of power to lower levels of the 
government makes them more accountable to the public. They emphasise the role of free press 
in monitoring public agents’ behaviours, and find decentralization to be an effective corruption 
deterrent only when and where there is an effective downstream monitoring of bureaucrats. 
Fisman and Gatti (2002) as well as Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) emphasise that the 
decentralization of expenditure or public good provision is significantly associated with lower 
levels of corruption. But Bardhan and Mookherjee further demonstrate how and to what extent 
local provision of public goods under different financing arrangements may suffer from local 
elite capture. As underlined by Lessmann and Markwardt (2010), ‘one size does not fit all’ and 
the role of institutional checks and balances in curbing corruption may vary according to the 
many other accountability and transparency arrangements available to rulers and policy-makers, 
such as performance-based funding, budget information management systems, internal audits, 
or yardstick competition in the provision of public services between local administrations and 
between different layers of government (see box No.2).37 
To conclude, though it is possible to identify regular patterns of administrative and political 
corruption in developed and developing countries, traditional frameworks for the analysis of 
corruption incidence may become inappropriate or incomplete as they stubbornly focus on 
public sector corruption, and tend to overlook the incentives and motivations driving the 
                                                          
37 Those issues have been extensively addressed in Yilmaz et al. (2008) or Shah (2007). 
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private counterpart of many corrupt transactions. The next sub-section further addresses this 
issue. 
3.2. The supply side of corruption: business sector issues 
The donor community, institutions and organisations combating corruption have often 
concentrated their strategies on the demand side of corruption, that is, corruption in the public 
sector (Kaufmann, 2005; Vogl, 1998). But corruption is also the consequence of bribe suppliers 
– individuals, companies or other non-state actors (NGOs, lobbies, etc.) – who may have strong 
motives for surrounding laws, rules and procedures by illicit means. As an example, an 
individual dealing with the administration may bribe public officials to speed things up. Or, a 
bidder is likely to offer public procurement officers kickbacks, in order to win a contract or to 
have a subsequent advantage over its competitors.  
The increasing role of private companies and other non-state actors in the delivery of essential 
goods and services raises the concern for the complex issue of the supply side of corruption 
(Transparency International, 2009a; Rose-Ackerman, 2007; Pope, 2000). This concern became 
global in 1999, with the entry into force of the ratification by OECD members of the OECD 
convention on combating the bribery of foreign public officials in international business 
transactions.38 However, addressing the supply side of corruption is a difficult task because it is 
far less understood and documented than the demand side of corruption, emerging mostly from 
the public sector (Kaufmann, 2005). Indeed, more attention needs to be paid to the proper risks, 
motivations, incentives and mechanisms underpinning decisions of private agents to engage in 
corruption. 
 
  
                                                          
38 See http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/ . 
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Box No.2. Institutional checks and balances in Public Finance Management (PFM) systems 
Assessing the quality of public finance management (PFM) systems generally consists in looking at the 
achievement of three hierarchical levels of public sector outcomes:  
1. Aggregate fiscal discipline; 
2. Resource allocation compliance with government policy priorities; 
3. Efficiency and effectiveness in public service delivery and revenue administration; 
These outcomes address “fiduciary risks”, or risks of public resources mismanagement. Indeed, a weak PFM 
system creates rooms for the diversion of public resources for private use, jeopardizes the ability of governments 
to achieve their agenda, and undermines the delivery of service in priority sectors such as education or health. In 
a well-functioning PFM system, authority delegation and reporting requirements must be clearly set, which 
requires to defining a balanced mix of restraints and flexibilities:  
• Restraints: The absence of restraints over public policy often results in weak control over expenditures 
management and revenue collection, and hence gives opportunities for corrupt transactions. Restraints often 
concretize in a hard budget constraint, adapted to sector policy demands and involving a significant degree 
of predictability. However, too many constraints imposed at aggregate level (aggregate fiscal discipline) 
may not translate into improvements at intermediate (resource allocation compliance) and local (efficiency 
and effectiveness in public services delivery) levels of budgetary outcomes. In the same way, too many 
restraints upon resources allocation compliance may hamper progress in service delivery effectiveness. 
• Flexibility: A certain degree of flexibility at each level may improve budgetary outcomes. However, too 
much flexibility without appropriate controls may foster corruption by increasing public agents’ 
discretionary powers, diminishing his probability of getting caught, or increasing the relative benefits of 
corrupt acts. 
It is therefore recommended to set effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms improving: 
• Accountability: lack of accountability in public finance management may significantly deter budgetary 
outcomes and to increase corruption, by reducing the commitment and discipline of all parties involved in 
PFM. Key institutions supporting accountability in public finance management are the following: the 
legislature (notably through the public account committee), the media, the judiciary, Supreme Audit 
Institutions (SAIs), the private sectors, taxpayers associations, and trade unions. These institutions can fully 
play their role of budgetary watchdogs, inasmuch they have easy access to information about revenue 
collection and public spending, and demonstrate a capacity to analyse fiscal information. This issue brings 
us to the next bullet point. 
• Transparency: on the one hand, increased transparency supports accountability of policy-makers by 
informing public expenses stakeholders and taxpayers about the quality of the PFM system. On the other 
hand, it allows improving and maintaining public trust and confidence in the performance of fiscal 
administration. These principles are fundamental to enhancing compliance with tax and spending 
regulations, enlarging the tax base, and thus reaching better expenditure outcomes. Supporting increased 
transparency through enhanced access to budget information for citizens and non-state organisations (see 
for instance the Open Budget Index39) often yields significant anti-corruption outcomes by increasing 
downstream scrutiny and participation in PFM.  
Sources: The World Bank, Public Expenditure Management Handbook, Washington D.C, 1998.; Shah, A. (2007) “Performance 
Accountability and Corruption”, Public Sector governance and Accountability Series, the World Bank.; Schiavo-Campo, S. 
“Strenghtening Public Expenditure Management in Africa: Criteria, Priorities and Sequencing”, in ed. A. Shah  Budgeting and 
Budgetary Institutions, The World Bank, 2007. 
                                                          
39 http://www.openbudgetindex.org/index.cfm?fa=about  
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3.2.1. General overview of private sector corruption 
Without underestimating the important role played by the non-business private sector in the supply 
side of corruption, the recent but growing concern of the international community for business 
sector corruption (Transparency International, 2009a), in a context of globalization of trade flows 
(Hellman et al., 2000), underlines the need for understanding the motives of private companies to 
engage in corruption. It is possible to identify two types of business corruption (Hess, 2009; Pope, 
2000): 
 Private-to-public corruption. Private-to-public sector corruption has been addressed in the 
previous sub-section, as it involves both private and public agents. Its main forms and 
incentives are consequently similar to those of public sector corruption. 
 Private-to-private corruption. Private-to-private sector corruption refers to private corrupt 
transactions involving private agents only. The growth of the private sector in developing 
countries has created opportunities for corrupt acts between private firms, which are both 
bribe payers and payees, or between private firms and other non-state actors (e.g. NGOs).  
Studies in business ethics give some elements of analysis of the mechanisms underlying corrupt 
behaviours in a private organisation. These studies consider private sector corruption as the result 
of a tension between firm profitability and societal values of ethics (Nguyen and Cragg, 2012; Rose-
Ackerman, 2007; Banfield, 1975). Results of experimental research on corrupt business practices 
suggest that profitability may in certain circumstances be preferred to morality, depending on 
cultural orientations of societies (see section 4). Indeed, it has been suggested that hiring staff with 
high ethical values does not necessarily lead to creating robust enough conditions to prevent 
business sector corruption (Nguyen and Cragg, 2012; Rose-Ackerman, 2007; Vitell et al. 2000, 
Banfield, 1975). According to these studies, integer staff members may i) add more premium to 
company goals than to honesty, ii) be forced by top manager to adopt unethical behaviours, or iii) 
find justification to make questionable practices circumstantial and ‘acceptable’. It has even been 
objected that the precedence of ethical values over company’s interest may also foster corruption. 
As underlined by Rose-Ackerman (2007), an agent with strong familial or loyalty values may unduly 
influence company’s decisions in favour of kinship or friendship networks. Similarly, corruption 
within an organisation can arise when norms of friendship and solidarity among workers are 
antagonists to corporate objectives. 
As expected, schemes of private corrupt transactions strongly vary and are not easily identifiable, 
due to the multitude of legal and contractual rights, responsibilities and codified procedures, and 
diverging interests between owners, managers, investors, and staff. Following TI’s analysis of 
corruption within enterprises (Hess, 2009), we illustrate below how corruption may flourish within 
corporate governance: 
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 A corporate ownership concentrated in the hands of a few majority stakeholders may facilitate 
the undue expropriation of minority shareholders.  
 Loyalty or friendship favours collusion between executives, by for instance facilitating the 
creation of networks of interconnected directorships where CEOs sit on each other’s boards. 
Such a configuration creates a fertile ground for excessive rewards/bonuses, massive 
compensation packages or favourable nominations to lucrative board positions. 
 Collusion between workers may arise and deter anti-corruption policies. For instance, 
combating corruption by rewarding whistle-blowers may fail because of empathy and solidarity 
between workers.  
 Collusion between worker’s representatives and executives may also arise within an enterprise, 
notably when “labour representatives [are] tempted to collude with management in exchange 
for generous expense allowances rather than representing employees’ interests”.40 
 An enterprise may collude with supplier and clients in order to evade taxation, by manipulating 
financial accounts, underreporting commercial or financial transactions, etc. 
If the above-listed examples of corruption schemes in private companies illustrate how corruption 
may prevail in the private sector, corrupt private practices a fortiori vary according to the following 
key factors (Johnston, 2007): 
 the competition environment; 
 firm’s exposure to risk and the regulatory pressure; 
 the link between firm’s headquarters and local operations; 
 the number and type of customers/suppliers; 
 the nature, size, and time horizon of firm’s operations and investments; and 
 the sector’s probability of being nationalized or privatized; 
To conclude, it is nevertheless important to note that the private sector may act as a strong counter-
power and is a significant driver of institutional change. Indeed, firms may resist corruption via the 
adoption of internal codes of conduct, network building or mutual support using structures such as 
chamber of commerce and business associations, and via improved coordination of anti-corruption 
efforts with the civil society, the media, and the public (Sullivan and Shkolnikov, 2008; Pope, 2000). 
                                                          
40 Mendes Aldrighi, D. “Corruption inside the enterprise: corporate fraud and conflict of interest”, in Corruption in the 
Private Sector, Global Corruption Report, Transparency International, 2009, p.14. 
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3.2.2. Private sector corruption and the deregulation process 
The internationalization of trade and financial flows over the last decades, combined with the 
privatization of public services worldwide and the deregulation of markets, created a fertile ground 
for private corrupt practices, notably in countries with weak and/or non-democratic institutions 
(TI, 2009a; Nellis, 2009; Hellman et al., 2003; Hellman et al., 2000).  
The international concern for the responsibility of private companies in public sector corruption 
started with the creation and ratification of the 1999 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.41 This convention calls signatory 
states to enact legislation criminalizing the bribery of foreign public officials and ending with the tax 
deductibility of bribes for companies headquartered in industrialized countries (TI, 2008). Since 
then, bribery is considered as a common and widespread mean for international companies to win 
contracts abroad, to avoid regulations, or to unduly influence policy-making, especially in the 
developing and transition world (TI, 2008; Hellman et al., 2003).  
Private sector corruption and the financial globalization process 
The globalization of financial flows went hand-in-hand with the development of private banking 
and offshore financial centres, allowing corrupt multinationals and officials to hide corruption-
related proceeds through money laundering techniques (Vogl, 1998; Pope, 2000). Indeed, offshore 
financial services and private banking constitute major channels for corrupt companies and 
transnational crime to launder money, by guaranteeing bank secrecy over companies’ operations 
and very low tax rates (Fenner, 2009; Hawley, 2000 Rose-Ackerman, 1996). In addition to facilitate 
corrupt transactions, the laundering of dubious proceeds generally lead to bribery in countries 
hosting these funds, which makes corruption and money laundering feeding each other. To 
illustrate this problem, the OECD Financial Action Task Force’s 1998 report on money laundering 
in Mexico states that  
"one of the most favoured techniques continues to be outbound currency smuggling, along 
with electronic transfers, Mexican bank drafts and the parallel peso exchange market. 
Corruption remains the chief impediment to Mexico's anti-laundering efforts".42 
Box No.3 proposes a general panorama of money laundering techniques.  
  
                                                          
41 http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html  
42 Cited in Vogl, F. (1998), “The Supply Side of Global Bribery”, Finance & Development, vol.35, no.2. 
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Private sector corruption and the privatization process 
In parallel to the financial liberalization processes, private sector growth and the wave of 
privatizations of state-owned enterprises in the 80-90’s has been recognized as an important 
contributor to business corruption and the emergence of private corrupt networks, especially in 
former communist economies (Nellis, 2009; Hellman et al., 2003; Hawley, 2000). As stressed by 
John Nellis in the 2009 Global Corruption Barometer (p.77),  
“the idea that private ownership could occur in an efficient and equitable manner in the 
absence of the legal and policy frameworks that underpin the functioning of markets was naive 
or worse.” 
The privatization process may lead to higher corruption levels in developing countries because of 
various overlapping factors. The intensified competition environment combined with the 
overwhelming focus on shareholders values put pressure on managers to reach short-term 
performance objectives, leading them to follow risky strategies and to undertake complex financing 
transactions prone to abuses, fraud and embezzlement. The absence of effective regulatory 
frameworks fostering transparent, open and competitive market transactions often enabled 
politicians and staff of ex state-owned companies to benefit from the lack of controls over 
privatization to strip enterprises’ assets. In eastern, Asian, and Latin-American countries which 
underwent a forthright and rapid transition to the market economy, many oligarchs bribed 
government officials to repurchase various state-owned enterprises far below market prices (Nellis, 
2009). Buen and Michaelowa in the TI 2009 Global Corruption Barometer stress how insufficient 
regulations over market transactions may be conducive to corruption through the experience of the 
new carbon credit market introduced by the Kyoto Protocol (see box No.4). 
Box No.3. Corruption and money laundering 
As corruption operates in secrecy, its corresponding proceeds generally need to be hidden. Conversely, Money 
Laundering (ML) activities may involve corrupt third parties helping in concealing the origin of ill-gotten money. The 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines ML as the “processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal 
origin in order to legitimize the ill-gotten gains of crime”. It often consists of the following steps: 
Step 1. Placement of (corruption) proceeds into the domestic or foreign financial systems through cash 
deposit, split up cash amounts transportation abroad, cash switch into other valuables (diamonds, gold 
bars, trade goods, etc.), or foreign currency purchase.  
Step 2. Layering, or concealment of the origin of criminal proceeds by transferring and splitting them between 
bank accounts, countries, individuals and/or corporations, often via offshore centres.  
Step 3. Justification of the pseudo legal origin of criminal proceeds by creating transactions based on false 
and/or artificial documents (invoices, contracts, agreements, etc.). 
Step 4. Investment is the use of criminal proceeds for personal gains, i.e. safekeeping, consumption or 
investment.  
Sources: Financial Action Task Force webpage: www.fatf-gafi.org/   
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Box No.4. Market economy, regulation and corruption: lessons drawn from the market for 
carbon credits 
The Kyoto Protocol, whose ratification started in March 1998, involves more than 190 countries. This 
agreement requires industrialized countries to cut their gas emission by 5 per cents below their 1990 levels. 
To reach this objective, the Protocol introduced market mechanisms that are intended to reduce CO2 
emissions effectively and efficiently. Among these mechanisms figure the Clean Development Mechanisms 
(CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI) scheme, whereby countries earn emission reduction credit by 
implementing emission reduction projects in developing countries.  
One important challenge encountered by the protocol is that this market involves carbon emissions, an 
intangible good difficult to quantify. To address eventual problems of under-reporting, mechanisms have 
been implemented for the tracking of carbon emission certificates through registries, and for independent 
checks of emissions reduction. Another challenge concerns the eligibility of projects falling under the CDM 
and JI mechanisms. Indeed, the additionality criterion states that offsets are considered to be valid “only if 
they are awarded for projects that would not otherwise have taken place” (TI, 2009, p.42). In other words, for 
carbon credits to be awarded, it must be proven that the project implementation faced prohibitive barriers or 
there exist more profitable ways of producing the product/service which would have emitted more carbon 
than the project actually do. In this system, the additionality criterion is prone to manipulation, and corruption 
is likely to arise when project developers, regulators and lobbies try to modify rules and regulation so that 
projects fall under the mechanisms. 
A solution was to include a degree of transparency in project design by imposing project developers to make 
detailed documentation available for stakeholder’s criticisms. However, this safeguard does not prevent from 
corrupt practices since project developers are still likely to bribe stakeholders to obtain obliging reports, and 
to falsify project documentation or expectancies (for instance to prove that project’s rate of return is below 
that of higher emitting-carbon methods). To establish the legal liability of project developers in case of fraud 
or falsification, the latter are hence required to signing a declaration certifying that their information is 
correct. Again, this precaution is not yet fully free from bribery, fraud or conflict of interest, since project 
developers and buyers are still prone to offer bribes or other undue advantages to authorities and expert 
consultants charged with the project review and approval.  
 
Source: Buen, J., and A. Michaelowa, “View from the inside – Markets for carbon credits to fight climate change: 
addressing corruption risks proactively”, in ed. Transparency International, Corruption in the Private Sector, Global 
Corruption Report, 2009. 
Chapter 1 – Insights into the emergence and incidence of corruption 
Page | 53  
3.2.3. Where does private-to-public corruption occur? 
As stressed in sub-section 3.1, corrupt transactions involving private agents and public officials are 
usually made in sectors and institutions where large amounts of money are involved, where public 
officials have strong discretionary powers, and where laws and regulations are complex and applied 
in a non-transparent manner. Figure 1.6i) displays a listing of industrial sectors most prone to 
bribery and state capture, drawn from the Bribe Payer Index (2011, 2008), and shows that public 
works, real estate, utilities, and natural resource extraction are industries where bribery and state 
capture are most prevalent. 
Figure 1.6. Sector and institutional locations of private sector corruption 
i) In which industries are bribes most paid?  
 
ii) CEO’s perceptions of most corrupt institutions  
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A further analysis of risks of corruption at the sector level indicates that the following processes are 
particularly vulnerable to private-to-public corruption: 
 Public procurement. The most evident example is when a company bribes public officials to 
influence a public tender in its favour. For instance, a corrupt firm may corrupt to influence 
procurement’s terms and conditions, to be included in the list of qualified bidders, or to be 
awarded a public contract (see Box No.5 and annex 1.C).  
 Privatization. As emphasised earlier, private sector corruption may occur when a government 
privatizes state-owned enterprises (Nellis, 2009). Companies may bribe to be included in the list 
of qualified bidders, to limit the number of competitors, or to be favoured in the selection 
process. They may also bribe so that the government underestimates the public property to be 
leased or sold off. Private agents may also offer informal payments to officials handling valuable 
information on bidding specifications, conditions for soon-to-be-privatized firms, and future 
capital projects. More complex schemes of corruption may occur when a state-owned enterprise 
manager creates an offshore company to buy it back far below from its market value. 
 Laws and regulations enactment/enforcement. Foreign and domestic companies may also 
bribe politicians, legislators, or high-level public officials so that they enact/modify/enforce laws 
and regulations in their favour. For instance, foreign companies may bribe a government to get 
a privileged access to domestic markets or large public procurements (e.g. in natural resource 
sectors), or to obtain the liberalization of specific sectors (e.g. the electricity sector or 
telecommunications). Likewise, domestic firms may be willing to pay government officials to 
have a privileged access to foreign markets (e.g. when soliciting subsidies) or to maintain and 
secure its position on the domestic market (e.g. when soliciting maintained or higher trade 
barriers). Opportunities for such misconducts are even higher when laws and regulations are not 
clearly set or when agencies entrusted with their application are inexperienced. The strong 
vulnerability of this area of public action to malpractices is illustrated by Figure 1.6ii), which 
shows that political parties, the legislature and the registry and permit services are perceived by 
businesses as the most corrupt institutions worldwide. 
 Taxation and customs. Private companies may also be inclined to evade taxation and customs 
duties through bribery of tax and custom officers. Conversely, tax or customs officers may 
extort private firms by threatening to charge them extra taxes or extra custom duties. 
 Administrative procedures. In countries where the administrative burden is heavy and delays 
are important, individuals and private firms have great incentives to escape red tape (see sub-
section 3.1) to make things going faster or jump the queue.  
 Illegal goods and services markets. Smuggling is also an area of business feeding corruption 
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through bribery and extortion. Law enforcement officers may demand bribes to overlook 
criminal activities or to limit their penalties. Conversely, people engaged in illegal businesses may 
try to corrupt the police or judicial officers to get immunity from prosecution or to confirm a 
monopoly over an illegal market (e.g. gambling or drugs). 
Not surprisingly, figure 1.6ii) shows that institutions perceived by CEOs as the most prone to 
corruption are those which are most concerned by the above-mentioned vulnerabilities. It can be 
observed that corruption in political parties and the legislature ranks among businesses’ top most 
corrupt public institutions. Political parties and the parliament are indeed key institutions for 
businesses because of their strong regulatory power and their direct influence on economic policy. 
Other public institutions with important discretionary powers over businesses, such as the police, 
the registry and permit services, customs or the judiciary, are also ranked by CEOs amongst the 
most corrupt areas of public interventions.  
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Box No.5. Corruption in the procurement process 
Procurement refers to the acquisition of goods and services through contracting. Efficient public procurement 
practices thus rely on the State ability to purchase and/or deliver goods and services in the right quantity, quality, 
time, price, place, and for the direct benefit of citizens. If corruption opportunities are inherent to the procurement 
process (see annex 1.C), the following key features of public tenders are expected to trigger corrupt and rent-
seeking behaviours (Ware et al., 2007; Søreide, 2002): 
• Overlapping procurement procedures. Donors’ procurement procedures may sometimes take 
precedence over national procedures, even if the latter impose harder conditions for transparency than 
the former.  
• Contract size and frequency. Since bribes are set proportionally to the total amount of money 
involved, the huger/more frequent the contract the larger/more frequent the bribes demanded.  
• Complexity of the technology. Procurement in projects with high technological content is particularly 
prone to corruption since technology argument may be advanced to hide dubious practices and to 
announce unrealistic costs. 
• Emergency and immediacy. In emergency contexts, the procurement process gives strong 
opportunities for corrupt acts since controls are weak, funding levels and media pressure are high, and 
staff turnover is rapid. 
• High discretionary powers. Procurement officers’ discretionary powers include the power of deciding 
which enterprise is invited to tender, the power of short-listing and pre-qualifying, the power of 
choosing the technology, the power of misusing confidential information, the power of changing the 
contract’s terms, and the power of negotiating governmental contracts. 
During the procurement process, contracting is the most critical phase because it operates at different levels of 
government and gives strong and repeated opportunities for bidders and public officers to collude. In this regard, 
two common corruption schemes are: 
• Bid rigging, which occurs when a competitive and transparent public tender is manipulated in a way 
that favours a specific bidder. For instance, bid rigging arises when specific requirements regarding the 
product/service purchased are included in the bidding documents and favour a particular bidder, when 
the contract specifies qualifications that are met by only one bidder, or when a favoured bidder has 
access to bidding information before it is formally disseminated, giving him a substantial advantage over 
its competitors. 
• Front or shell companies, which are used by corrupt officials to hide their illegal influence over the 
contract awarding process they have been entrusted for. They may use their positions to ensure that a 
front or shell company wins the contract, benefiting from the resulting illegal gain without necessarily 
fulfilling the contract. In some cases, the front/shell company acts as an intermediary, contracted by a 
prime contractor, which is expected to deliver certain goods or services. This mechanism hence serves 
corrupt public officials to hide the kickbacks paid by the prime contractor, and to launder money or 
move it offshore. 
Sources: U4 web page on corruption in public procurement at: http://www.u4.no/themes/procurement/procurementintro.cfm ; 
Tina Søreide (2002), “Corruption in Public Procurement, Causes, Consequences and Cures”, Development Studies and Human 
Rights, Chr. Michelsen Institute ; Ware, G. T., Moss, S., Campos, J. E., and G. P. Noone, “Corruption in Public Procurement, a 
Perennial Challenge”, in Eds. J. E. Campos and S. Pradhan,  The Many Faces of Corruption, The World Bank, 2007. 
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3.2.4. Where does private-to-private corruption occur? 
In the same way as public sector corruption, private-to-private sector corruption is a pervasive 
phenomenon occurring in areas where private agents (payees) have strong monopoly and 
discretionary powers over other private agents (payers). According to Pope (2000), private-to-
private corruption is commonly found in the following activities43: 
 Private procurement. Corruption in private procurement is a very common practice which 
occurs when, for instance, a private supplier offers kickbacks to a purchasing agent in exchange 
for a contract. This form of private corruption is usually found in sectors like mass-market 
retailing, or in the manufacturing sector. For instance, a paint manufacturer may corrupt a 
purchasing agent of automobile companies so that the latter uses its products. 
 Distributorship, licence and franchises. Huge bribes are paid to company officials to be 
granted distributorships. 
 Retail display space. Sales representatives of consumer good manufacturers may bribe store 
managers so that their products benefit from favourable display space. This pattern of private 
corruption similarly occurs when a company bribes a private TV channel to get an advertising 
space at privileged audience hours. 
 Proprietary technical and commercial data. A company may pay a competitor’s marketing 
employees to get commercial private information such as pricing information.  
 Financial and banking sector. A company may bribe bank officials to obtain loans or interest 
rates in privileged conditions. In the securities industry there have been cases of bribes paid by 
brokers to obtain special allocations of shares in attractive Initial Public Offerings. Recent 
studies based on enterprise surveys pointed out that corruption in the banking sector may be 
widespread, particularly in developing countries (Houston et al., 2011; Barth et al., 2009; Beck et 
al., 2006). These studies find that corruption in lending is lower when the monitoring of banking 
activities by private and independent entities is effective, and when transparency and 
competition within the banking system is improved. 
 Scrap disposal. This area includes the bribery of quality control inspectors to reject good 
products, which can then be purchased as scrap and resold as quality products. 
 Sports. Sports benefiting from large media coverage are vulnerable to corruption. An example 
of corruption in sports is when players are bribed by bookmakers to under-perform during a 
competition, or when referees receive bribes to unduly favour a team (Garicano et al., 2005). 
Corruption may also occur within an enterprise, notably in the area of financial management. 
                                                          
43  Analysis based on the views expressed by the author in TI 2000 Source Book - Confronting Corruption: the Elements of a 
National Integrity System, Berlin: Transparency International, 2000, p. 137- 152. 
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Indeed, recent financial scandals put the spotlight on cases of embezzlement of large amounts of 
money by high-level representatives of private enterprises or private pension funds.  
3.3. Concluding remarks 
In this section, we provided a panorama of the conditions, forms, and contexts of emergence of 
corruption the public and private sectors.  
We built our analysis of public sector corruption on the framework proposed by Klitgaard (1988), 
adapted from the socio-economic analysis of the costs and benefits of engaging in corruption. We 
addressed a wide range of country characteristics which are expected to affect the monopoly and 
discretionary powers of public agents, as well as accountability and transparency mechanisms 
supporting their integrity. Among these characteristics, the role of economic development appeared 
prominent but non monotonic. Empirical evidence suggested that at early stages of the 
development process, an increase in per capita wealth may translate into higher corruption levels, 
notably if institutional rules are unclearly set and poorly entrenched. In this regard, our (illustrative) 
empirical analysis showed that around one-third of the (nonlinear) correlation between the GDP per 
capita and corruption perceptions is ascribable to the stability of political institutions.  
We stressed that natural resource endowments are also an important corruption catalyst, as they 
provide tremendous monopoly and discretionary powers to public agents for the exploitation of 
natural resources, and for the collection and distribution of the resulting incomes. However, we did 
not evidence a positive association between the size of the state and corruption levels, although 
public sector size is otherwise considered by many studies as a key driver of corruption. We even 
found robust and significant negative correlations between public sector size and corruption 
perceptions, in particular when we approximated the former by the share of tax revenue in GDP. 
Such findings tends to support the idea that public sector growth goes hand in hand with the 
development of stable institutions, the gradual satisfaction of citizens’ basic needs, and the 
openness of economies; and does not necessarily foster corrupt practices.  
We then analysed the supply of bribes by private firms. We distinguished private-to-public from 
private-to-private corruption, identified activities and sectors most susceptible to business 
malpractices, and stressed the key processes by which they may expand. We showed that private 
corruption is prevalent in public works, real estate, utilities, and natural resource extraction sectors, 
which are sectors involving large amounts of money and being subject to complex laws and opaque 
regulations. As a result, it appeared that bribe payments are mostly intended to public institutions 
which are directly related to economic policy and regulations – i.e. political parties, the parliament, 
customs, and registry and permit services. Finally, we pointed out that, contrary to public sector 
corruption, business corruption arises from a tension between firms’ pecuniary objectives and 
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norms of ethics and honesty which may prevail within a given society or a group of individuals. In 
this regard, the next section further addresses the importance of local contexts in shaping 
corruption levels and perceptions, and emphasises anthropological and cultural foundations of 
corrupt practices.  
4. The anthropological and cultural contexts of corruption 
It has been investigated how attitudes toward corruption or standards of behaviours may stick 
countries into high-corruption equilibrium, characterized by systemic corrupt transactions, a low 
probability of detection and punishment of corrupt activities, and a high probability that the next 
transaction partner is corrupt (Bardhan, 1997; Tirole, 1996; Andvig and Moene, 1990; Cadot, 1987). 
However, the literature which looks more closely at the cultural or anthropological mechanisms 
underlying corruption prevalence is recent and still hesitant, culture being often treated as a ‘black 
box’. In what follows, we try to highlight key anthropological settings explaining the corruption 
differential in countries equal in other things. 
4.1. Social capital, trust, and reciprocity in corrupt deals 
The cultural foundations of institutional quality have been addressed by several studies. In these 
studies, a particular attention has been paid to the effects of social capital and its manifestations – 
such social norms of honesty or dishonesty, kinship, and trust – on corrupt exchanges (Graeff, 
2005; Knack and Keefer, 1997). In this regard, the importance of reciprocity as a key principle 
guiding corrupt deals has been investigated. Following the agency problem presented in the earlier 
section, the illegal nature of corrupt arrangements between the agent (the corruptee) and the client 
(the corrupter) makes them very difficult to enforce, so that corrupt exchanges occur if and only if 
the corrupter expects the corruptee to deliver the favour he has been paying for (Kingston, 2007). 
In these setting, a number of surveys advance that in societies with strong social norms of 
corruption and/or high interpersonal trust, reciprocity in corrupt deals is likely to be guaranteed. 
4.1.1. When corruption reciprocity is a social norm 
According to Graeff (2005), certain social norms foster corruption by systematizing the reciprocity 
in corrupt deals. Those ‘corruption norms’ are defined by the author as  
“the expectation that one can usually offer or accept a corrupt deal in a certain situation”.44  
By specifying how corrupt agents should behave in particular situations, corruption norms structure 
corrupt exchanges, especially when agents and clients do not know each other, and so, may not 
                                                          
44 Graeff, P. “Why should one trust in corruption ?” in eds. Lambsdorff, G, Taube, M. and M. Schramm, The New 
Institutional Economics of Corruption, Chapter 3, Routledge, 2005, p.44. 
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trust each other. Blundo et al. (2006) endeavoured to analyse the ‘real’ rules and procedures that 
govern informal and formal daily behaviours in developing countries. In their study of petty and 
institutional forms of corruption in West Africa, they note that  
“corruption must be understood as a practice embedded in everyday forms of sociability that 
transcend normative concepts of illegality and illegitimacy”.45  
They find that corruption is pervasive in everyday life in the countries where they carried out their 
research. They observed that the communal complicity of the different actors who commit corrupt 
acts was a way of dealing with dysfunctional public services. As a consequence, in many countries 
the public tolerates corruption in public administration and pay bribes even when civil servants do 
not ask for them. Talking about corrupt practices in Democratic Republic of Congo, Kodi (2008, 
p.17) stresses that, 
“for the majority of the people, a fight for survival became the order of the day. One had to 
be ‘resourceful’ to survive and provide for one’s family. It was in this context of utter 
destitution that the moral values of the society were challenged and turned upside down. 
Corruption became an accepted and tolerated reality. Corrupt individuals, who flaunted their 
ill-acquired riches, were admired and became role models”. 
In these settings, an individual who does not engage in corruption is dismissed as a fool. Honesty 
may even sometimes be considered as selfishness, when for instance a public agent does not take 
advantage of his position to enrich and redistribute corruption proceeds among his kin or 
colleagues (Blundo et al., 2006). In certain countries people are even recruited on condition that 
they actively seek bribes and share the proceeds with the individuals who recruited them (Kodi, 
2008).  
4.1.2. When corruption reciprocity relies on interpersonal trust 
According to Graeff (2005), when previous norms of corruption do not fully operate, trust can 
ensure the reciprocity in corrupt exchanges. Frequent and prolonged interactions between corrupt 
actors allow them to increase their knowledge about each other and, hence, to lift the uncertainty 
prevailing on the reciprocity in corrupt deals. Kingston (2007) stresses the limits of such 
enforcement mechanism in situations requiring secrecy of corrupt transactions and lowering the 
frequency of transactions. He rather underlines the role of informal shared activities between 
bribers and bribees, collateral to corrupt exchanges, to enforce corrupt arrangements. Trust may 
therefore be encouraged through various types of network membership – such as kinship or 
friendship, age, ethnic group, gender, social/religious cast or religion – so that corruption may be 
persistent even in societies with broad civic and ethical norms. 
                                                          
45 Blundo, G., and J-P. O. de Sardan, Everyday Corruption and the State: Citizens and Public Officials in Africa. London: Zed 
Books, 2006. 
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Other studies consider that trust and norms of honesty may be self-reinforcing features of a society. 
Uslaner (2005) points out that trust – when defined as a “value expressing the belief that others are 
part of your moral community”46 – discourages corrupt behaviours by enhancing the coexistence of 
citizens and contributing to the respect of laws, values of ethics and morality. Letki (2006) nuances 
slightly this assertion. She distinguishes interpersonal trust from citizen’s trust in public institutions, 
and finds that the sole trust in institutional actors – such as the police, the justice, the parliament, or 
the army – contributes to people’s adhesion to moral and civic values. Notably, she says that trust 
results from good institutions, fostering the stability and the predictability of formal rules governing 
people’s interactions, and consequently favouring their compliance. In the same vein, in their 
attempt to identify UN diplomats’ inclination to break the law, Fisman and Miguel (2007, 2008) 
suggest that corruption prevalence in a given country depends on people’s “sentiments towards 
their own country’s laws”47. Thus, according to these studies, the frontier between trust and 
adherence to social norms of ethics and civic-mindedness is porous.  
Kingston (2008) proposes a model of corruption where informal social ties among corrupt actors 
can be used to circumvent norms of corruption, in so far as government officials and clients belong 
to an integrated and cohesive group and discipline each other. However, in less cohesive societies, 
trust and other informal ties can be used to ensure reciprocity in corrupt exchanges. As Litch et al. 
(2007, p.92) point out, 
“the strong informal ties within disjoint groups that characterize a collectivist social structure 
may facilitate parochial corruption but cannot be used to enforce broader social norms 
against bribery when individuals from different groups are involved. Conversely, the broader 
‘civic’ social ties prevalent in an integrated social structure can more readily be used to 
enforce broader anti-bribery norms.” 
4.2. The cultural foundations of corrupt exchanges 
Using surveys on well-being in Afghanistan, Graham and Chattopadhyay (2009) analyse public 
opinions about democracy and political freedom, trust in others and in public institutions, and 
concerns about crime and corruption. Regarding people’s attitudes toward corruption, they found 
out that even in the challenging environments of armed conflict, people may surprisingly show a 
high level of tolerance to the vice. Their reported that well-being has not decreased because they 
consider corruption and crime as normal events, contending that, 
                                                          
46  Uslaner, E.M. “Trust and corruption” in eds. Lambsdorff, G, Taube, M. and M. Schramm, The New Institutional 
Economics of Corruption, Chapter 5, Routledge, 2005, p.76. 
47  Fisman, R., and E. Miguel “Nature or Nurture? Understanding the Culture of Corruption” in eds. Fisman, R., and E. 
Miguel, Economic Gangsters, Chapter 4, Princeton University Press, 2008, p.100. 
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“while adaptation may be a good thing – or perhaps even a survival strategy – from an 
individual happiness perspective, it may be bad for welfare in the aggregate, as it results in a 
collective tolerance for bad equilibrium, such as high levels of crime and corruption.”48 
4.2.1. Culture as the rationale behind corrupt acts 
Following Graeff (2005), the influence of culture on corruption can be resumed to the influence of 
norms and trust underlying reciprocity in corrupt deals, and can be transposed into a cost-benefit 
analysis: 
E(G) = [1 – probF] x G – probF x F >0 (1.4) 
E(G) is the expected gain related to the corrupt deal. ProbF is the corrupter’s probability of being 
fooled by the corruptee, i.e. the corruptee probability of not meeting his commitments. F is the 
client’s loss if he is fooled by the agent, corresponding to the resources he places at the disposal of 
the agent to perform a certain task (e.g. the bribe). G is the gain associated with the proceeds of 
corrupt exchange. The probability [1 – probF], the reciprocity in corrupt exchanges, increases as 
corruption norms or trust get stronger. On the one hand, in societies displaying strong norms of 
corruption, the probability probF approaches zero, corruption becomes persistent and systemic. This 
argument has been invoked to explain how societies get stuck into a high equilibrium of corruption, 
where the probability that the next transaction involves corrupt agents is high and the incentive to 
behave honestly is low (Cadot, 1987; Andvig and Moene, 1990; Tirole, 1996). On the other hand, 
when corruption norms do not exist but there are informal ties between the agent and the client, 
the probability of being fooled remains low as their mutual sense of reciprocity is high. In this 
situation, trust supersedes corruption norms to structure corrupt exchanges.  
4.2.2. Cultural orientations and corruption 
The literature which emphasises cultural orientations facilitating the acceptance and the 
dissemination of norms of corruption/integrity is extensive. To grasp the popularity of the 
argument of a society’s cultural inclination towards bad governance, it is worth reminding the many 
studies using the country predominant religion or the colonial heritage to proxy cultural emphases 
on values hostile or favourable to institutional development – such as hierarchy, trust, tolerance 
(Treisman, 2000; La Porta et al. 1999). Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) study how well-entrenched 
cultural orientations favouring norms of democracy act as a constraint on corrupt behaviours. Licht 
et al. (2007) establish a framework setting schematic cultural stances, and identified those 
supporting norms of good governance and institutional quality. They find that cultures promoting 
the autonomy of individuals within the society tend to demonstrate higher values of transparency 
                                                          
48 C. Graham and Soumya Chattopadhyay, “Well-being and Public Attitudes in Afghanistan: Some Insights from the 
Economics of Happiness”, Foreign Policy at Brookings, Working Paper , no. 2, May 2009, p.15. 
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and compromise than do societies embedding individuals’ actions into the social fabric. In the same 
vein, a study conducted by Mazar and Aggarwal (2011) stresses that collectivism reduces the sense 
of responsibility of individuals who compound it and fosters bribery. By contrast, they support that 
individualism encourages one’s self-determination and awareness of interdependences between 
individuals, which in turn promotes value of honesty and morality.  
Other stress that societies which value respect for one’s kin, clan or ethnic group are more prone to 
corruption than those that value secular-rational attitudes toward authority or hierarchy. In this 
regard, it is argued that a high level of respect toward one’s kin gives rise to a nepotistic or parochial 
type of corruption (Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005). Banerjee and Pande (2007) document that 
increased levels of voter ethnicisation – defined as a greater preference for the party representing 
one’s own ethnic group – has an impact on the quality of political leaders, including their integrity. 
Looking at voting patterns, they find out that ethnicisation reduces the average winner quality for 
the pro-majority party. In contrast, they observe that the quality of candidates from minority parties 
increases as they has to show a high level of integrity to stand a chance to win. They conclude that 
ethnicisation of voting behaviours may open a political space for corrupt politicians, especially 
when there is a dominant ethnic group. They advised, furthermore, that it is misleading to relate the 
perceived rise in corruption to the rise in tolerance toward corruption, as other factors are at play, 
such as ethnicisation of voting behaviours. Kingston (2007) also addresses the problem caused by 
parochial corruption and explains it by an “unequal access to the bribe-paying market”.49 He 
stresses that, for a given amount of bribe, an official or politician may prefer contracting with an 
inefficient bribe-payer instead of an efficient one if the former has an ‘inside track’, i.e. presents any 
informal social or economic tie with him. 
The association between gender and corruption prevalence has also been investigated through the 
prism of cultural settings. Some authors opposed male-dominated corrupt societies, promoting 
particularistic and selfish interests, to female-dominated societies, more conducive to altruism, 
generosity, and integrity (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001). As a consequence, it is commonly 
argued that improving women’s participation in political decisions lowers levels of corruption and 
vice versa. The direction of the causality is not however clearly established since low levels of 
corruption may hamper male-dominated networks and, therefore, improve women’s access to 
higher positions. There is however an on-going debate on whether women are naturally less corrupt 
than men (Sung, 2003). Indeed, empirical results derived from experimentations led by Lambsdorff 
and Frank (2011) nuance the former view according to which ‘selfish/aggressive’ male-dominated 
societies are more prone to corruption than ‘caring/integer/protective’ female-dominated societies. 
These authors find that women are less likely to carry out corrupt deals not because of a higher 
                                                          
49 Kingston, C. (2008) “Parochial corruption”, Journal of Economic Behaviors and Organization, Vol.63, p.74. 
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sense of ethics, but because they would demonstrate a less pronounced sense of reciprocity than 
men would do. 
To sum up, where power is unequally distributed between groups of individuals or when hierarchy 
is generally accepted, corruption levels tend to be higher (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Knack and Keefer, 
1997). Conversely, in societies where individuals are more autonomous and have an equal access to 
power and resources, higher levels of interpersonal trust and little acceptance of hierarchy are 
found, individuals are expected to transcend their own interest in favour of the social well-being, 
and corruption tend to be lower (Licht et al., 2007).  
4.3. The organisation of power and systemic corruption 
The recent literature emphasizing the anthropological nature of corruption exchanges represents 
corrupt societies as dynamic hybrid systems where new and ancient coordination modes may 
sometimes confront each other. From this overlap of coordination modes may emerge persistent 
inefficient states, characterized by state capture by private interest and/or patrimonial forms of 
corruption (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Hellman et al., 2003). Following Max Weber’s theory of 
modernization, Andvig (2006) proposes a conceptual framework according to which corruption 
arises from the persistence of former coordination norms in areas or sector governed by new 
norms of coordination. Following Andvig (2006), four coordination modes (or transaction modes) 
governing exchanges between individuals can be identified: 
• Bureaucratic or hierarchical coordination modes: the organisation of power is vertical, 
involving a personal tie between a superior and his subordinate, which legitimacy arises from 
the subordinate’s obedience to the organisation’s hierarchy and/or empathy towards 
organisation’ objectives. 
• Family-friendship coordination modes: the organisation of power is either vertical (e.g. 
family) or horizontal (e.g. ethnic group), involving personal (e.g. family) or impersonal (e.g. 
ethnic group) ties, governed by the respect, the altruism or the sympathy toward one’s kin. 
• Political coordination modes: the organisation of power is vertical, involving impersonal ties 
between those who govern and the governed, which legitimacy arises from the democratic or 
non-democratic delegation of power from the latter to the former. 
• Market coordination modes: the organisation of power is horizontal, involving impersonal 
pecuniary ties between individuals, which legitimacy arises from the mutual gains resulting 
from a monetary transaction. 
Andvig studies corruption in two cases of institutional change – the rapid modernization of an 
economy and the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. He considers 
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modernization as the transition from a traditional society mainly governed by friendship-based and 
market-based transactions, to a society where the area of market-based transactions expands, and 
where new hierarchical and political transactions emerge. From the regulator point of view50, 
patrimonial forms of corruption arise from the overlap of the persistent informal family-friendship 
coordination mode within the new bureaucratic/political spheres. Considering commercial 
corruption, it arises from the persistence of former family-friendship transactions in the extended 
area of market-based transactions. As for the situation of transition economies, Andvig stresses that 
the expansion of market-based transactions in areas where formal political and bureaucratic 
transactions used to prevail fosters another form of commercial corruption, arising from the 
persistence of former political and hierarchical coordination modes into the area of newly legalised 
market-based coordination mode. Finally, this analytical framework can be applied to the 
phenomenon of state capture by private interests, when political favours are sold or bestowed to 
private entities. In this context, state capture stems from the illegitimate intrusion of market or 
kinship/friendship transactions in the area of political transactions. 
Neo-patrimonial states are interesting cases of institutional failure, illustrating how overlapping 
norms of coordination may lead to widespread corruption, inefficient state organisation and limited 
provision of public goods. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) defines patrimonial states as 
“Hybrid political systems in which the customs and patterns of neo-patrimonialism co-exist 
with, and suffuse, rational legal institutions […] Patrimonial logic is internalized in the formal 
institutions of neo-patrimonial regimes, it provides essential operating codes for politics”.51 
(Neo-)patrimonial states are characterized by a weak separation of the public and the private 
spheres, encouraging the capture of state resources by private or group interests; and by 
personalism, when these resources are accumulated in the hands of an individual, the “big man” or 
“strong man” (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Carmack et al., 2007; Hellman et al., 2003). In these settings, 
clientelism and patronage based on kinship, friendship, ethnicity or religion supersedes legal/formal 
political, bureaucratic, or market-based coordination modes.  
In neo-patrimonial systems, the political competition for power is a zero-sum game: in accordance 
with the political logic of the patrimonial state, the “big man” uses formal institutions and informal 
customs and rules to take advantage over other politicians in a “winner-takes-all” competition for 
the control of state resources. The control of power and state resources is the driving force for 
alliances between political actors, rather than ideologies and principles. In such a socio-political 
                                                          
50  Considering that new formal/legal coordination mode may be perceived as illegitimate by populations, and therefore 
corrupt. 
51  cited in Carmack et al. (2007) “Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda and Malawi 
in 2006”, Overseas Development Institute, p.3. 
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system, politicians’ primary motive for seeking power is to provide for their own kin, ethnic group 
and other clients. They have no interest in national economic development and they would actively 
oppose to any changes or reforms that are perceived as a threat to the status quo. At best, they would 
manipulate the proposed reforms to suit their aim of maintaining themselves in power, weakening 
their competitors and serving the particularistic interests of their clients (Kodi, 2008). 
4.4. Concluding remarks 
Cultural arguments have often been invoked to explain the pervasiveness of corruption. In this 
section, we emphasised key interconnected anthropological features underlying country differences 
in the incidence and persistence of corruption: social norms and trust, cultural orientations, and the 
way formal and informal forms of powers are articulated within a society.  
We stressed that widely accepted norms of corruption ensure the necessary reciprocity condition 
underlying corrupt transactions. And when these norms do not exist, interpersonal trust may 
replace them to ensure reciprocity between corrupt agents. We also outlined the importance of 
citizens’ trust towards key national institutions, such as the political system, the police or the army, 
in shaping their degree of integrity.  
This last issue naturally raised the question of whether there exist cultural settings more conducive 
to corruption or honesty. Following the literature on the effects of cultural orientations on 
corruption, we highlighted some cultural features that are considered as key determinants of 
corruption prevalence in a given country context. First, societies promoting individual autonomy 
seem to be less inclined to corruption than societies where individuals’ attitudes are determined 
holistically. Second, it has also been suggested that societies promoting the respect of hierarchy and 
kinship are found to foster patrimonial or parochial forms of corruption; while societies promoting 
values of equality and universality are found to facilitate individual coexistence and to exhibit lower 
corruption incidence. Third, it has been advanced that male-dominated societies are more inclined 
to corruption than female-dominated ones, since the former are considered as driven by more 
individualistic and less public-spirited attitudes than the latter.  
In a last stage, we explained the prevalence and systemic nature of corrupt exchanges in the light of 
Andvig’s dynamic anthropological framework. From the regulator point of view, systemic 
corruption results from the confrontation between older (illegal) and newer (legal) coordination 
modes: patrimonial corruption stems from the persistence of family/friendship transactions where 
political, bureaucratic or commercial transactions should prevail; commercial corruption emerges 
when family/friendship transactions or political and hierarchical transactions are carried out 
whereas market transactions should normally operate; and the phenomenon of state capture arises 
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from the illegitimate intrusion of market-based or kinship/friendship transactions in the area of 
political transactions. 
5. Conclusion 
This first chapter was aimed at providing updated background knowledge on the conditions of 
emergence and prevalence of corruption. For this purpose, we proposed an extensive literature 
review, supported by some empirical evidence and operational highlights.  
Different approaches to defining corruption and various typologies of public sector corruption 
have been emphasised. We outlined that definitions and forms of corruption vary according to the 
approaches, aims and needs of analysts. We noted that the diversity of corruption definitions is 
reflected in the various approaches of measuring and assessing it. In their efforts to grasp 
corruption incidence within and across countries, international organisations combating corruption 
and academic scholars developed a number of measurement tools over the last few years, which 
allow them to assess the situation of corruption at a given time, to identify areas that need remedial 
action and also to draw international comparisons.  
The logical next step was therefore to provide an overview of public and private sector corruption. 
First, an analytical framework for understanding the mechanisms underlying corruption in the 
public sector – the principal-agent framework – was presented. According to this theory, agent’s 
incentives for corruption are encouraged by opportunities for corrupt acts and discouraged by the 
presence of effective legal mechanisms, so that rational decisions based upon the expected benefits 
and costs of corrupt acts underlie corrupt transactions. Using this general framework, we reviewed 
a number of selected theoretical arguments, illustrated by a simple empirical analysis, highlighting 
country characteristics expected to affect the monopoly and discretionary powers and the 
accountability of public officials. We then focused on the private side of corruption by identifying 
its motivations, forms, causes and contexts of emergence. In this regard, the importance of norms 
of honesty and ethics in supporting good corporate governance was pointed out. 
This led us to underline in a final section the role of cultural and anthropological factors in 
explaining the pervasiveness and persistence of corruption in certain countries. We addressed how 
social capital, cultural orientations and the organisation of powers prevailing in some societies may 
maintain them in a long-lasting state of impunity and widespread corruption.  
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Chapter 2  
Measuring macroeconomic instability 
Applications to export revenue data, 1970-2005 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The global economic crises of the 20th century have made macroeconomic instability a key issue 
for the analysis of the determinants of economic growth. The multiplicity of ways in which it 
affects the long-term growth path of economies, its diverse causes and the array of methods by 
which it is measured, make economic instability a complex and multidimensional phenomenon.  
Economic instability refers to the notion of economic disequilibrium, and its measurement is 
generally based on the extent to which observed values of a given economic variable deviate from 
their trend or reference values. In other words, the greater and/or the more frequent is the 
deviation from the trend, the greater the instability. Therefore, measuring instability requires, in a 
first stage, to choose the appropriate trend computation method. The second stage consists in 
summing deviations from this trend. Traditionally, indicators of instability measure the average 
amplitude of economic fluctuations around their trend, by simply computing instability indicators 
based on the second moment of the distribution around a reference value, such as the standard 
deviation or the coefficient of variation. However, this approach does not account for other 
important features of instability, such as the asymmetry of deviations (predominance of positive or 
negative shocks) or the occurrence of extreme deviations, which are expected to have specific 
economic consequences (Rancière et al., 2008; Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2005; Dercon, 2002; 
Alderman, 1996).  
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The choice of instability indicator is also generally little discussed by authors, on the grounds that 
the different methods generate instability scores that are strongly correlated. A common approach 
of measuring instability is to look at the distribution of a variable growth rates, assuming, 
sometimes without any prior testing, that the variable is stationary in first difference. Other 
measures focus on the residuals of a regression of a variable on a mixed (deterministic and 
stochastic) trend. Or, cyclical economic fluctuations around filtered values are sometimes taken as a 
basis for instability measurement. The aim of this chapter is to discuss these techniques by 
computing indicators of instability using export revenue data of 134 developed and developing 
countries over the period 1970-2005, and examining their characteristics, similarities and 
dissimilarities.  
In what follows, we present standard parametric and non-parametric approaches of calculating the 
trend component of exports. Then, on the basis of these trend calculations, we compute indicators 
of instability for the magnitude, the asymmetry and the occurrence of extreme deviations, 
respectively. Results show that, i) in line with the empirical literature, indicators of the magnitude of 
instability are strongly correlated with each other; ii) correlations between indicators of the 
asymmetry of fluctuations, and between indicators of the occurrence of extreme deviations, are low; 
iii) whatever the trend calculation method, the average magnitude of instability is found to be 
unrelated to its asymmetry and to the occurrence of extreme deviations; and iv) whatever the trend 
calculation method, the asymmetry of instability is found to be strongly driven by the occurrence of 
extreme events. Thus, attention should be paid to the proper characteristic of the different methods 
applied for the measurement of instability. 
In the next section, we propose a brief overview of the literature in economics addressing the main 
causes and consequences of economic instability, and a non-exhaustive review of common 
approaches to measure it. The third section compares parametric and non-parametric approaches 
of calculating the trend component of exports. The fourth section outlines the various ways of 
characterizing the fluctuations in a variable around its trend value. We show that it is possible to 
quantify instability not only by the average magnitude of economic fluctuations, but also in terms of 
their asymmetry and the occurrence of extreme variations. Correlations between these different 
indicators are then discussed. The fifth section concludes. 
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2. Literature review 
Macroeconomic instability is considered by many studies as an impediment to economic 
development. It depresses investment, productivity, the quality of policy, and consumption, 
especially in countries with imperfect financial markets, a high exposure to shocks and a low state 
capacity for reacting to them. Studies addressing the causes and consequences of macroeconomic 
instability however use a wide range of instability indicators. We review below the main findings of 
the literature and the main approaches of measuring macroeconomic instability. 
2.1. Macroeconomic instability and development 
The literature provides an extensive analysis of the costs and consequences of macroeconomic 
instability. Although the positive relationship between risk and capital returns may, under certain 
conditions, explain a positive relationship between economic instability and growth, most research 
agrees that this phenomenon has a negative impact on long-term growth and well-being. Indeed, 
over the long term, instability contributes to a reduction in levels of consumption, investment and 
factor productivity, to an increase in the instability and unpredictability of economic policy, and to a 
deterioration in the institutional environment. These effects on economic performances are even 
more marked in developing countries, which are often subjected to more significant external shocks 
but which do not enjoy the internal conditions that would allow them to absorb them more easily.  
2.1.1. The costs of instability 
Macroeconomic instability is a major obstacle to growth. According to estimates of Hnatkovska 
and Loayza (2005) based on a sample of 79 countries, increasing the average value of instability by 
one standard deviation results in an average loss of 1.3 points for GDP growth over the period 
1960-2000, and 2.2 points for the decade 1990-2000. Instability is, indeed, a strong impediment to 
economic development. 
An early series of research articles examined the impact of macroeconomic instability on growth 
from the point of view of investment or factor productivity (Guillaumont and Demeoq, 1989; 
Dawe, 1996; Dehn, 2000; Combes and Guillaumont, 2002; Koren and Tenreyro, 2006). Dawe 
(1996) analyses these two channels and finds a positive effect of instability on investment through 
an increase in precautionary savings, and a negative effect on growth through an allocation of 
capital to sectors with lower yields. Guillaumont and Demeocq (1989) study the effects of exports 
instability on the different sources of economic growth, namely, savings, capital inflows, and capital 
productivity. They distinguish the risk effect of export instability – resulting from the uncertainty in 
export fluctuations – from the ratchet effect of export instability – resulting from asymmetric 
responses to positive and negative export shocks. They find that export instability lowers growth 
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mainly through a negative effect of uncertainty on resource allocation and investment planning, and 
through a negative effect of export booms on capital productivity which is not compensated by a 
symmetric positive effect of export busts. In the same vein, Dehn (2000) distinguishes between the 
effects of commodity price uncertainty from those of discrete commodity price shocks on 
investment. He finds evidence of asymmetric investment responses to commodity price variations: 
while a positive effect of positive price shocks is found, negative shocks do not affect investment 
rates. The author explains this evidence by the irreversibility of some investments which cannot be 
reduced in the same extent during hardships. Koren and Tenreyro (2006) empirically test a 
theoretical model where the development process comes with an increased diversification of inputs 
into the production system, thereby reducing the effect of instability in world prices on factor 
productivity. In general, macroeconomic instability therefore seems to be an obstacle to economic 
growth as it discourages investment decisions, has a negative effect on factor productivity and 
diverts capital from the most productive sectors. 
Other studies analyse the impact of macroeconomic instability on growth and well-being through 
its effect on the quality of economic policy. Easterly et al. (1993) show that positive shocks in 
relation to terms of trade influence the long-term growth path of economies, in part through an 
improvement in economic policy. Ramey and Ramey (1995) find that the unpredictability of 
economic policy caused by instability in growth rates has a negative effect on the average growth 
rate of the economy. To take two other examples, both Fatas and Mihov (2005, 2007) and Afonso 
and Furceri (2010) have emphasised the negative impact of variability in budget policy on growth in 
both OECD countries and developing nations.  
The negative effect of macroeconomic instability on growth and well-being, based on instabilities in 
public and private consumptions, has also been examined in a number of studies. Aizenman and 
Pinto (2005) and Wolf (2005) point out that when financial markets are imperfect, the government 
and individual households are unable to fully protect themselves against risks on their revenue and 
adjust their consumption to the hazards of economic activity. As a result, instability driven by 
external factors, such as world agricultural prices or world interest rates, contributes to intermediate 
or policy-related instability in relation to consumption, real effective exchange rates, or investment 
rates, particularly in the poorest countries (Guillaumont, 2010; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007; Loayza 
et al., 2007).  
Poor economic policy and unstable consumption levels are very important economic consequences 
of instability. They also represent key channels through which sector instability is transmitted to the 
entire economy, with a concomitant negative effect on growth and development.  
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2.1.2. A typology of instabilities and their contribution to economic vulnerability  
There exist different types of instability. The literature on economic vulnerability52 (Combes and 
Guillaumont, 2002; Guillaumont, 2009ab, 2010) draws a distinction between:  
• external sources of economic instability (exports, international prices, terms of trade, or 
international interest rates) and domestic ones (such as economic policy, agricultural production 
and natural or climatic shocks);  
• primary instabilities (related to climatic events, terms of trade movements or political factors) 
and intermediate ones (related to changes in investment or real exchange rates); or between  
• exogenous sources of instability (related to international trade, agricultural production and 
natural shocks) and endogenous sources of instability (linked to economic policy or domestic 
socio-political conditions).  
Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) also make a distinction between “normal” fluctuations in GDP 
(positive or negative, repeated and on an average scale) and “crisis” fluctuations, the latter being 
identified when GDP falls exceed a certain proportion of its trend values. They highlight an 
important and significant effect of “crisis” fluctuations on growth, but no significant effect of 
“normal” fluctuations. A similar distinction is made by Rancière et al. (2008) and applied to the 
study of the effect of financial “systemic risk” on growth. 
The literature addressing the contribution of external trade-related and internal natural shocks to 
economic vulnerability is particularly vast (Guillaumont, 2007, 2009ab, 2010). A study carried out 
by Becker and Mauro (2006) identifies terms of trade deteriorations or sudden stops in capital 
movements as important external sources of growth collapses. Raddatz (2007) analyses the sources 
of instability in GDP in Least Developed Countries by examining the total and relative contribution 
of external shocks to instability in GDP. The author finds that external shocks (terms of trade, 
price of primary products, LIBOR and development aid) have only a marginal effect on growth 
instability, while internal factors related to economic policy (level of public deficit, inflation and 
overvaluation of exchange rates) are found to be important contributors. These findings support 
those of Fatas and Mihov (2005, 2007) and Acemoglu et al. (2003), who show that distorting 
economic policies are the main cause of output instability. 
2.1.3. Domestic factors of a higher or lower vulnerability to shocks 
One positive effect of instability on growth, explained, primarily, by the positive correlation 
between risk and return on investment projects, has already been highlighted (Imbs, 2007; Rancière 
et al., 2008; Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2005). Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) suggest that this 
positive effect relies on the existence of risk-sharing mechanisms and respect for ownership, which 
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are, in turn, guaranteed by domestic factors such as a well-developed financial system or high-
quality institutions. On the other hand, the literature on economic vulnerability identifies a range of 
domestic handicaps explaining a greater vulnerability to shocks, particularly in developing countries. 
Many developing countries are indeed structurally more exposed to shocks while demonstrating a 
low resilience to them (Guillaumont, 2009ab). Structural factors that affect exposure to shocks – 
such as the size of the population, the degree of economic diversification, the distance from global 
markets and the geographical remoteness – increase the likelihood of economies to face adverse 
shocks and heighten their negative impact on GDP growth. As for country resilience to shocks, it is 
primarily linked to policy outcomes, notably the government capacity for operating counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy, the degree of trade openness, the regulatory framework or the existence of democratic 
economic governance (Guillaumont, 2009a; Rodrik, 1998 2000). 
Among these factors of vulnerability to shocks, the contribution of the degree of trade openness to 
the stability or instability of economies is widely documented. A recent study of Malik and Temple 
(2009) on the structural determinants of growth instability stresses the negative relationship 
between access to foreign markets and macroeconomic instability. According to the authors, 
countries which are isolated from foreign markets tend to lack diversity in terms of exports and 
experience greater instability in the GDP. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) also study the extent 
to which trade openness results in a specialisation of export sectors highly exposed to external 
shocks, and how it may translate into increased economic instability. They show that countries with 
a low or moderate comparative advantage in high-risk export sectors diversify their economy in 
order to attenuate the risk on their export revenues. Conversely, countries with a very high 
comparative advantage in these sectors tend to specialise into them, which in turn increases the 
exposure to terms of trade, export earnings, and GDP growth rates instabilities. Koren and 
Tenreyro (2006, 2007) show that poor countries specialise in a limited number of sectors, with 
relatively simple production technologies using a limited range of inputs, and are more vulnerable 
to movements in international prices. Development is hence supported by an economic 
diversification or a specialisation into export sectors based on more complex technologies or using 
a wider variety of inputs, thereby lessening countries’ exposure to trade-related shocks.  
Other studies have examined the role played by the quality of governance and the financial 
development in absorbing the adverse effects of economic instability. Mobarak (2005) finds that 
democratic institutions reduce economic instability through an increased public scrutiny of the 
management of economic policy. These results support those of Rodrik (2000), who shows that 
democratic institutions encourage political consensus around political responses to external shocks. 
Other papers also examine the role of the development of financial markets in transmitting 
macroeconomic instability (Beck et al., 2001; Aghion et al., 2005; Aghion et al., 2004). In general, 
financial development is found to attenuate shocks, although it may magnify the effects of 
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monetary shocks on GDP instability (Beck et al., 2001). The quality of governance and the 
development of financial markets are therefore key internal factors of country resilience to shocks. 
 
Thus, the decisive contribution of macroeconomic instability to country economic counter-
performances is widely documented and debated. In what follows, we illustrate the large array of 
instability indicators used in the literature and try to point out the main features of these indicators.  
2.2. Measures of economic instability: a variety of indicators. 
Measuring instability generally consists in quantifying the gap between observed values of an 
economic variable and its equilibrium value. This equilibrium value, or reference value, is a 
permanent state or trend around which a variable’s fluctuations are transitory. In statistical terms, 
economic instability is traditionally measured by the second moment (the variance or standard 
deviation) of the distribution of a variable around its mean or a trend.  
Measuring instability thus relies on two key steps: the trend computation – i.e. the choice of a 
stationarisation method – and the indicator computation – i.e. the characterization or quantification of 
fluctuations around this trend. We set out below a review of the main indicators of economic 
instability used in the literature, noting how reference values and indicators have been calculated by 
various authors. A summary table of different approaches of measuring instability is presented in 
annex 2.A. 
2.2.1. Instability indicators based on the growth rate of a variable 
Many studies use instability indicators based on the standard deviation of a variable’s growth rate. If 
the simplicity of this approach is a desirable feature, it nevertheless assumes that assumes that this 
variable is stationary after first-differencing, which implies restrictive hypotheses upon time series 
behaviours, without any prior hypothesis testing. 
Ramey and Ramey (1995), for example, propose studying the effect of economic instability on long 
run growth using the standard deviation of the growth rate of GDP per capita. Servén (1997) 
examines the effects of instability on investment in sub-Saharan Africa and uses two indicators of 
macroeconomic instability, based on the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of 
several economic aggregates (terms of trade, black-market premium, inflation, etc.).53 In their study 
of the effect of institutional quality on macroeconomic instability, Acemoglu et al. (2003) use the 
standard deviations of GDP growth rates and terms of trade. Similarly, Di Giovanni and 
Levchenko (2010), and Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) examine the effects of a high level of 
exposure to external shocks using indicators of instability based on the standard deviation of the 
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growth rates of terms of trade, GDP per inhabitant and exports. Raddatz (2007) also computes the 
standard deviation of the growth rates of several macroeconomic variables (price of primary 
products, terms of trade, aid per inhabitant, GDP per inhabitant and LIBOR) to examine the 
contribution of external shocks to the instability of GDP in African countries.  
2.2.2. Instability indicators based on the residuals of an econometric regression 
Other indicators of instability are based on the residuals or explanatory power of econometric 
regressions. Pritchett (2000) computes three indicators of instability. The first indicator is based on 
the coefficient of determination of a growth-rate regression on a linear time trend. The lower is this 
coefficient of determination, the less the trend’s explanatory power and the greater the instability. 
The second measure is based on the difference in growth rates before and after a break year 
identified by minimising the sum of squared residuals of a regression on a simple linear trend. As a 
third measure, the author proposes an indicator based on the standard deviation of the residual of a 
regression of GDP on a mixed (deterministic and stochastic) trend. The same approach is followed 
by Servén (1998), Combes and Guillaumont (2002), and Chauvet and Guillaumont (2009). In the 
same vein, Lensink and Morrissey (2006) measure the instability of Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI) by the standard deviation of residuals of a regression of FDI on its lagged levels and a time 
trend. 
Finally, other authors propose indicators of economic uncertainty. Ramey and Ramey (1995) 
compute a measure of economic uncertainty based on the standard deviation of the unpredicted 
component of the residual of a growth regression. Similarly, Servén (1998) and Dehn (2000) 
examine the effect of economic uncertainty on investment using an array of measures based on the 
standard deviation of residuals of a GARCH process (1,1). 
2.2.3. Instability indicators based on the cycle isolated by a statistical filter 
Finally, other studies use filtered value of a statistical series as a reference value. Filter techniques 
decompose a time series into trend (long term) variations and cyclical (short term) variations. It 
differs from the previous parametric methods insofar as it does not formulate a priori the behaviour 
of a series (order of integration, difference-stationarity or trend-stationarity) and often smoothes 
time series on the basis of their past and future values. Section 3.3 examines this technique in more 
detail. 
Dawe (1996) smoothes export series using a five-years moving average filter calculated over [t-
2;t+2], and measures instability as the average cyclical deviation, that is, the average difference 
between observed and smoothed time series. Other authors apply the Hodrick-Prescott filters 
(Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) to smooth GDP series (Becker and Mauro, 2006) or aid (Chauvet and 
Guillaumont, 2009), and compute a measure instability based on the standard deviation of isolated 
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cyclical GDP or aid fluctuations. Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) isolate cyclical fluctuations in 
GDP series using the Baxter and King (1999) filter and calculate their standard deviation. Finally, 
Afonso and Furceri (2010) compute the standard deviation of the cyclical component of public 
spending and tax revenues isolated using both HP and Baxter-King filters. 
 
The usual indicators of economic instability can therefore be distinguished according to the method 
chosen to calculate the reference value. In general, these indicators are either based on the variance 
of a series’ growth rates, of the residuals of a regression, or of the cycle isolated by statistical filters. 
However, divergences between methods of summing deviations from a reference value are less 
salient, since the literature on the causes and consequences of economic instability is often confined 
to use variance-based indicators, reflecting the average magnitude of fluctuations. 
In the following section, we present various computation methods of the reference value, using 
export revenue data for the period 1970-2005, and stress analytical differences between these 
methods. In section four, we outline different ways of characterising a variable’s fluctuations 
around reference values. We show that it is possible to go beyond variance-based instability 
indicators, reflecting the average magnitude of economic fluctuations, by computing indicators 
reflecting the asymmetry of fluctuations and/or the occurrence of extreme shocks.  
3. Methods of computing the reference value 
Instability measurements generally rely on the extent to which observed values of time series 
deviate periodically from their permanent state. However, most economic aggregates are not 
“naturally” stationary, meaning that some variations around their average values are not temporary. 
As a consequence, it is often necessary to compute a more complex reference or trend value around 
which fluctuations are transitory only (Dehn, 2000; Hnatkovska, 2005).  
Consider yt = µ t + εt,, a non-stationary process with µ t a non-constant term and εt the residual. 
Stationarising yt consists in calculating or estimating the trend component µ t so that the residual (or 
cycle) εt meets the following conditions54: 
(1) E(εt) = 0; 
(2) V(εt)= σε2  < ∞ for all of t; and 
(3) Cov(εt ; εt -k) = ρk. 
These three conditions require the residual εt to have a zero mean (1), a variance and 
autocovariance finite and independent of time (2, 3). Instability indicators based on this residual are 
                                                          
54 We are referring here to conditions of “weak” stationarity. 
Chapter 2 – Measuring macroeconomic instability 
Page | 78  
expected to reflect a history of transitory fluctuations. If the series is poorly stationarised, variations 
which are attributable to a long-term (or permanent) change in µ t may be included in the residual, 
thus breaching conditions (1), (2), and (3).  
In this section, we present the principles and properties of usual methods for calculating reference 
values. We illustrate our analysis using the annual series of export earnings for 134 (developed and 
developing) countries over the period 1970-2005, from the 2008 World Development Indicators. The 
instability of exports is an important component of macroeconomic instability, which is addressed 
in depth in the literature on economic instability (Guillaumont 2010, 2009a; Jones and Olken, 2010; 
Easterly et al., 1993; Bevan et al., 1993, Guillaumont and Déméocq, 1989). In what follows, we 
proceed to the decomposition of export series’ evolution, we present standard techniques for trend 
computation, and we propose different indicators of export instability around their trend. 
3.1. Decomposition of economic series 
We first look at how exports vary for a sample of selected countries. We then decompose 
theoretically time series variations into permanent components and transitory components. This 
lead us to distinguish two main families of indicators: indicators of economic variability, which are 
indicators reflecting all transitory variations in a time series; and indicators of economic uncertainty, 
which are indicators reflecting only unpredictable variations in a time series. 
3.1.1. Examination of a series’ pattern of evolution 
As an illustration, figure 2.1 displays the evolution of export revenues in constant dollars (2000) in 
six different countries (South Korea, Argentina, Venezuela, Kenya, Ivory Coast and Burundi) and 
their associated spectrum densities. The spectrum of a series is a representation of the contributions 
of each frequency of variation to the total variation of the series.55 Observing the spectrum density 
of a series then makes it possible to identify whether the evolution of a series is dominated by 
longer-periodicity or shorter-periodicity variations. Examining the spectrum is therefore a helping 
diagnostic tool to model correctly the dynamics of change in a series. A peak at a given frequency 
(or periodicity) indicates that a significant proportion of the total variance in a series can be 
explained by the variations of this frequency (or periodicity). 
The evolution of export proceeds in a selected sample of developing countries and their respective 
spectrum densities are represented in figure 2.1. Except for South Korea56, a large proportion of the 
                                                          
55 The calculation for switching from frequency to periodicity is as follows: T=1/F, where F = frequency and T = 
periodicity. 
56 Like many western countries, South Korea’s export series exhibits a “Granger profile” (Granger, 1966), with most of 
the power of the spectrum located at zero frequency. This pattern suggests that a strictly decreasing or increasing trend 
in exports represent the principal source of total export variance. 
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series spectrum is located at long periodicities of around 20 years (with a peak in density at a 
frequency of around 0.05). Variations of 5 and 7-years periodicity (with a frequency between 0.1 
and 0.3) also represent an important part of total variability in exports from Venezuela, Ivory Coast 
and Burundi. The spectrum of export series also points to the existence of density peaks at high-
frequency variations, corresponding to periodicities of around 2-3 years. Thus, while export series 
are dominated by low frequency variations, short or medium-run export movements also contribute 
substantially to the total variance of the series in this sample of developing countries. These 
observations are consistent with the conclusions reached by Rand and Tarp (2002) and Aguiar and 
Gopinath (2007), who find that developing economies experience shorter business cycles and 
greater instability in their growth trend than their developed counterparts.  
This illustrate how challenging is the choice of the reference value, as it determines which 
frequencies of variation are considered as transitory components of a series’ evolution, and which 
frequencies of variations are considered as a trend components of a series’ evolution. In what 
follows, we represent the theoretical dynamics of trend and transitory components of a time series. 
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Figure 2.1. Export series and spectrum densities for South Korea, Argentina, Venezuela, 
Kenya, Ivory Coast and Burundi. 
i) Export raw data (USD, 2000) 
 
ii) Spectrum densities 
 
 
 
3.1.2. Theoretical breakdown of series 
Following Dehn (2000) and Hnatkovska (2005), movements in economic series exhibit a trend or 
permanent (yPt) component and a cyclical or transitory (yCt) component: 
yt = yPt + yCt  (2.1) 
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The permanent component is made up of a deterministic part (y0+a.t), with a temporal trend t57, and a 
stochastic (εPt) part: 
yPt = y0 + a.t + εPt  (2.2) 
εPt represents stochastic shocks affecting the series trend on a permanent or prolonged basis. By way of 
example, variations in the productivity or in the preferences of economic agents can affect the path 
of an economic series over the long term. 
The cyclical or transitory component comprises a predictable (yCPt component – influenced by country 
characteristics such as the level of development, the foreign exchange system, or the country size, 
etc.) and an unpredictable (εCt) component: 
yCt = yCPt + εCt  (2.3) 
εCt represents unpredictable shocks with a temporary effect on the series, like sudden changes in 
international prices of raw materials or unforeseen climatic events. 
3.1.3. Variability, risk or uncertainty? 
As Azeinman and Pinto (2005) suggest, the literature generally links economic instability to 
economic risk or uncertainty.58 According to the authors, instability indicators based on the 
moments of the observed distribution of a variable around its reference value (average, filter, 
estimates) inform on its possible realisations, and could represent an approximation of its 
associated risk. The authors emphasise, however, that such a measure can overestimate risk by also 
including predictable transitory fluctuations. Pure risk or uncertainty would be better measured by 
the residual obtained from conditional variance models like GARCH models (Dehn et al., 2005; 
Dehn, 2000; Serven, 1998). Techniques for measuring instability may therefore be divided into two 
main families: those which provide measures of series variability, reflecting transient variation, and those 
which provide measures of uncertainty or risk (Wolf, 2005). 
Uncertainty indicators, such as those based on GARCH models, generally apply to high-frequency 
economic data (daily, monthly or quarterly price changes, for example). Since in this chapter is 
focused on the measurement of instability in export proceeds, which are reported annually59, we do 
not address uncertainty indicators. Instead, we review reference values underlying indicators of 
instability reflecting economic variability, i.e. based on variations in yC (see equation (2.3)). 
                                                          
57 Here we are examining the case of a linear deterministic trend, accepting that this may take diverse forms (quadratic and 
exponential trends, etc.) 
58 Leaving aside the distinction made by Knight between risk and uncertainty. 
59 As in the majority of researches on macroeconomic instability. 
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3.2. Parametric approaches 
Many measures of macroeconomic instability are based on a parametric approach which models the 
trend component of economic series on the basis of their past evolution. The most common 
techniques are presented below. 
3.2.1. Fluctuations around a linear deterministic trend 
A usual approach consists in building an instability indicator reflecting the average magnitude of 
deviations from a linear time trend. Export series evolution, as for many macroeconomic variables 
(GDP, exports, interest rates, etc.), is dominated by low frequencies variations (see figure 2.1). This 
feature often justifies expressing export evolution as a function of a deterministic trend (linear, 
polynomial or exponential). For instance, in a study of world cereal price series behaviour, Sarris 
(2000) stresses that cereal price trends are generally deterministic, since the variance of residuals 
after deterministic detrending is not found to increase over time. In its simplified (linear) form, this 
deterministic detrending consists of estimating the following model: 
yt = α + β.t + εt  (2.4) 
Where yt is the variable whose instability is being measured, α a constant, t a linear trend, and εt a 
zero-mean error term. In this case, the reference value is the trend: 
ty t βα ˆˆ +=  (2.5) 
In principle, deviations from the trend (εt) have no permanent effects on yt. In other terms, these 
deviations are assumed to be stationary around the trend and can therefore be a basis for the 
measurement of instability in yt. A measure of instability based on εt implies that i) trend values 
increase at a constant rate, ii) the long-term evolution of the series is perfectly predictable and iii) 
all deviations from the trend are transitory.  
Beveridge and Nelson (1981) highlighted the limitations of an approach of this kind. To illustrate 
these limitations, figure 2.2 shows the evolution of export series and their corresponding 
deterministic trends in Belize between 1980 and 2004, and in Argentina between 1970 and 2005 
(figure 2.3 displays their related residuals). Although the actual trend in Belize’s export revenues 
seems linear, the observed values may durably deviate (between 1994 and 1999, as shown in figure 
2.3) from trend values. This becomes problematic for Argentina, where the trend in export 
revenues is not apparently linear. Thus, this specification is likely to exacerbate the importance of 
shocks by unduly including a part of the trend component in the residual. 
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Figure 2.2. Linear trends of export series in Belize and Argentina. 
 i) Belize ii) Argentina 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Residuals of linear trends in Belize and Argentina 
 i) Belize ii) Argentina 
 
3.2.2. Fluctuations around a global mixed trend 
Equation (2.2) suggests that it is possible that residual variations may have a permanent effect on 
the trend followed by a series. It is hence possible to estimate a reference value based on a 
stochastic trend, represented by the following first-order autoregressive process AR(1), 
yt = yt-1 + εt (2.6.a) 
which can rewritten as follows: 
   ∑   (2.6.b) 
Changes in yt are determined by a successive history of random shocks, implying that a shock 
occurring in the past, even a distant past, has the same effect on the series as a shock in the present 
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(long-memory process). A time series with such a variation pattern is said difference-stationary, that is, 
its trend component follows a random walk process. In equations (2.6), the series exhibits a unit 
root process. After differencing, the series can be rewritten as follows: 
( )20,N~ σεε ttt withy =∆  (2.7) 
This is the hypothesis retained by studies using indicators of instability based on the standard 
deviation of a variable growth rate. This is a strong assumption given that spectrum densities of 
macroeconomic variables like GDP, exports or public spending are located at low-frequency 
variations (Nelson and Kang, 1981).   
White and Granger (2011) reconcile the two previous approaches of modelling the trend by 
stressing that trends commonly observed in macroeconomic variable display both stochastic and 
deterministic movements. As a result, a more flexible approach may consist in estimating a trend 
based on both a deterministic and stochastic process, after transforming data in log: 
( )21 0,N~log.. σεεδβα tttt withytyLog +++= −   (2.8) 
The resulting predictions of log yt are then rescaled with an exponential transformation.
 
Using panel 
data on exports series from 134 countries, we perform the Maddala-Wu panel unit root test (based 
on the Phillips-Perron’s unit root test) on εt (p-value are shown in table 2.1). We also compute 
Fisher statistics for the joint null hypothesis on α, β and δ (displayed in table 2.1, second column). 
The non-stationarity hypothesis is rejected once the series is differenced two times, and F-test 
statistics reject the joint null hypothesis on the coefficients. Modelling export series by the process 
in equation (2.8) hence seems an appropriate approach. We should nevertheless take our unit root 
analysis with careful consideration given their low power with roots approaching unity, with trend 
regime shifts, and with a limited data time-length (Sarris, 2000). 
As illustrated in figure 2.4 and annex 2.B this method produces a trend that is a slightly smoothed 
version of the observed change in real export values. Correlograms of residuals of Belize and 
Argentina in figure 2.4 suggest that deviations from the trend are transitory for these countries, 
since residuals are not significantly autocorrelated (correlograms of other examples of countries 
displayed in Annex 2.B).  
In a comprehensive review of statistical methods for trend calculation, White and Granger (2011) 
stress that one desirable property of trend values is to be pointedly smoother than the gross series. 
Yet, this trend seems to reproduce in t the change in exports observed in t-1. 
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Figure 2.4. Export revenue, global mixed trend and the correlogram of residuals in Belize and 
Argentina 
i) Belize 
 
ii) Argentina 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Specification and unit root test on panel data 
H0: the series is non-stationary Prob>Chi2 F-test 
 
1.000 47.47 
 
0.000 36.61 
Countries (Observations): 134(3693). 
3.2.3. Fluctuations around a rolling mixed trend 
By computing the above mixed trend, we hypothesized that estimated coefficients of the stochastic 
and deterministic components are constant over time. Effectively, this so-called “global” trend is 
predicted each year for each country, based on coefficients estimated for the whole period of data 
availability. It therefore excludes the possibility for regime changes in the deterministic and 
stochastic components of the trend. Although tests of structural breaks in time series do exist (e.g. 
∆y it = α i + β it + φ1y it −1 + ε it
∆∆y it = α i + β it + φ2∆y it−1 + εit
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CUSUM, Max Chow tests)60, an alternative and more practical solution (applied to panel data with 
limited time length) may consist in estimating a mixed trend on a “rolling” basis (Guillaumont, 
2007), allowing the estimated coefficients to change from year to year and thus reflecting recent 
changes in time series trend components. This “rolling” mixed trend is estimated each year for each 
country over the period T = [t; t-k], rather than the whole of the period of data availability: 
1logˆˆˆˆ −++= t
TTTT
t ytyLog δβα  (2.9) 
Predictions of log yt are rescaled using exponential transformation.
 
Figure 2.5 plots the estimated 
“rolling” trend when k = 12 against the “global” mixed trend in Argentina. Annex 2.B plots the 
“global” and “rolling” mixed trends for a sample of different countries, and exposes correlograms 
of their corresponding residuals. It can be observed that the “rolling” mixed trend is smoother than 
the “global” mixed trend, and, contrary to the later, it does not exhibit a “saw-tooth” profile 
(resulting from time-constant parameters). Similarly, an examination of correlograms in figure 2.5, 
figure 2.6, and in annex 2.B, suggests that the residuals resulting from this approach are stationary, 
for this sample of countries. 
Figure 2.5. Export revenue, global and rolling mixed trends, and the correlogram of residuals in 
Argentina 
 
 
Nonetheless, this technique presents some drawbacks. First, it reduces the time coverage of 
instability indicators, since the first trend value is only available from t = 1+k. Second, estimates 
based on a rolling mixed trend are not necessarily an ideal solution when there is a regime shift in 
the trend of export series, since the prior trend regime may still exhibit inertia after the shift 
operates. Moreover, by estimating the trend over a shorter period than the global mixed trend, it is 
more sensitive to medium-periodicity than long-periodicity fluctuations, with the risk of including 
                                                          
60Sarris (2000) performs these tests to ensure that structural breaks are not included in the estimated variance of 
detrended cereal price series. These tests were inconclusive because of insufficient degrees of freedom. 
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the latter in the residual. This point may be illustrated by the relative behaviour of the two mixed 
trends in exports from Burundi between 1985 and 1995, in figure 2.6. In this example, the rolling 
mixed trend tends to underestimate the trend downfall relative to the “global” trend after the 1985 
economic reversal.  
Choosing an appropriate timeframe for trend estimation is a critical step because it has serious 
implications regarding components included into the residuals. Here, we have chosen a 12-years 
estimation period, so as to make the comparison between this technique and the global mixed trend 
more salient (in chapter 4, we compute indicators of instability based on a 16-year rolling mixed 
trend). It can be considered that a rolling trend calculated over a period of between 15 and 20 years 
is a reasonable basis. As suggested by spectrum densities presented previously in figure 2.1, 
variations of this periodicity strongly contribute to the long-run path of the series. Thus, the 
timeframe over which trend is estimated is an arbitrary choice which is intended to reflect at best 
the evolution of a series for a given sample of countries. Such a choice possibly induces 
misspecification problems when looking at export series in specific countries. 
 
3.3. The filter approach 
Other researches on economic instability use statistical filters to isolate the cyclical component and 
removing the trend components of a time series (Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2005; Becker and Mauro, 
2006; Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2009). The standard deviation of the resulting cycle is a popular 
measure of economic instability.  
Unlike the parametric approach, the filter approach does not make a priori assumptions on the trend 
of time series. Moreover, statistical filters are sensitive to regime shifts in the trend component of 
Figure 2.6. Export revenue, global and rolling mixed trends, and correlograms of residuals in 
Burundi. 
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time series. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick-Prescott, 1997) and the band-pass (BP) filter 
put forward by Baxter and King (1999) are amongst the most popular filter approaches. When 
applied to our export data, both techniques give extremely similar results. Although the BP filter 
maintains the properties of the series more accurately, this advantage comes at the price of a loss of 
observations at the end of the sample (Baxter and King, 1999).61 In what follows, we only present 
the results obtained with the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Hodrick and Prescott break down the 
change in a series into a non-stationary trend component (yPt), and a stationary cyclical component 
(yCt): 
yt = yPt + yCt  (2.10) 
with T = 1, 2, 3,…, t. The HP filter isolates the cyclical component by optimising the following 
programme in relation to HP: 
{ } ( )













 ∆+−∑ ∑
−
−
=
T
t
T
t
tttHP HPHPyt
1
21
2
22
*min λ  (2.11) 
with the deviation 	
   −
∗. This method is close to a symmetrical moving average filter 
with infinite time horizon. λ is a smoothing parameter which can be either estimated or determined 
ad hoc. The first term of the equation (2.11) minimises variance in the cyclical component while the 
second term smoothes the change in the trend component. When λ tends towards infinity, the 
variance in the trend growth converges towards 0, which implies that the trend component – or 
smoothed series – is close to a simple linear trend. Conversely, when λ tends toward 0, the filtered 
series is close to the original series. As a result, the lower is the value of the smoothing parameter, 
the shorter the periodicity of isolated cyclical fluctuations, and vice versa. 
The choice of the value of λ is still debated in the literature. If Hodrick and Prescott advocate a 
parameter λ equal to 100 for annual data, Baxter and King suggest a value up to 400, while Maravall 
and Del Rio (2001) choose a value down to 6.  
We hereafter compare results obtained with λ set at 100 (long-periodicity trend, or HP100) and 6.5 
(medium-periodicity trend, or HP65). As expected, figure 2.7 shows that the trend HP65 fluctuates 
more than the trend HP100. Annex 2.C reports correlograms of the isolated cycles of countries 
represented in figure 2.7. Figures 2.7 and annex 2.C both suggest that extracted cycles are stationary 
and not significantly autocorrelated, for this sample of countries.  
                                                          
61The BP filter is a bilateral filter, which requires a minimum number of observations before and after each filtered 
observation point in order to increase the precision of the filtering. Baxter and King (1999) recommend to exclude the 
first 12 and last 12 quarters when filtering quarterly series. For annual series, they recommend to exclude the first three 
and last three years from the sample. 
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The filtering approach nonetheless presents some drawbacks. First, it relies on the hypothesis that 
the cyclical and trend components are independent. In light of the significant amount of research 
on the effects of macroeconomic fluctuations on long-term growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995), this 
hypothesis seems restrictive. Moreover, the HP filter may suffer from compression effects when the 
smoothing parameter is set at a low value: part of short-periodicity cyclical variations can be 
attributed to trend variations. The resulting trend may become more volatile while the cyclical 
component – upon which instability measures are based – may be understated. Conversely, 
choosing a high smoothing parameter may cause leakage effects: some of the long-periodicity 
variations may be included into the cyclical component. The resulting trend may appear less volatile 
while the cyclical component may be overstated. Given the contribution of medium-periodicity 
fluctuations in the total variance of countries represented in figure 2.1, and given the predominance 
in our sample of developing countries with shorter business cycles and more variable trend 
components (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007; Rand and Tarp, 2002), a lower smoothing parameter 
seems more appropriate.  
 
Parametric and filter approaches of computing the trend are conceptually different. While the 
former approach models the process followed by trends in time series on the basis of their past 
evolution, two-sided filter methods such as the HP or BK filters use both past and future data to 
smooth time series. These differences imply that the choice of the reference value affects 
measurements of instability and their use in empirical analyses. 
On the one hand, the filter approach is probably much more efficient in making series stationary, 
by computing a trend which is more sensitive to regime changes in the trend evolution of time 
series, and more flexible when time series variations exhibit very diverging patterns between 
countries. According to King and Rebelo (1993), the HP filter can stationarise series with an order 
of integration up to four. On the other hand, because series are modelled according to their past 
realisations, instability indicators based on the parametric approach better reflects the effects of 
unusual economic events such as economic crisis or booms, which is a key feature for the study of 
the consequences of instability on economic outcomes.  
Conversely, since the two-sided filter approach uses both past and future information to compute 
the trend, it should be more sensitive to outliers and may hence produce cycles that are less 
sensitive to extreme events. In fact, filter approaches were originally aimed at identifying business 
cycles and relating them to macroeconomic policy outcomes and long-run properties of developed 
and developing economies. This approach of computing the trend is generally used to test business 
cycle models, with the underlying assumption of rational expectations of economic agents. By 
contrast, parametric approaches of computing the trend are popular among macro and 
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microeconomic studies on the effects of shocks on economic agents’ production and consumption 
decisions, and rather rely on the hypothesis of extrapolative or adaptive expectations.  
As a final word, whatever the approach chosen, both imply arbitrary choices: regarding the period 
of trend estimation for the parametric approach, and regarding the value of the smoothing 
parameter for the filter approach. These choices should at best reflect trend movements in 
economic time series, but both inevitably induce some misspecification problems when applied to 
wide panel datasets. Respective pros and cons of trend computation methods are synthetized in 
table 2.2 below. 
 
Table 2.2. Pros and cons of trend computation methods 
 Filter approach Parametric approach 
Pr
o
s 
More efficient and more flexible in making 
series stationary 
 
Seems more appropriate for the study of 
macroeconomic responses to instability 
Better reflects outliers in the distribution around trend 
values. 
 
Seems more appropriate for the study microeconomic 
responses to instability 
C
o
n
s 
More sensitive to outliers in the distribution 
around trend value 
 
Arbitrary modelling of the trend component in time 
series 
Weaker results whtih structural breaks 
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Figure 2.7. Export revenue data smoothed by the HP filter 
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4. Quantifying instability: ways of summing deviations from the trend 
While shock variables inform on the asymmetry and/or the size of an economic fluctuation at a 
given point of time, instability indicators reflect a history of past shocks, by summing deviations 
from their trend over a finite timeframe. Amongst available measures of instability, variance-based 
indicators are the most common ones. However, confining the analysis of instability to the analysis 
of a variable’s variance may mask other important dimensions of economic instability. In fact, other 
important dimensions of economic instability are the asymmetry of fluctuations and the likelihood 
of crisis or booms. We hereafter show that it is possible to quantify these dimensions of instability 
by exploiting moments two, three and four of the distributions of exports around our different 
reference values. 
4.1. Calculation period 
As indicators of instability are intended to reflect a past history of shocks, it is first necessary to set 
the period over which deviations are summed. When the evolution of a time a series presents 
distinct episodes of instability over time, it may be relevant to align the period over which 
deviations are summed to the approximate duration of the episodes of instability (Wolf, 2005). 
Moreover, in an econometric analysis of the consequences of instability, the period of summing 
deviations should also fit with time variations of the dependent variable. For instance, studying the 
short-term effects of instability by summing deviations over a five-year period is indeed a relevant 
approach inasmuch the outcome variable varies over a similar timing (see chapter 4).  
4.2. The average magnitude of export fluctuations 
Numerous research articles examine the consequences and determinants of the average magnitude 
of fluctuations. A very common indicator is the standard deviation of a variable around its 
reference value (here expressed in % of the trend): 
∑ 





−
×=
t t
tt
y
yy
T
INS
2
1
ˆ
ˆ1100  (2.12a)
 
with T=1, …, t. We compute the standard deviations as a share of the reference value so as to 
rescale instability measurement when fluctuations’ order of magnitude differs from one country to 
another. It is also possible to calculate the average absolute deviation of deviations from the trend: 
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with T=1, …, t, yt is the observed value of the series, and tyˆ  is the reference value. The question of 
the respective advantages of the standard deviation and the average absolute deviation as a measure 
of the average magnitude of deviations in a distribution is an old debate (see Gorard, 2005). The 
standard deviation is the most familiar indicator and provides a more efficient estimate of ‘average 
deviation’ in the case of a normal/Gaussian distribution. It also increases exponentially with the 
size of deviations, which can be a desirable property when the effects of instability are more than 
proportional than the size of fluctuations (Guillaumont and Demeocq, 1989). However, the average 
absolute deviation is a more efficient measure in presence of measurement errors, or when the 
distribution is not normal (Gorard, 2005).  
We illustrate differences between these two indicators of the magnitude of fluctuations calculated 
for Venezuela and Kenya (see figure 2.8). Both measures are calculated on a rolling annual basis 
over a six-year period (t; t-5). Figure 2.8 suggests that peaks of instability which correspond to the 
end of the 1970s, 1980s and the early 1990s and 2000s are more heavily weighted when we use the 
standard deviation as instability indicator (INS1).  
We privilege the use of the standard deviation (INS1) as a measure of the average magnitude of 
deviations, because this measure presents a greater time and country variability. We then compare 
standard deviations of export distributions around the different reference values presented in the 
previous section. In what follows, indicators of the average magnitude of export fluctuations, based 
on the standard deviation of exports, are computed over the period 1982-2005 for each reference 
values. Results are shown in tables 2.3 and 2.4, and in figure 2.9. 
Standard deviations of export around mixed trends and HP-filtered values display high correlations, 
between 80% and 96%. Standard deviations of exports around the global mixed trend and the 
HP100 filter tend to be in average higher than other indicators, while standard deviations around 
HP65 filtered values are lower in average and display lower variability than with other reference 
values. The standard deviation around the HP100 filter is the one that correlates the less closely 
with other indicators, but still at a high 80% level. 
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Figure 2.8. Indicators of the magnitude of instability (% of trend) 
 i) Venezuela ii) Kenya 
 
 
 
Table 2.3. Correlations between standard deviations of exports around different reference values. 
 
(1) 
Global mixed trend 
(2) 
Rolling mixed trend 
(3) 
HP 6.5 
(4) 
HP 100 
Standard deviations calculated over 1982-2005 
(1) 1.00    
(2) 0.92* 1.00   
(3) 0.96* 0.95* 1.00  
(4) 0.87* 0.80* 0.87* 1.00 
* Significant at 5%. Observations: 134. 
 
 
Table 2.4. Descriptive statistics of standard deviations of exports around reference values. 
 
Global mixed trend Rolling mixed trend HP 6.5 HP 100 
Mean 13.6 11.5 9.2 13.3 
Standard 
deviation 8.7 7.8 6.1 7.8 
Observations: 134. 
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Figure 2.9. Graphical illustrations of correlations between standard deviations of exports around 
different reference values 
 
4.3. The asymmetry of export fluctuations 
Variance-based indicators of instability do not reflect the effects of the asymmetry of shocks, which 
is a very important dimension of instability (Wolf, 2005). Considering the asymmetry in fluctuations 
is justified by the distinction made between agents’ responses to adverse and favourable income 
shocks (Dercon, 2002; Elbers et al., 2007). In this regard, the coefficient of asymmetry in a 
statistical distribution – or skewness – is an indicator of the relative predominance of adverse or 
favourable shocks over a given period. A skewness-based indicator of the asymmetry of instability 
can be calculated as follow (in % of the trend): 
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Skewness  (2.13)
 
with T= 1, …, t. A symmetrical distribution displays a coefficient of skewness close to 0%. As a 
result, a distribution with a positive (negative) skewness indicates that export instability is 
dominated by positive (negative) shocks. We provide a graphical illustration of a positively skewed, 
a centred, and a negatively skewed distribution of export in figure 2.10. This figure exposes kernel 
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densities of the distribution of export around a 12-year rolling mixed trend in Argentina, Algeria 
and Mexico, respectively. Kernel densities show that a positive (negative) skewness increases with 
the size and/or the frequency of positive (negative) shocks. It can also be noted that the 
distribution of shocks of two different countries with close standard deviation may exhibit a 
contrasting asymmetry (see also figure 2.11). 
 
Figure 2.10. Kernel densities of the distribution of exports around a 12-year rolling mixed trend 
and its corresponding moments in Argentina, Algeria and Mexico. 
 
 ARGENTINA ALGERIA MEXICO 
 Std. Dev. = 20%  Std. Dev. = 15%  Std. Dev. = 7% 
 Skewness = 136%  Skewness = 71%  Skewness = −125% 
 Kurtosis = 433%   Kurtosis = 502% Kurtosis = 520% 
 
 
Table 2.5 and annex 2.E suggest that the coefficients of skewness display important discrepancies 
between reference values. Indeed, correlations between the skewness based on different trends are 
weak, except between HP-based measures of skewness. Figure 2.11 plots the standard deviations of 
exports against the skewness of exports around each reference value. The straight-line correlations 
obtained for each reference value suggest a fairly weak positive correlation, particularly once certain 
outliers are excluded.  
Thus, graphs in figures 2.10 and 2.11, and annex 2.F, stress that for a similar average magnitude of 
export fluctuations, the asymmetry of shocks may strongly differ.  The choice of the reference value 
is therefore likely to reflect a strikingly different history of shocks.  
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Table 2.5. Correlations between coefficients of skewness calculated over 1982-2005. 
 
(1) 
Global mixed trend 
(2) 
Rolling mixed trend 
(3) 
HP(6.5) 
(4) 
HP(100) 
 
Skewness calculated over the period 1982-2005 
(1) 1    
(2) 0.23* 1   
(3) 0.08* 0.14* 1  
(4) 0.29* 0.02 0.65* 1 
* Significant at 10%. Sample = 134 countries.  
 
Figure 2.11. Correlations between the standard deviation and the skewness of exports, by 
reference value. 
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4.4. The occurrence of abrupt export fluctuations 
A final dimension of the instability is the likelihood of abrupt deviations in a given statistical 
distribution. This dimension is measured by the fourth moment of the distribution of observations 
around their reference value, or the kurtosis. This value is calculated as a percentage of the 
reference value, as follows: 
22
4
ˆ
ˆ1
ˆ
ˆ1
100














−






−
×=
∑
∑
t t
tt
t t
tt
y
yy
T
y
yy
T
Kurtosis  (2.14)
 
with T= 1, …, t. The kurtosis is a measure of the relative peakedness or tails’ fatness of a statistical 
distribution. It indicates the extent to which the number of observations away from the mean is 
high compared with observations close to the mean. A low value indicates that the distribution 
tends to be uniformly distributed around the mean, while a high value indicates a distribution 
pointed around the mean with thick tails. Figure 2.12 illustrates three types of flattening of 
distributions of exports around their trend – platykurtic (kurtosis < 300%), mesokurtic (kurtosis = 
300%), and leptokurtic (kurtosis > 300%). As shown in this figure, the kurtosis gives an indication 
of the propensity of a variable to take high values in comparison to values around the trend. 
 
Figure 2.12. Graphical illustrations of a platykurtic, mesokurtic, and leptokurtic distributions of 
exports around a rolling mixed trend. 
 
 
 INDONESIA FINLAND GAMBIA 
 Std. Dev. = 9% Std. Dev. = 6%  Std. Dev. = 9% 
 Skewness = 21% Skewness = 23%  Skewness = -58% 
 Kurtosis = 195% Kurtosis = 299%  Kurtosis = 420% 
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The risk of kurtosis is seen as a major risk in finance, and on this basis, can be used as a measure of 
economic instability in its own right. As underlined by Rancière et al. (2008), a high value of 
kurtosis should be interpreted with caution since it may both “be generated either by extreme 
events or by a cluster of observations around the mean that affect the peakedness of the 
distribution” (p.386). They find that about one-fifth of their sample of countries exhibiting high 
kurtosis was affected by observations in the neighbourhood of the distribution centre. One should 
hence look carefully at country data or may combine an indicator of kurtosis with an indicator of 
skewness, to ensure that countries actually experienced sharp asymmetric fluctuations (this 
approach is carried out in chapter 4).  
Table 2.6 shows descriptive statistics for kurtosis-based indicators of instability. Distributions 
around reference values are on average slightly leptokurtic (higher than 300%). Distributions 
around the HP filter display in average a similar degree of flattening, but lower than those displayed 
by distributions around mixed trends. Table 2.7 and annex 2.G show correlations between 
indicators of kurtosis of distributions around the four reference values. These correlations are 
slightly stronger than the previous correlations between asymmetry coefficients. The occurrence of 
large-scale infrequent positive or negative deviations is logically less influenced by the choice of 
reference value than the asymmetry of fluctuations. However, correlations between rolling mixed 
trend-based and HP-based kurtoses are weak, suggesting again that the different trend computation 
methods reflect a pretty different history of shocks, even if these shocks are sharp and infrequent. 
 
Table 2.6. Descriptive statistics of coefficients of kurtosis calculated over 1982-2005. 
 
Kurt. (global mixed 
trend) 
Kurt. (rolling mixed 
trend) 
Kurt. 
(HP(6.5)) 
Kurt. 
(HP(100)) 
Mean (%) 352.7 367.9 320.0 312.2 
Standard 
deviation 
155.7 173.0 139.0 146.2 
Total sample: 134 countries. 
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Table 2.7. Correlations between coefficients of kurtosis calculated over 1982-2005 
 
(1) 
Kurt. (global mixed 
trend) 
(2) 
Kurt. (rolling mixed 
trend) 
(3) 
Kurt. (HP(6.5)) 
(4) 
Kurt. (HP(100)) 
(1) 1    
(2) 0.39* 1   
(3) 0.38* 0.28* 1  
(4) 0.49* 0.22* 0.62* 1 
*Significant at 5%. Sample = 134 countries.  
As suggested by figure 2.13, which illustrates the correlation between standard deviations and 
kurtoses of distributions around different reference values, the average magnitude of deviations 
seems quite unrelated to the occurrence of extreme ones. In figure 2.14, we compare scores of 
asymmetry with scores of kurtosis. A U-shaped relationship can be observed between the two 
indicators, with a turning point located close to a null skewness. Table 2.8 shows a strong positive 
correlation between these two indicators when the sample is limited to countries with a positive 
asymmetry, and a strong negative correlation for countries with a negative asymmetry. Moreover, it 
appears that high values of kurtosis are often associated with high positive values of skewness. This 
observation is consistent with a recent work of Bekaert and Popov (2012), who stress that the 
cross-sectional distribution of volatility is right-skewed, and is particularly true for distributions 
around mixed trends and the HP(100) filter. For an asymmetry between 0 and 100% in absolute 
value, these two dimensions of instability are however less related. Therefore, a low coefficient of 
asymmetry in absolute values refers to small-magnitude high-frequency deviations, while a high 
value refers to large-magnitude low-frequency deviations. Combining indicators of skewness with 
indicators of kurtosis may also help sizing country’s propensity to experience huge negative or 
positive external shocks. Chapter 4 gives an illustration of such an empirical approach. 
 
Table 2.8. Correlations between the skewness and the kurtosis of export distributions, by reference 
value, 1982-2005 
 Global mixed 
trend 
Rolling mixed 
trend 
HP (6.5) HP (100) 
Total sample +0.65* +0.51* +0.12* +0.35* 
Positive asymmetry (skewness>0%) +0.85* +0.83* +0.84* +0.91* 
Negative asymmetry (skewness<0%) -0.58* -0.48* -0.70* -0.45* 
Weak asymmetry  
skewness =[-100%; 100%] 
+0.24* +0.16* +0.33* +0.35* 
 *Significant at 5%. Sample = 134 countries. 
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Figure 2.13. Graphical illustrations of the correlation between the standard deviation and the 
kurtosis of export distributions, by reference value 
 
 
Figure 2.14. Graphical illustrations of the correlation between the skewness and the kurtosis of 
export distributions, by reference value 
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5. Conclusion 
The literature on macroeconomic instability issues is extensive and uses a great range of 
instability indicators. Approaches of measuring instability vary according to the choice of the 
reference value and the way deviations around it are summed. Although, in general, the literature 
is confined to the study of the causes and consequences of the average magnitude of economic 
fluctuations, it is worth extending the analysis to the effects of the asymmetry of fluctuations 
and the occurrence of extreme shocks. In fact, these aspects are separate dimensions of 
instability but largely overlooked by the economic literature on the subject.  
We present four popular trend calculation methods. The parametric approach of computing the 
trend is reliant on selecting an appropriate functional form. Applied to export revenue data, we 
set a mixed trend, including a deterministic and a random component, declined in two versions: 
a “global” mixed trend and a “rolling” mixed trend. In our view and when the data coverage is 
long enough, we opt for a “rolling” estimated trend rather than a “global” mixed trend, since the 
former enables estimated coefficients to better account for structural breaks. In another 
approach, we produced trend values by smoothing time series with statistical filter methods, 
with a low and a high smoothing parameter. Using filters does not require an a priori 
formalisation of the change in the series. It also offers the advantage of being more sensitive to 
structural breaks than parametric approaches presented in this chapter.  
Each trend computation method is not exempt from misspecification problems. Whether it be 
the period over which trends are estimated or the value of the smoothing parameter, trade-offs 
have to be made in accordance with the average trend evolution of the sample of countries. As 
developing countries are a significant part of our sample, a rolling trend estimated over a 15-20 
year period or a smoothing parameter set between 6 and 10 initially seemed appropriate, since 
the trend component in these countries is found to be more volatile than in developed 
countries.  
The parametric and the filter approaches are however conceptually different and are designed 
for different purposes. On the one hand, the HP filter is a two-sided filter often used for 
identifying business cycles and relating them to macroeconomic policy outcomes and long-run 
properties of developed and developing economies, with the underlying assumption of rational 
expectations of economic agents. On the other hand, parametric approaches of computing the 
trend are popular among macro and microeconomic studies on the effects of risk on economic 
agents’ production and consumption decisions, and rather rely on the hypothesis of 
extrapolative or adaptive expectations. 
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As indicators of instability intend to reflect a history of current and past shocks, we set out 
various options for summing deviations from the trend. On the basis of previous trend 
calculation methods, we compute indicators of instability for the magnitude, the asymmetry and 
the occurrence of extreme fluctuations. First, results show that indicators of the magnitude of 
export instability, measured by the standard deviation of exports, are strongly correlated with 
each other. Second, we find low correlations between indicators of the asymmetry of 
fluctuations, measured by the skewness of exports around their trend, and between indicators of 
the occurrence of extreme deviations, measured by the kurtosis of exports around their trend. 
Third, whatever the trend calculation method, the average magnitude of instability is found to 
be unrelated to its asymmetry and to the occurrence of extreme deviations. And fourth, 
whatever the trend calculation method, the asymmetry of instability is found to be strongly 
driven by the occurrence of extreme events. Thus, the coefficient of asymmetry seems 
particularly interesting because of its bi-dimensional nature. Not only does it express the degree 
of asymmetry of fluctuations around a trend over a given period, but it also reflects the 
frequency and size of fluctuations. 
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Chapter 3  
Building a Retrospective Economic 
Vulnerability Index62 
Construction and analysis of annual series 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The dramatic financial collapses that occurred in Asian countries at the end of the 90’s, along with 
the many socio-political conflicts that undermine growth rates in low-income countries, or the 
occurrence of huge climatic phenomenon affecting recurrently small island developing states in the 
Caribe and in the Pacific, raise the global concern for the vulnerability of developing states and 
citizens to economic, socio-political and climatic shocks (Guillaumont and Simonet, 2011; 
Guillaumont, 2009ab). The need for international specific support to vulnerable countries has been 
expressed by the 1971 UN general assembly, which lead to the creation of criteria for the 
identification of two groups of vulnerable countries, namely the Least-Developed Countries 
(LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). In 2000, an index of structural economic 
vulnerability, the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI), has been calculated and considered by the 
United Nations Committee for Development Policy (UNCDP) as an additional criterion along with 
the GNI per capita and the human capital level (measured by the Human Asset Index) for the 
identification of least developed countries (Guillaumont, 2009a). The structural economic 
vulnerability of countries, defined as the country likelihood of seeing its economic development 
process hindered by external trade-related shocks or domestic environmental/natural shocks, is 
indeed of interest as it results from factors independent of political will and policy (Guillaumont, 
                                                          
62 This chapter is based on a 2011 research working paper of the Foundation for Researches and Studies on International 
Development. It uses definitions of the Economic Vulnerability Index which are prior to the revisions made for the 
2012 review of the United Nations Committee for Development Policy. 
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2009ab). Since then, the EVI has been revised for the 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2012 triennial reviews 
of the UNCDP. 
Economic vulnerability results from three main determinants: the size and likelihood of shocks, the 
exposure to these shocks, and the resilience or the capacity for reacting to them (Guillaumont, 
2009). While the two former determinants mostly depend on country structural features 
(geographic localization, human capital, economic diversification, and so on), resilience rather relies 
on country policy responses to shocks. Therefore, structural economic vulnerability differs from 
policy-related vulnerability arising from state or financial fragility, in that it results from exogenous 
factors that are independent from the quality of governance. The emphasis placed on developing 
countries’ structural vulnerability is justified by the need for long run aid allocation criteria, which 
should not depend on transitory features such as economic policy. As stressed by Guillaumont 
(2009b, p.195),  
“if a vulnerability index is to be used in selecting certain countries for the allocation of long-
term support by the international community, what needs to be measured is, naturally, the 
structural vulnerability, which essentially results from the size of the shocks that can arise from a 
country’s exposure to them”.  
The EVI is a country-level synthetic index of the magnitude of shocks and exposure to them (UNCDP, 
2008). An index of the magnitude of shocks is computed, considering two main categories of 
shocks. First, the shock index intends to capture the effects of domestic natural shocks, including 
natural disasters – such as earthquakes or tsunamis – and climatic shocks – such as droughts, 
floods, or typhoons. Other domestic shocks like civil wars, political and social instabilities are not 
taken into account since they are at least partly endogenous. Second, the shock index also accounts 
for the effects of external shocks, which are related to trade and exchange, such as international 
commodity price instability, slumps in external demand, or fluctuations in world interest rates. As 
for the exposure to shocks, we compute an index which is negatively related to country size, 
positively related to country degree of specialisation in primary commodities, and positively related 
to country remoteness from world markets (Guillaumont, 2009ab).  
The EVI is an index between 0 and 100, a high score corresponding to a high level of vulnerability, 
and vice versa. UNCDP triennial reviews, available at the United Nations Department of Social and 
Economic Affairs (UNDESA) website63, provide vulnerability scores for 130 developing countries 
(in the 2009 review). However, these triennial reviews proposed by the CDP since 2000 do not 
allow intertemporal comparisons. In fact, three major changes in the calculation method have been 
                                                          
63 In the UNCDP 2012 review, definitions and components of the EVI have been refined. As the work carried out in this 
chapter was prior to this review, recent adjustments in the EVI calculation have not been yet taken into account. Annex 
3.E reports the new EVI definitions published on the UNDESA-CDP website.  
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made: i) between the 2000 and 2006/09 reviews, the EVI switched from a simple arithmetic 
average of five components to a weighted average of seven components; ii) two additional 
components have been included since the 2000 review, namely the share of homeless due to natural 
disaster in the population and remoteness from world markets; and iii) the share of manufacturing 
goods and modern services in GDP has been replaced by the share of agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries in GDP. Last but not least, components have not been revised in a way that enables 
comparisons of scores over time.  
As a consequence, triennial reviews do not allow an assessment of progresses made by countries 
regarding their structural vulnerability. The CERDI/FERDI, in collaboration with the UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, already attempted to calculate five-year and ten-year 
retrospective series of the EVI. The retrospective EVI database presented in this chapter goes 
further by providing annual scores from 1975 to 2008, consistent with the purpose of giving 
researchers and policy makers the opportunity to make cross-section and/or intertemporal 
comparisons. When calculating this retrospective data, we tried to follow as close as possible the 
method of the UNCDP 2009 review, detailed in the UNCDP (2008) Handbook on the least 
Developed Country Category. This chapter presents the method employed to construct the annual 
retrospective EVI, compares retrospective scores with scores of the UNCDP 2009 review, and 
exposes the main findings and trends of the retrospective series by country category. 
2. Definitions and general principles of calculation 
The retrospective EVI is a weighted average of seven indicators (or components), gathered into 
five sub-indexes (size, specialisation, location, trade shocks and natural shocks) among which are 
two shock sub-indexes (natural and trade shocks) and three exposure sub-indexes (size, 
specialization, location). The EVI, as calculated by the UNCDP 2009 review (UNCDP, 2008), 
results from the simple arithmetic average of: 
 The size and likelihood of shocks, which is a weighted average of the annual mean share of homeless 
due to natural disasters in the population (25%), the instability in the agricultural production 
(25%), and the instability in exports of goods and services (50%). 
 The exposure index, which is a weighted average of the population size (50%), the remoteness 
from world markets (25%), export concentration (12.5%), and the share of agriculture, forestry 
and fishery in GDP (12.5%). 
Table 3.1 below connects components, sub-indexes and indexes to their related data sources. 
 
Table 3.1. Indexes, sub-indexes, and components of the retrospective EVI 
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Components Data sources Sub-indexes Indexes 
Population (in log) World Bank (except Afghanistan, for which 
the United Nations data has been used) Size 
EXPOSURE 
Share of agriculture, forestry 
and fisheries in GDP. 
United Nations Statistics Division, United 
Nations National Accounts Main Aggregates 
Database Specialisation 
Export concentration UN Conference on Trade and development  
Remoteness from main world 
markets, adjusted for 
landlockness 
CERDI (exports of goods in current dollars, 
World Development Indicators) Location 
Instability of exports receipts CERDI (deflated exports of goods and 
services, United Nations). Trade shocks 
SHOCKS 
Instability of agricultural 
production 
Food and Agriculture Organization, United 
Nations 
Natural shocks 
Homeless due to natural 
disasters 
Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT) – 
WHO in collaboration with the Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED) –, and the World Bank – World 
Development Indicators database. 
 
2.1. The exposure to shocks 
The country exposure to shocks is an important dimension of economic vulnerability because, first, 
the impact of shocks is all the more important when country exposure to shocks is strong, and, 
second, the exposure to shocks also reflects the likelihood for a country to be harmed by future 
shocks. Following the UNCDP 2009 review, the exposure index comprises the following 
indicators: 
 Population size: because countries with small population size are more likely to be open to 
international trade, which in turn increases their exposure to trade shocks. 
 Merchandise export concentration: because when countries export a limited number of goods, the 
impact and likelihood of trade shocks are expected to be higher. 
 The share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in GDP: because countries depending on those sectors 
are more vulnerable to climatic shocks and international commodity price fluctuations. 
 Remoteness from main world markets: while being a structural handicap to growth and poverty 
reduction, remoteness from world markets particularly explains a greater exposure to trade and 
natural shocks. 
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2.2. The size of internal and external shocks 
The shock index reflects the average magnitude of domestic (internal) and trade-related (external) 
shocks experienced by developing countries. It consists of one sub-index reflecting the importance 
of climatic and other natural shocks – the climatic or natural shock index – and another sub-index 
reflecting the importance of trade or export fluctuations – the trade shock index. 
Climatic shocks and other natural shocks – earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, droughts, floods, etc. – 
represent an important source of vulnerability in many developing countries. Natural or climatic 
shocks are proxied by two variables: the annual mean share of homeless due to natural disasters in 
the population, and the instability in the agricultural production.  
Trade shocks are proxied by the instability in exports of goods and services, which reflects exogenous 
trade-related events such as slumps in external demand, or domestic events independent from 
economic policy, such as climatic shocks (Guillaumont, 2009ab). 
2.3. Normalization of components 
EVI scores, as well as those of its components, are normalized through the min-max procedure. It 
ranges original data from 0 to 100, where 0 and 100 are the normalized values for minimum and 
maximum values actually observed in our sample of countries. However, upper and lower time-
invariant boundaries have been imposed to the distributions, in order to prevent from possible 
distortions produced by distributions containing outliers or presenting excess kurtosis. Applying 
this procedure yields index values that are comparable over time. Each normalized component 
contributes positively to vulnerability (the closer to 100 the index, the more vulnerable the country). 
2.3.1. The min-max procedure 
Except for the population size, all other variables behind the calculation of EVI components 
contribute positively to structural vulnerability. For these variables, the min-max procedure consists 
in applying the following formula: 
 I = [(Value-Min)/(Max-Min)] x 100. 
Population size, which is negatively related to vulnerability, is normalized through the following 
operation: 
II = [(Max-Value)/(Max-Min)] x 100 or  II = 100 - I 
2.3.2. Lower and upper boundaries 
Table 3.2 exposes lower and upper boundaries used to normalize values of each component. These 
limits are the same as those used by the UNCDP in its 2009 review, except for the homeless 
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component. Indeed, the homeless component has been computed on a yearly basis in our 
retrospective series, while homeless in the UNCDP 2009 review is based on the cumulative sum of 
homelessness over 1990-2004.64 Thus, we had to modify boundaries used by the UNCDP so that 
they fit with annual retrospective data, dividing them by the number of years from 1990 to 2004, i.e. 
15 years. Section 3 provides further details on the way components have been computed. 
Table 3.2. Boundaries used for normalization 
Variables/components Lower boundary Upper boundary 
Population 150 000 100 000 000 
Remoteness 0.100 0.900 
Export concentration 0.100 0.950 
Share of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in GDP 
(%) 
0 60.00 
Homeless due to natural disasters (annual mean % 
of the population) 
0.0001 1.3 
Instability in the agricultural production 1.50 20.00 
Export instability  3.00 35.00 
 
2.4. Averaging of EVI components 
Following the UNCDP 2009 review, the EVI is a simple arithmetic average of exposure and shock 
indexes: 
EVI = 0,5 x Exposure + 0,5 x Shock. 
Exposure Index is the weighted average of the following sub-indexes: 
Exposure = 0,5 x Size + 0,25 x Location + 0,25 x Specialization. 
… and the specialization sub-index the simple arithmetic average of the following components: 
Specialization = 0,5 x Export concentration + 0,5 x Share of agriculture, forestry, fisheries in GDP. 
The shock index is the arithmetic average of natural shock and trade shock sub-indexes… 
Shock = 0,5 x Natural shock + 0,5 x Trade shock 
                                                          
64 See United Nations, Handbook on the Least Developed Country Category : Inclusion, Graduation and Special Support Measures, 
Committee for Policy Development and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Novembre 2008, p. 
53. 
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… and the natural shock sub-index the arithmetic average of homeless and instability in the 
agricultural production components: 
Natural shock = 0,5 x Homeless + 0,5 x Instability in the agricultural production 
The EVI’s architecture is represented in figure 3.1 below. When aggregating weights of each 
component, export instability represents 25% of the EVI, the homeless and instability in the 
agricultural production components both represent 12.5%, the size of population 25%, remoteness 
from world markets 12.5%, export concentration and the share of agriculture in GDP 6.25% (see 
box No.6 for a discussion of an alternative averaging method). Given that component scores are 
between 0 and 100 and that the sum of their weight equals 1, the EVI is between 0 and 100, a high 
score corresponding to a high level of vulnerability. 
 
Box No.6. An alternative averaging method, reflecting the interaction between shocks and 
the exposure to them 
The traditional arithmetic averaging, followed by the UNCDP, presupposes that indexes, sub-indexes, and 
components of the EVI are substitutes. Guillaumont (2009a) proposes alternative approaches of averaging 
EVI’s components, reflecting different interactions between and within shock and exposure indexes and their 
components.  
It is possible to perform a semi-geometric averaging, combining the geometric average of the two shock and 
exposure index with the arithmetic average of their respective components. The geometric averaging of the 
shock and exposure indexes supposes that they have multiplicative effects. In fact, the impact of increased 
size/frequency of shocks is higher in more exposed countries, while the effect of an increased exposure is 
higher the more important/frequent shocks are. By contrast, the arithmetic averaging of sub-indexes and their 
sub-components suggest they remain substitutable between each other. The geometric average consists in 
giving more weight to whichever of the two indexes is the lower, i.e. 
EVI	  	Exposure	 × shock, 
or giving more weight to whichever of the two indexes is the higher, i.e. 
EVI	  	1 −  1 − Exposure	! ×  1 − shock! 
The second solution is interesting when one wants to capture the huge impact of infrequent and abrupt shocks, 
such as Tsunami, in countries which are usually not exposed to these events. Other alternative averaging 
methods are further presented and discussed in Guillaumont (2009a). 
 
Source: Guillaumont, P, Caught in a Trap, Economica, 2009, p.201-205. 
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Figure 3.1. EVI averaging method 
i) shock index’s components (and their corresponding weights) 
 
ii) exposure index’s components (and their corresponding weights) 
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3. Calculation of the retrospective EVI  
The calculation of the retrospective EVI consists in combining contemporaneous values (at time t) 
of each component following the averaging method explained in sub-section 2.4. Obtaining 
retrospective and annual series however requires making some adjustments vis-à-vis UNCDP 
calculation principles.  
We built series covering 128 developing countries over 1975-2008. The sample is similar to that of 
the UNCDP 2009 review, except for two countries that have been removed, namely Israel and 
Brunei, because of their high level of GDP per capita. The sample includes 49 Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) and 63 Low Income Countries (LICs). The classification of LDCs corresponds 
to the list of LDCs established by the United Nations in 2007 (excluding Cap Verde from the list), 
while LICs have been identified according to the World Bank income group classification. In what 
follows we consider all countries presently LICs or formerly LICs between 1987 and 2009 as LICs. 
Moreover, we excluded Papua New Guinea and Zimbabwe from the “non LDCs” category because 
they have been eligible for their inclusion in the LDCs category (but refused it in 2006 and 2009, 
respectively).  
We explain in detail the calculation of each variable below. Annex 3.A provides a list of countries 
included in our sample and their corresponding country category (LICs or LDCs). Country EVI 
scores of LDCs are presented in annex 3.C.vii). EVI scores for the entire sample of countries are 
presented in annex 3.D, and ordered by decreasing ranking difference between scores of 
retrospective series and scores of the UNCDP 2009 review. Averages by country income group are 
presented in section 4.2 (and in Annex 3.C).  
3.1. Population size 
We did not encounter difficulties with the computation of this component as annual raw data from 
the WDI database are available for the entire sample. For Afghanistan, data prior to 1990 are World 
Bank’s, while data posterior to 1990 are United Nations’. Population size is then expressed in 
logarithm and normalized using the inversed min-max procedure with the corresponding boundaries 
presented in table 2. 
3.2. Remoteness from world markets, adjusted for landlockness 
The remoteness component is the trade weighted average distance from world markets. Two sets 
of data are required: the bilateral distance (in kilometres) between the country and world main’s 
exporters, and the share of each world exporter in total world exports. Then, trade-weighted 
bilateral distances are summed up until the cumulative share of exports of all possible combination 
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of these trade partners reaches 33% of the world markets (the UNCDP established a threshold of 
50% in the 2009 review). It is then minimized according the following formula: 
Distance from world markets = Min ∑
=
k
j Xwld
XjDij
1
*  (3.1a) 
With the country i and the trade partner j, k the combination of trade partners allowing to reach 
33% of the world market with a minimal distance, Dij the bilateral distance between country i and 
partner j, and Xj and Xwld total exports of trading partner j and total world exports, respectively. 
Beyond the proper effect of distance, landlockness is another structural handicap, which is often 
associated with increased barriers to trade and higher transport costs, for a given distance to the 
world markets. Distance has hence been adjusted for this additional handicap by applying an 
adjustment coefficient of 15% for landlocked countries. Thus, the remoteness component finally 
consists in applying the formula: 
Remoteness = [0,85*lnD + 0,15*L] (3.1b) 
With D the normalized Distance from world markets (min-max procedure), and L a dummy variable 
indicating whether the country is landlocked (L=1) or not (L=0). The remoteness index is available 
from 1975 to 2007 on an annual basis. In 2008, we used data of 2007. 
It worth mentioning that data were missing in the following countries: Kiribati, Maldives, St Kitts & 
Nevis, Timor Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. We therefore fill in missing data by copying 
remoteness scores of relevant neighboring countries. Thus, missing data from: 
• Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu equals data from Salomon Islands; 
• Maldives equals data from Sri Lanka; 
• St Kitts and Nevis equals data from Antigua and Barbuda; 
• Timor Leste equals data from Indonesia; 
• Tonga equals data from Samoa. 
3.3. Merchandise export concentration index 
The export concentration index is derived from the Herfindhal index applied to exports of 
merchandises (excluding services) as categorised by the three-digit level of the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC). This index is between 0 and 1, a high level of 
concentration being associated with a score close to 1. A country exporting only one product would 
score 1 according to this index. The derived Herfindhal Index formula is the following: 
Chapter 3 – Building a retrospective EVI 
Page | 115  
H j =
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X j
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∑ − 1 n
1 − 1 n
 (3.2a) 
Where j is the country index, xi is the value of exports of commodity i, Xj the total exports of 
country j, and n the number of products at the three-digit SITC level. The index is then normalized 
using the min-max procedure with the bounds specified in table 2. 
In 1971, 1977, 1978 and 1979, data is missing for the entire sample. Gaps have been filled using a 
centered moving average of the closest past and future available data: 
Concent_1t= (concentrationt-k + concentrationt+k)/2 (3.2b) 
k is set according to the availability of previous and future data. For instance, in 1971, interpolated 
data is the average of 1970 and 1972. In 1977, data is the average of 1976 and 1978; in 1978, data is 
the average of 1976 and 1980; and in 1979, we averaged data from 1978 and 1980. 
When missing data is dispersed, two additional methods have been applied: 
• Data is copied from previous (t-k) or later (t+k) available data. 
Concent_2t=Concentrationt-/+k (3.2c) 
• Data is interpolated by adding to the last available observation a variation corresponding to the 
difference between this last observation (t-p) and the next one (t+q), weighted by the ratio of 
the number of years passed since the last observation over the total number of years between 
the last and the next observations: 
Concent_3t=concentrationt-p + [(p+1)/(p+q+1)]* (concentrationt+q - concentrationt-p) (3.2d) 
Finally, even after these procedures, data is still missing in 2007 and/or 2008 for the following 
countries: Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Tonga, Timor Leste, Somalia, Salomon Island, Sierra Leone, 
Mauritania, Lesotho, Kiribati, Iraq, Dominica, Djibouti, Comoros, Chad, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. 
To address this issue, we extrapolated missing data using the annual mean growth rate of country 
export concentration index between 1975 and 2006/2007. 
3.4. Share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in GDP 
Raw data has been retrieved from the United Nations National Accounts Main Aggregates 
Database. The min-max procedure with the bounds specified in table 2 has then been applied to the 
data. 
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For Timor Leste, the value in 1995 has been applied to previous years from 1975 to 1994; while for 
Yemen, values from 1975 to 1988 are the weighted averages of the two Yemen values. 
3.5. Homeless due to natural disasters 
The construction of the homeless component required to adapt the method of the UNCDP in a 
manner that we obtain annual data and fill in missing data for a large number of countries. Raw 
data is gathered from various databases (Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT) – WHO in 
collaboration with the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) –, and the 
World Bank – World Development Indicators database) and covers 1970-2008. In some countries 
data is missing over the whole period, while in other countries data is missing for a few years, which 
again imposed making some extrapolations. 
In the UNCDP 2009 review, the homeless component is the cumulative sum of homelessness from 
1990-2007, divided by the national population during the middle of the period (1998/99). In order 
to obtain annual series, we computed, for each year, the cumulative annual mean share of 
homelessness in the population. 
First, we computed the cumulated yearly-averaged number of homeless for each year. For instance, 
in 1979, we added up the number of homeless people from 1970 to 1979 and divided it by the 
number of years since 1970, i.e. 10 years. In 1980, we added up the number of homeless people 
from 1970 to 1980 and divided it by the number of years since 1970, i.e. 11 years, and so on. We 
then computed each year the ratio between the yearly-averaged number of homeless and the annual 
population size. The resulting annual mean share of homeless in the population was then expressed in 
logarithm and normalized through the min-max procedure (using boundaries presented in table 2).  
To summarize, the construction of an annual retrospective homeless component consists in 
applying the following formula: 
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For countries with missing data over the whole period, we followed three distinct procedures to 
approximate it. 
3.5.1. First procedure 
We predicted missing data by an Ordinary Least Square regression of the logarithm of the annual 
mean share of homeless in the population over the annual mean share of people affected by natural 
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disasters in the population of neighbouring countries. Estimates were then used to extrapolate 
homeless data from data on people affected by natural disasters: 
• For Equatorial Guinea, relevant chosen neighbouring countries are Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
• For Timor Leste relevant chosen neighbouring countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New 
Guinea, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
Estimates are reported in Annex 3.B. 
3.5.2. Second procedure 
We extrapolated missing data by averaging neighbouring countries' annual mean share of homeless 
in the population: 
• For Cote d’Ivoire, we averaged values from Burkina Faso, Liberia, and Mali. 
• For Libya, we averaged values from Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Chad. 
• For Grenada, we averaged values from Trinidad-and-Tobago, St. Lucie, St Vincent, 
Dominica, Antigua-and-Barbuda, and Barbados. 
• For Gabon, we averaged values from the Republic of Congo and Cameroon.  
3.5.3. Third procedure 
We replaced missing data by the annual mean share of homeless in the population of a relevant 
neighbouring country. 
• For Singapore, the data was taken from Malaysia; 
• For Sierra Leone, the data was taken from Cameroon; 
• For Surinam, the data was taken from Guyana. 
3.6. Instabilities in exports receipts and agricultural production 
Raw data on exports of goods and services (deflated by the import unit value index in developing 
countries) and agricultural production (net PIN base 1999-2001 in dollars) have been retrieved 
from United Nations National accounts and Food and Agriculture Organization, respectively.  
Following the parametric approach presented in chapter 2, the measurement of instability consists 
in averaging deviations of the observed value of export proceeds from their trend, estimated over a 
finite time interval. For these retrospective series of EVI, we follow the general principles 
governing the calculation of instability in the UNCDP 2009 review: (i) the reference value is a 
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mixed trend (deterministic and stochastic) estimated over a period specified below, (ii) instability 
indicators are measured as the standard deviation of the prediction error calculated over the same 
period. However, instabilities calculated for the retrospective EVI differ from those of the UNCDP 
2009 review, in that the retrospective (and annual) nature of series constrained us to compute 
standard deviations on a rolling basis, and over a shorter period than the UNCDP does.  
Thus, 
• in regard to the instability in the agricultural production: while the UNCDP chose a 
16-year period (1990-2005), we chose a rolling 15-year period to compute standard 
deviations, i.e. a period covering the current year and the 14 previous years65; 
• in regard to the instability in exports of goods and services: while the UNCDP chose a 
28-year period, we proceeded in the same way as we did for instability in the agricultural 
production by choosing a rolling 15-year period. 
Regarding trends estimation, we apply the formula described in chapter 2, which consists in 
estimating a mixed trend, including a deterministic component and a stochastic component: 
tYYLog Tt
TTT
t t
.ˆ log.ˆˆˆ 1 γβα ++= −  (3.4a) 
with Y the export receipts or agricultural production variable, t the deterministic trend, and T the 
period of estimation. Trend values are estimated over the current and last 14 years, that is, T = (t-
14; t). Predictions of log yt are then rescaled using an exponential transformation. The indicator of 
instability is the 15-year standard deviation of the prediction error in per cent of the trend: 
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To sum up, the construction of an annual retrospective EVI involved to make marginal 
adjustments from the UNCDP 2009 review, concerning the calculation of four (among seven) 
components of the EVI. Regarding the remoteness component, the share of world market has been 
modified and established at 33% of world exports (while 50% in the UNCDP last review). 
Regarding the homeless component, the annual mean share of homeless in the population replaced 
the share of homeless in the population cumulated from 1990 to 2007. Thus, an annual averaging 
has been preferred to an 18 year-based averaging. Regarding instability components, we chose to 
compute instabilities in exports and agricultural production over the same reference period, 15 
                                                          
65 As a consequence, computing instability in 1975 requires raw data starting in 1961, which is actually the case for a 
limited number of countries. 
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years, instead of two longer but different periods in the UNCDP review.66 These changes explain 
why retrospective EVI scores may in certain cases slightly differ from those of the UNCDP review. 
We provide in the next section further insights into the way the retrospective EVI behaves, first by 
comparing 2006 scores with respect to those of the UNCDP 2009 review, and then by analysing its 
retrospective evolution by country category. 
4. Statistical highlights 
In this section, we propose a comparative analysis of retrospective EVI scores in 2006 and scores 
of the UNCDP 2009 review. We also analyse main trends taken by the retrospective EVI and its 
components, in developing countries and different categories of developing countries. Further 
empirical highlights are provided in Annexes 3.C and 3.D. 
4.1. Comparing retrospective EVI scores with those of the UNCDP 2009 Review 
We compare scores and rankings of the retrospective EVI in 2006 with those of the UNCDP 2009 
review, in order to check the validity of our methodology and to identify sources of divergences 
between these two databases. We chose the year 2006 as benchmark because periods of computing 
components of the 2006 retrospective EVI are the closest to those of UNCDP 2009 review. As a 
reminder, we expect the following variables to show the most noticeable differences: 
Exposure index: 
 Remoteness from world markets: in the UNCDP 2009 review, the share of world market is set at 
50%, while in the retrospective series this share is set at 33%. 
Shock index: 
 Homeless due to natural disasters: in the UNCDP 2009 review, homelessness has been added 
over the 1990-2007 period and weighted by national population in 1998/1999. In the 
retrospective series, we computed each year the annual mean share of homelessness in the 
population. 
 Instability in the agricultural production: in the UNCDP 2009 review, the period chosen to 
compute instability in agricultural production starts in 1990 and ends in 2005, while in the 
2006 retrospective EVI, the instability in the agricultural production has been calculated 
over the 1992-2006 period. Given the proximity between the periods chosen, very few 
differences are expected. 
                                                          
66 16 and 28 years for these two instabilities respectively. 
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 Instability  in export earnings: in the UNCDP 2009 review, the period chosen to compute 
instability in exports covers 1980-2007, while in the 2006 retrospective EVI, it has been 
calculated from 1992-2006. 
Thus, the main causes of divergences between these two versions of EVI should be the 
“Homeless” and “Instability in exports” components. Figure 3.2 plots scores of vulnerability 
provided by the UNCDP 2009 review (x axis) against those of the retrospective EVI in 2006 (y 
axis). This figure shows a strong positive and significant correlation between the two versions of 
the EVI, confirmed by a 94% rank correlation.  
Figure 3.2. Correlation between the EVI-UNCDP 2009 and the 2006 retrospective EVI 
Rank correlation = 94% 
 
Nevertheless, discrepancies between the two EVI arise at high levels of vulnerability. Figure 3.3 
shows that these divergences between the two versions of EVI are mainly explained by differences 
in shock index scores (rank correlation of 83%). Figure 3.4 compares scores between each 
component of shock indexes. As stressed earlier, the “homeless” and “exports instability” 
components are the main sources of divergence between the retrospective EVI and the UNCDP 
2009 review, with rank correlations of 68% and 85% respectively. However, the graph plotting 
scores of “homeless” shows a de facto stronger correlation between the two databases than fitted 
values suggest. Indeed, the strength and the significance of the correlation appears to be 
understated since the new retrospective “homeless” indicator gives scores higher than 0 for various 
countries which had null scores in the UNCDP 2009 review. 
In regard to instability indicators, instability in agricultural production scores display, as expected, a 
strong rank correlation (96%). Exports instability scores, despite a weaker (but still strong) 85% 
rank correlation, are sometimes dispersed for more unstable countries. In the retrospective EVI 
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database, yearly export instabilities have been calculated over a rolling 15-year period (1992-2006 
for the retrospective EVI in 2006) while in the UNCDP 2009 review the export instability 
component has have been calculated over a 28-year period (1980-2007). As a consequence, export 
instability in the UNCDP 2009 review is on average higher than in the retrospective series because: 
i) important episodes of instability in exports that occurred in the 80’s are not taken into account in 
the retrospective series; ii) trends around which annual deviations are averaged are less sensitive to 
medium term variations when the period over which they have been estimated is longer (see 
chapter 2, subsection 3.2.3), which results in larger residuals. As a consequence, countries seeing the 
largest gaps between the two scores are located in the bottom-right side of the chart in figure 3.4, 
meaning that UNCDP instability scores tend to be higher, in average. 
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.Figure 3.3. Correlations between the UNCDP 2009 and the 2006 retrospective shock and exposure 
indexes 
i) Shock index 
Rank correlation = 83% 
 
ii) Exposure index 
Rank correlation = 99% 
 
Chapter 3 – Building a retrospective EVI 
Page | 123  
Figure 3.4. Correlations between shock index components 
i) Homeless index (rank correlation = 68%) 
 
ii) Instability in agricultural production (rank correlation = 96%) 
 
iii) Instability in export earnings (rank correlation = 85%) 
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4.2. Evolution of the retrospective EVI and its components, by country category 
What have been the main trends of structural vulnerability in developing countries? Graphs 
thereafter presented give some insights into the way economic vulnerability evolved in developing 
countries over the last decades. They expose averaged evolutions of the EVI and its components by 
group of countries from 1984 to 2008.67 Annex 3.C provides further results regarding average 
scores of EVI and its components by country group and by decade, as well as their corresponding 
Wilcoxon mean tests. Figure 3.5 and tables 3.C.i) and 3.C.ii) in annex C show the average evolution 
of structural vulnerability in the following groups of countries: all developing countries, LICs, non-
LICs, LDCs, non-LDCs, LICs-non-LDCs and LDCs-also-LICs.  
Figure 3.5. Evolution of the EVI by group of countries. 
 
 
While the EVI has been in average decreasing when considering the whole sample, vulnerability 
trends by category of countries evidence two main schemes of evolution. On the one hand, 
vulnerability in LICs, LDCs, LDCs-also-LICs and LICs-non-LDCs showed an inversed U-curve 
evolution with a turning point occurring in the second half of the 90’s. LDCs and LICs display a 
similar pattern of evolution as they both came back in 2008 to a level of vulnerability close to 1984. 
It can be noticed that vulnerability in LDCs-also-LICs converged toward that of the LDCs, which 
                                                          
67 Results presented in this subsection are obtained from a sample of 127 developing countries, among which include 48 
LDCs, 63 LICs, 43 LDCs also LICs and 18 LICs non LDCs. Timor Leste (LDC) has been excluded from the sample 
because data is missing until 2004. EVI scores prior to 1984 are not available for the whole sample. 
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is not surprising since many LDCs are also LICs.68 By contrast, the LICs-non-LDCs group 
experienced a rapid collapse of its vulnerability since 2000, which made it diverge from LDCs. On 
the other hand, trends in vulnerability scores of non-LDCs and non-LICs categories have been 
strictly declining since 1987 up until 2008. As a consequence, the gap between the most vulnerable 
groups of countries (LDCs and LICs) and the least vulnerable ones (non-LICs and non-LDCs) has 
been increasing until the mid-90’s, and has then been stabilizing during the second half of the 1984-
2008 period. From 1984 to 2008, the LDC category remains the most vulnerable category of 
countries, while the group of LICs-non-LDCs remains the least vulnerable one. 
Table 3.3. Correlations between within standard deviations of the EVI and those of its components 
 Retrospective EVI 
Exposure index  21% 
Population 10% 
Remoteness 3% 
Exports concentration 27% 
Share of agriculture, …, in GDP 30% 
Shock index  96% 
Homeless 19% 
Instability in agricultural production 31% 
Exports instability 88% 
Table 3.3 exposes correlations of intra-individual (at the country level) standard deviations of the 
EVI with intra-individual standard deviations of its components. It appears that the shock index 
explains most of the within variation in country vulnerability scores. Indeed, shock index country-
level standard deviations are found to be 96% correlated with EVI country-level standard 
deviations, while exposure index standard deviations exhibit a 21% correlation with those of the 
EVI. Among components of the shock index, exports instability is the main source of changes in 
vulnerability scores. Actually, export instability intra-individual standard deviation displays an 88% 
correlation with the EVI standard deviation. Thus, time variability in EVI scores seems mainly 
driven by the evolution of the shock index, in particular that of the export instability component. 
 
 
                                                          
68 Actually six LDCs are not LICs. See Annex 3.A. 
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Figure 3.6. Respective evolution of exposure and shock indexes, 1984-2008. 
i) LDCs versus non-LDCs countries 
 
ii) LICs versus non-LICs countries 
 
iii) LICs-also-LDCs versus LICS-non-LDCs 
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However, figure 3.6 and annex 3.C.i) show that, though the exposure index declined in all 
categories of countries, the level of exposure to shocks is a also a great source of divergence 
between categories’ average vulnerability scores. But the shock index remains the main driver of 
time variations in average vulnerability scores. Indeed, the turning point in vulnerability scores 
observed in LDCs, LICs, LICs-non-LDCs can also be observed in the evolution of shock scores. 
The sole category seeing a strict increase in its average shock index between 1995 and 2006 is the 
group of LDCs-also-LICs, which explains why vulnerability decreases less in this category than in 
LDCs and why both are converging since 1995. The category of LICs-non-LDCs also exhibits 
specific trends since it is the unique group experiencing a simultaneous decrease in both exposure 
and shock scores since 1997. One possible explanation is the inclusion in this group of current 
emerging economies that were formerly LICs (e.g. China, India, or Indonesia), and which saw their 
exposure and shock indexes strongly decreasing during the last two decades. 
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 plot the evolutions of shock and exposure indexes’ components by country 
group. Looking at trends in shock index components, we first observe that all categories 
underwent, on average, a positive and continuous growth of their homeless component during the 
entire period. LDCs and LICs experienced a slight increase in their exports instability component 
and a relative stagnation of their agricultural instability component during the first two decades, but 
saw them both decreasing since the late 90’s. The decline in the shock index in LDCs-also-LICs 
observed in 2006 (see figure 3.6) is corroborated by a decline in the two instability components. In 
regard to groups of non-LDCs and non-LICs, the decrease in their shock index also seems to be 
both driven by a decrease in agricultural and exports instability components. The analysis of trends 
evolution tend to confirm that the instability in exports component, and in a lesser extent the 
instability in agricultural production component, contribute significantly to time variations in 
country group vulnerability scores.  
It is worth noting that the rise in the annual mean share of homeless in the population observed in 
all categories is statistically explained by a improved country coverage of the indicator through time. 
Indeed, as missing data decreases over time, the number of countries that previously had null scores 
diminishes in all categories, which logically increases group averages. Thus, the rise in the index 
observed in figure 3.7 does not imply a de facto rise in countries’ share of homeless in the population 
since 1984. 
As for exposure index components, the rise in the population size and the downturn in the share of 
agriculture, forestry and fishery in GDP, common for many countries, mostly contributed to the 
decrease in the exposure index in all categories. The rapid decline in the exposure index in both 
LDC and LIC categories is partly due to the remoteness component, which has been decreasing for 
these two groups during the last two decades. This feature may be explained by recent changes in 
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the location of world markets in favour of LDCs and LICs, illustrated by the emergence of new 
leading exporting countries such as China, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and so on. 
5. Conclusion 
We introduced in this chapter our retrospective Economic Vulnerability Index, and provided a 
comparative analysis of retrospective vulnerability scores with those of the UNCDP 2009 review. If 
our methodology closely follows definitions and sources of variables used for the elaboration of the 
EVI in the UNCDP 2009 review, the retrospective nature of our index implied some changes in the 
computation of shock index components – namely the homeless, instability in the agricultural 
production and instability in exports components. Comparisons between the retrospective EVI in 
2006 and the UNCDP 2009 review show a strong 94% rank correlation. If the retrospective 
exposure index is almost perfectly correlated with its counterpart of the UNCDP 2009 review, the 
shock index is the main source of divergence between the two versions of EVI. 
Then, we exposed retrospective EVI’s main trends as well as those of its components. It appears 
that, according to this new retrospective index, vulnerability in developing countries slightly 
declined over the 1987-2008 period, in average. However, the evolution of structural vulnerability 
displays disparities among groups of countries. In particular, LICs and LDCs categories saw their 
structural vulnerability rising continuously until the mid-90s, while other categories (non-LDCs and 
non-LICs) experienced a early decrease, starting by the end of the 80’s. The retrospective series 
evidenced that LDCs, as classified by the UNs in 2007, are the most vulnerable countries, from 
1984 to 2008. A further analysis of EVI components’ main trends reveals that the export instability 
component is the main driver of changes in vulnerability scores over time.  
  
Chapter 3 – Building a retrospective EVI 
Page | 129  
Figure 3.7. Evolution of shock index components – 1984-2008. 
i) LDCs versus non-LDCs countries 
 
ii) LICs versus non-LICs countries 
 
iii) LICs-also-LDCs versus LICS-non-LDCs 
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Figure 3.8. Evolution of exposure index components – 1984-2008. 
i) LDCs versus non-LDCs countries 
 
ii) LICs versus non-LICs countries 
 
iii) LIC-also-LDCs versus LICS-non-LDCs 
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Chapter 4 
When corruption is a response to export 
instability 
Country and firm-level evidence 
 
“On dit qu'au fond d'une urne habite l'espérance ; Au fond d'un pot de vin cherchons notre assurance.”  
Édouard Pailleron, Le Parasite. 
 
1. Introduction 
As the columnist Eduardo Porter pointed out in the New York Times, if trust in institutions and 
perceptions of good governance are probably better off during good times than during hard times 
(Stevenson and Volfers, 2011; Kaplan and Panthania, 2010), there is in parallel a high temptation 
for fraud, embezzlement and other corruption offences during “the general prosperity of economic 
booms”.69 His view strongly coincides with a former work of Galbraith (1997), who stresses that 
economic crises are often followed by scandals of large-scale corruption, revealing the prevalence 
of malpractices in the administration of public and private affairs prior to economic reversal. The 
2008 worldwide financial crisis and its consequences on national public accounts and fiscal solvency 
are striking illustrations of this complex link between public and private sector governance and 
output fluctuations. While poor norms of transparency and lack of accountability mechanisms in 
the management of public and private funds contributed to the dramatic economic collapse 
                                                          
69 Eduardo Porter “The Spreading Scourge of Corporate Corruption”, in The New York Times, July 10, 2012. 
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experienced by industrialized economies, these malpractices found a fertile ground in the 
recklessness and opulence of economic and financial expansion. 
The relationship between governance quality and output fluctuations has already been emphasised 
by the economic literature. On the one hand, the contribution of bad governance to the instability 
of output is evidenced in important cross-country analyses, such as Acemoglu et al. (2003) or 
Mobarak (2005). On the other hand, Rodrik (2000), and more recently Arin et al. (2011), show that 
the ability of governments to handle economic crisis depends on the quality of institutions. 
According to Rodrik (2000), democratic institutions encourage political consensus around policy 
responses to external shocks, while Arin et al. (2011) find that corrupt OECD countries are less 
likely to rebalance their budget during serious attempts of fiscal consolidation. Thus, according 
these studies and in the light of the recent economic events, the contour of a vicious circle between 
bad governance and the instability of output looms: economic shocks are more likely to occur, and 
their destabilizing effects are more likely to persist, where institutions fostering good public and 
private governance are weaker.  
The missing (or under-documented) element of this puzzling equation is the reverse causality, 
namely, the impact of output fluctuations on institutions and governance quality. The consequences 
of economic fluctuations on institutional variables have been so far studied by very few 
contemporaneous empirical studies. Brückner and Ciccone (2011) find a positive effect of adverse 
shocks on the quality of institutions, arguing that citizens are likely to voice their discontent and 
hasten democratic change during hardships. By contrast, others advance that transient economic 
booms may foster illegal enrichment of agents in charge of public affairs in 29 African countries 
(Voors et al., 2011), and 39 developed and emerging countries (Gokcekus and Suzuki, 2011). 
Building on these recent contributions, we provide additional insights into the effects of economic 
instability on corruption, at both macro and micro levels. While taking into account the pro-cyclical 
relationship between transient output movements and corruption stressed by Voors et al. (2011) 
and Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011), we advance that corrupt transactions may also arise from the 
necessity to protect against the detrimental effects of income fluctuations on welfare. In other 
words, corruption may represent a response to risk, together with the usual risk-coping and risk-
management strategies emphasised by analyses of households saving and insurance decisions 
(Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Dercon, 1996, 2002; Elbers et al. 2007).  
A striking illustration of a risk-coping corruption strategy is when a firm undergoing adverse shocks 
bribes to get rid of the “state burden” – e.g. excessive red tape, taxation, or custom duties – and, in 
so doing, relaxes its liquidity or budgetary constraint. On the other hand, an example of a risk-
management corruption strategy is when trade-related or natural sources of economic instability 
makes future market demand, tax rates, public spending or subsidies unpredictable, so that bribes 
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are paid by private agents to secure future revenue inflows. Such a ‘resource-locking corruption 
strategy’ may consist in buying protection from foreign competition through political corruption, or 
illegally influencing procurement procedures for the award of public tenders.  
Similar strategies may also be adopted by public agents, when politicians and public officials cope 
with adverse income shocks by increasing extortion or embezzling public funds; or when public 
procurement officers corrupt higher-level officials to secure their monopoly and discretionary 
powers over public tenders and to maintain their income stable.  
Along this chapter, we focus on corrupt transactions involving both public and private agents, 
considering corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency 
International, 2009, p.24). We place the emphasis on the instability in the constant value of export 
earnings, since exports are a major mostly-external source of output fluctuations, with strong 
destabilizing effects on growth, tax, and redistribution policy (Guillaumont 2010, 2009ab; Jones and 
Olken, 2010; Easterly et al., 1993; Bevan et al., 1993). Building on researches made by Guillaumont 
and Demeocq (1989), Bardhan and Udry (1999), Dercon (1996, 2002), and Elbers et al. (2007), we 
assume that export instability has ex ante and ex post effects on corruption, resulting from agents’ 
perception and experience of economic instability. We identify the ex ante and ex post effects of 
instability using measures of instability based on the standard deviation and the skewness of the 
distribution of exports around their trend, respectively.  
Ex ante and ex post effects of instability are tested on measures reflecting corruption prevalence at 
both macro and micro-levels. On the one hand, fixed effect (FE), instrumental variable (IV) and 
system-Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimations are conducted on a panel of 68 
developed and developing countries covering the period 1985-2005, using data on corruption 
perceptions taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). On the other hand, as 
corruption perceptions are probably influenced by business cycles (Stevenson and Volfers, 2011; 
Kaplan and Panthania, 2010), we run comparable Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and IV cross-
section estimations on a sample of more than 9000 firms clustered in 23 developing countries, 
using data on bribes paid by firms drawn from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES). 
Country-level and firm-level estimates provide evidence of nonlinear ex post and ex ante effects of 
instability, depending on the frequency and size of export fluctuations and on the liquidity 
constraint faced by economic agents.  
The next section presents our conceptual framework. Section 3 presents the data and our empirical 
approach. In sections 4, 5 and 6, we expose and comment our main empirical results. Robustness 
checks are performed in section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
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2. Conceptual framework: how does instability impact corruption? 
Following the distinction between household’s responses to instability in incomes proposed by 
Elbers et al. (2007), we posit there exists ex post and ex ante effects of instability on corrupt 
behaviours (see box no.4.1). According to these authors, 
“a household’s economic decisions (for example, on savings) are affected by risk in two ways: 
through the household’s experience of shocks and through its perception of the distribution of the 
shocks it faces. (…). Hence, the ex ante effect results from the household’s view of the world: two 
households that differ in their perception of the risks they face but that are identical in all other 
aspects will in general make different investment decisions. By contrast, the ex post effect measures 
the impact of the shocks themselves”.70 
Thus, the ex post effect of instability refers to the agent’s experience of instability and its consequences 
on income and welfare. As for the ex ante effect, it refers to agent’s perception of instability and the 
way he adjusts his behaviour to lower his exposure to it, regardless the actual impact of shocks.71 
Transposing this framework to the analysis of corruption determinants, we identify two types of ex 
post effects of economic instability on corruption schemes, acting in opposite ways:  
• opportunistic corruption (Voors et al., 2011; Gokcekus and Suzuki, 2011), which feeds on the 
mechanical ups and downs in opportunities for corruption following ups and downs in 
economic activity; and  
• survival corruption, which spreads when resources become scarcer and when formal and 
informal risk coping mechanisms cannot fully cushion economic hardships.  
As for the ex ante effect of instability on corruption, i.e. the effect of instability through agents’ 
perception of shocks, we draw a parallel between corruption strategies and risk-management strategies 
aimed at reducing the risk in the income generating process. In this regard, we posit that agents 
perceiving their economic environment as unstable may engage in resource-locking corrupt 
transactions, that is, they may reduce ex ante the variance of their income by locking future 
resource inflows through bribery. These effects of economic fluctuations on corrupt schemes are 
illustrated in figure 4.1 and further explained below. 
                                                          
70 Elbers, C., Gunning, J.W., and B.H. Kinsey (2007) “Growth and Risk: Methodology and Micro Evidence”, World Bank 
Economic Review, Vol.21, No.1, p.4.  
71 This distinction between the ex ante and ex post effects of instability made by Elbers et al. (2007) echoes that made by 
Guillaumont and Demeocq (1989) between the risk effects of export instability, related to the uncertainty in export 
fluctuations, and the ratchet effects of export instability, relying on the asymmetrical reactions ton ups and downs in 
export earnings. 
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Figure 4.1. Economic instability, risk, and corruption strategies 
 
Source: author. 
 
Box No. 7. Households’ strategies to protect against economic fluctuations. 
The literature on the link between risk, saving and consumption in developing countries emphasises the effects of 
income fluctuations on microeconomic decisions (Elbers et al. 2007; Dercon, 2002, 1996; Paxson, 1992; Alderman 
and Paxson, 1992). The absence or incompleteness of credit and insurance markets in developing countries fosters 
the use by households of sophisticated strategies to protect against income shocks. These strategies commonly fall 
into two main categories: risk-coping and risk-management strategies. 
Risk-coping strategies are mechanisms implemented by households to smooth the impact of positive or negative 
income shocks on their consumption through time or across individuals. Households may accomplish inter-temporal 
consumption smoothing by saving during positive shocks and dissaving during negative shocks, by increasing labour 
supply or borrowing on formal and informal credit markets during hardships, and by accumulating assets or storing 
consumption goods. Inter-households consumption smoothing can be ensured through formal risk-sharing 
mechanisms such as insurance markets, or through informal risk-sharing mechanisms such as transfers between 
relatives, friends, or neighbours. While inter-temporal consumption smoothing strategies are effective against 
idiosyncratic (individual) and covariate (common, aggregate, economy-wide) shocks, risk-sharing mechanisms are 
effective against idiosyncratic shocks only.  
To summarize, risk-coping strategies are often referred as consumption smoothing strategies (when 
implemented by producer-consumer households), resulting from individuals’ experience of idiosyncratic (inter-
temporal consumption smoothing and risk-sharing) and/or covariate (inter-temporal consumption smoothing) 
shocks. Thus, risk-coping strategies are considered as an ex post effect of risk or instability, as they are 
implemented following the occurrence of economic shocks. 
Risk-management strategies are undertaken to smooth income, i.e. to lower income variability, when formal and 
informal risk-coping mechanisms do not allow agents to fully smooth consumption. Income smoothing strategies 
may consist in reducing income exposure to shocks by diversifying productive assets, techniques and/or activities, or 
skewing income by choosing less profitable but less risky productive activity. The optimal degree of income 
smoothing depends on i) individuals’ ability to smooth consumption ex post, ii) individuals’ attitude toward risk – i.e. 
how much households are willing to pay to stabilize income –, and iii) individuals’ perception of risk.  
To summarize, risk-management strategies are often referred as income smoothing strategies, resulting from 
individuals’ attitudes toward risk and perception of it. Therefore, risk-management strategies refer to the ex ante 
effect of risk or instability, as they aim to reduce exposure to future income shocks, regardless their actual 
consequences. 
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2.1 The ex post effects of instability on corruption 
In regards to the ex post effect of instability, we invoke two main competing corruption responses to 
income shocks: opportunistic corruption, which stems from the mechanical ups and downs in public 
and private rents induced by export transitory movements; and survival corruption, which arises from 
the necessity to relax the liquidity/budgetary constraint during hardships. While both mechanisms 
result from individuals’ experience of instability, only the latter can be, strictly speaking, referred as 
a coping or smoothing mechanism (see figure 4.1 and box No.7). Since these two effects are 
expected to act in opposite ways, the direction and strength of the resulting net effect are a priori 
uncertain. We thereafter emphasise different scenarios according to which the ex post net effect of 
export instability on corruption is expected to differ. 
2.1.1. Opportunistic corruption 
As stressed by Voors et al. (2011) and Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011), positive shocks increase 
opportunities for corrupt transactions, which may incite agents to intensify their efforts to 
accumulate wealth through corrupt activities. Conversely, adverse shocks reduce the number 
and/or the size of rents of which public and private agents were or would have unduly taken 
advantage.  
The literature on the natural resource curse provides striking illustrations of how ‘voracious’ 
appetites for wealth accumulation are stimulated by resource expansions. For instance, important 
rises in international raw material demand may undermine the rule of law and reorient economic 
activity toward rent-seeking activities (Van der Ploeg, 2011, 2010; Arezki and Brükner, 2010). 
Notably, Isham et al. (2005) and  Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) stress that it is the adverse 
effect of resource booms on institutional quality, rather than a “Dutch disease” effect, which 
contributed to poor long-run economic performances in many resource-dependent countries, such 
as Nigeria or Cameroon (see also Gauthier and Zeufack, 2009). In addition, Van der Ploeg (2010) 
also shows that, in natural resource rich countries, a precautionary motive may lie behind oil rent 
extraction during temporary oil-demand positive shocks. By extrapolation, it is plausible that 
favourable export shocks also give liquidity-constrained agents the incentive to insure themselves 
against future economic collapses, by engaging in corrupt activities during ‘good years’ and 
spending the resulting corruption proceeds during ‘bad years’.72 
In a more general setting, public and private agents are likely to accumulate extra-wealth through 
bribery, extortion or embezzlement when opportunities for corrupt transactions flourish. 
Therefore, opportunistic corrupt behaviours are expected to be pro-cyclical, i.e. spreading during 
                                                          
72 suggesting that, in contrast to the view expressed in figure 4.1, a risk-coping motive for corruption may also exist 
during positive shocks. 
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positive shocks and decreasing during negative shocks. In figure 4.2, we propose a very simple 
graphical representation of the relationship between transitory income or shock (Y) and opportunistic 
corruption. Graphs displayed in figure 4.2 illustrate three scenarios, in which the marginal effect of 
transitory income (or income shocks) on opportunistic corruption is either: 
i) constant, depicting a standard situation where corruption rises in same proportion as transitory 
income increases; 
ii) decreasing, which may illustrate situations where the opportunity cost of engaging in additional 
corrupt transactions decreases as income gets bigger and access to legal income-generating 
activities is better off, or where the probability of being detected and sanctioned rises with the 
size or occurrence of corrupt transactions; 
iii) or increasing, which may characterize situations where the appetite for accumulation of corrupt 
actors intensifies as their transitory wealth increases. It may also apply to situations where the 
profitability of corrupt activities rises with the size and frequency of transactions (Bardhan, 
1997), and when the incentive to engage in corrupt transactions increases with the number of 
corrupt agents (Andvig and Moene, 1990).  
 
2.1.2.  Survival corruption  
If the negative correlation between economic development and corruption prevalence has been 
widely emphasised (see for instance Treisman, 2000), the possibility of contra-cyclical variations in 
corruption levels has been less considered by the literature. To our knowledge, Robertson and 
Watson (2004) are the few authors mentioning that corruption may spread when resources become 
temporarily scarcer. Yet, various microeconomic surveys show that during negative income shocks, 
usual productive activities may not enable households to maintain their standard of living, so that 
labour supply adjustments represent an appealing strategy to earn extra income (Jacoby and 
Skoufias, 1997; Dercon, 2002). Interestingly, in a recent study, Robinson and Yeh (2009) show that 
transactional unprotected but better compensated sex is a way chosen by sex workers in Kenya to 
cope with health shocks, when formal and informal risk coping mechanisms do not allow them to 
fully smooth consumption. A similar motive for engaging in criminality has been stressed by 
Guillaumont and Puech (2006), who point out that individuals may be likely to compensate income 
losses during hardships by engaging in criminal activities. 
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Figure 4.2. The effect of export shocks on ‘opportunistic’ corruption 
i) constant marginal effect 
 
ii) decreasing marginal effect 
 
iii) increasing marginal effect 
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Thus, adverse transitory shocks may lead liquidity-constrained agents to engage in corrupt activities 
in order to cushion income losses. For instance, during economic downturns, public officials may 
require firms to pay higher and/or more frequent bribes to complete their income. Similarly, firms 
under economic stress may be prone to fraud and bribery in order to avoid taxation, to get business 
or export licenses, to evade red tape, or to smuggle. Therefore, if the ‘survival’ motive prevails, 
corruption should increase during economic downturns when the liquidity constraint hardens, and 
should decrease during economic upturns when the liquidity constraint softens. As illustrated in 
figure 4.3, we consider that the marginal effect of income shocks on survival corruption can be 
either:  
i) constant, which depicts a standard situation where corruption decreases in the same proportion 
as transitory income declines;   
ii) decreasing, which may illustrate the decreasing marginal return of efforts to corrupt when rents 
become scarcer and competition for them intensifies. It may also reflect a probability of being 
detected and sanctioned increasing with the size of corrupt transactions, because of stronger 
checks and balances during hard times (Brückner and Ciccone, 2011; Galbraith, 1997). Or, this 
decreasing marginal effect of shocks may reflect situations where access to legal risk coping 
mechanisms is good, thereby increasing the opportunity cost of engaging in additional survival 
corrupt transactions. 
iii) Or increasing, which may characterize situations where institutional safeguards against 
corruption fall as growth collapses, encouraging the impunity for acts of corruption. It may also 
reflect situations where formal and informal traditional risk coping mechanisms that are typically 
available to people are dysfunctional, and where illegal or risky activities such as corruption 
represent one of the few remaining options to cope with adverse shocks and minimize income 
losses. 
By reassembling these corrupt patterns in a unified analytical framework, we derive testable 
hypotheses on the relationship between export shocks and corruption. We consider in figure 4.4 
four main situations yielding four different corruption outcomes. Graphs 4.4i) and 4.4ii) depict the 
simplest cases, where the marginal net effect of shocks is constant and corruption responses are 
symmetric, yielding:  
i) a positive net effect of shocks on corruption: variations in opportunistic corruption (OC) 
during positive and negative shocks outweigh variations in survival corruption (SC). 
ii) a negative net effect of shocks on corruption: variations in SC during positive and negative 
shocks outweigh variations in OC.  
In graphs 4.4iii) and 4.4iv), we relax the linearity assumption upon the marginal effect of shocks on 
corruption, asymmetric responses to shocks emerge and yield more complex corruption patterns:  
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iii) a ‘global deterrent’ effect of shocks on corruption: when the marginal effect of (positive or 
negative) income shock is decreasing – i.e. the relationship between transitory income and 
corruption is concave – OC outweighs SC during negative shocks while SC outweighs OC 
during positive shocks. As a result, corruption decreases during both positive and negative 
shocks. 
iv) a ‘global boosting’ effect of shocks on corruption: when the marginal effect of (positive 
and negative) income shocks is increasing – i.e. the relationship between transitory income and 
corruption is convex – SC outweighs OC during negative shocks while OC outweighs SC 
during positive shocks. As a result, corruption spreads during both positive and negative 
shocks. 
To sum up, when the relationship between corruption and shocks is linear, corruption may be pro-
cyclical or contra-cyclical, depending on the relative prevalence of opportunistic or survival 
corruption. When the linearity assumption is relaxed, economic instability may have either a ‘global 
deterrent’ ex post effect or a ‘global boosting’ ex post effect on corruption, depending on the 
marginal effect of shocks on corruption.  
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Figure 4.3. The effect of export shocks on ‘survival’ corruption 
i) constant marginal effect 
 
ii) decreasing marginal effect 
  
iii) increasing marginal effect 
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Figure 4.4. The net ex post effects of shocks on corruption 
Symmetric corruption responses 
i) Pro-cyclical relationship 
 
ii) Contra-cyclical relationship 
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Asymmetric corruption responses 
iii) ‘Global deterrent’ effect of shocks 
 
iv) ‘Global boosting’ effect of shocks 
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2.2 The ex ante effect of instability on corruption 
The ex ante effect of instability refers to agents’ productive decisions aimed at reducing revenue 
exposure to economic fluctuations (Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Dercon, 1996, 2002). Income 
smoothing strategies consist in reducing the risk in the income process by, for example, diversifying 
production choices, or re-orienting production toward lower-return but lower-risk activities 
(Dercon, 2002). Business literature on the effects of cultural orientations on corrupt schemes also 
emphasises that an uncertainty avoidance motive for corruption may operate, especially in cultures 
where the aversion for uncertain or unknown situations prevails (Husted, 1999, Robertson and 
Watson, 2004). As Husted (1999, p.345) stresses,  
“corruption can be viewed as a mechanism to reduce uncertainty. In situations where 
outcomes are uncertain, corruption may serve to secure a more certain result.”  
From a rent-seeking perspective, it can be asserted that bribes are paid by economic agents to 
ensure the control of resource inflows over a given timeframe. Resource-locking corruption strategies 
can therefore be undertaken to maintain current and future revenue inflows, thereby reducing the 
variance of income over a certain period. Thus, when macroeconomic instability undermines the 
predictability of the government’s fiscal policy, creating uncertainty upon the allocation of resources 
at different layers of the government (ministries, sub-ministries, and agencies), public officials may 
bribe higher-level public agencies in order to secure the allocation of such resources. The instability 
of output generates similar incentives for private agents. For instance, private firms may be inclined 
to secure the attribution of public tenders through bribery or other corrupt arrangements, thereby 
securing future revenue inflows over time. For the same reason, they may also be incited to unduly 
influence governments and legislators to initiate and pass laws and rules that give effect to their 
interest in trade protections or favourable economic regulations (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). 
This point is corroborated by the recent work of Arin et al. (2011), who show that during serious 
attempts to correct fiscal imbalances, corrupt governments are less likely to cut spending than 
honest ones, since the former have “higher incentives to keep expenditures large (…) in order to 
accommodate the interests of influential lobbies”.73 That is why we expect resource-locking corruption 
to be an appealing income smoothing corrupt strategy, spreading (lessening) in environments with 
high (low) output instability. 
  
                                                          
73 in Arin, K.P., Chmelarova, V., Feess, E., and A. Wohlschlegel (2011), “Why are corrupt countries less 
successful in consolidating their budgets?”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol.95, No.7-8, p.529. 
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3. Data and empirical approach 
3.1 Corruption data 
In this chapter, we try to systematically provide comparable and consistent empirical country-level 
and firm-level evidence of corruption mechanisms described previously. On the one hand, we use a 
measure of corruption perception drawn from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
provided by the Political Risk Service (PRS) group.74 This measure is constructed by a network of 
country experts and assesses corruption in the political and (to a lesser extent) administrative 
spheres. It measures corruption as a risk for business by assessing to what extent it may take the 
form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favour-for-favours', secret party funding, 
suspiciously close ties between politics and business, or bribes. The ICRG ranges from 0 (higher 
corruption level) to 6 (lower corruption level). Whilst the ICRG corruption indicator takes into 
consideration low-level bureaucratic corruption, it insists on corruption prevailing in the political 
arena or high levels of the administration, which makes this indicator rather political-oriented (as 
shown in chapter 1, section 3.1.2). We favour the use of the ICRG corruption indicator for various 
reasons:  
- It covers a range of 135 countries and an extensive 22-year period (1984-2005), which allows 
exploiting the time dimension of corruption data.  
- We favour a single-source measure rather than composite indexes such as the Corruption 
Perception Index of Transparency International, since their construction may sometimes induce 
conceptual imprecision, uncertainty and inconsistency (see Knack, 2006). Many studies find a 
high correlation between the ICRG and other popular corruption perception indicators such 
as the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Indicator (CPI), or the World 
Bank’s “Control of Corruption” (CoC) Index (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2010), 
arguing that these correlations are evidence of their reliability. However, as shown in annex 
4.C rank correlations between the ICRG and composite indexes in 2004 are pretty low 
(around 50%) once restricting our sample to low and middle-income countries. This 
discrepancy between corruption scores in lower-income countries is a first argument for the 
use of this single source dataset. 
- ICRG ratings put the emphasis on the risk of corruption for foreign investor or firms, which 
is of great interest given the emphasis placed on private sector corruption in our analysis. 
However, as stressed by Donchev and Ujhelyi (2010), Treisman (2007), and Knack (2006), the 
ICRG corruption perception indicator suffers from certain drawbacks: 
                                                          
74 http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx 
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- The ICRG is a centralized indicator, which means that despite ratings are sourced from 
country-specific diagnosis, they are in fine set centrally by a small number of people. This 
feature raises the issue of the transparency in the rankings of countries. Moreover, the 
perception of the prevalence of corrupt practices is probably culturally oriented, since most 
data users are international or foreign firms and investors.  
- The methodology and assessment criteria are not fully documented. The ICRG provides a 
single measure of corruption reflecting various aspects of corruption without mentioning 
precisely the relative weights given to each aspect, and how these are documented. 
For the ease and convenience of result interpretation, we reversed the score of the ICRG indicator, 
a high score corresponding to a higher level of corruption and vice versa. 
As for the WBES data, it provides a comprehensive and comparable-internationally firm-level 
assessment of business environment conditions around the world, based on a survey administered 
to around 130 000 companies in 135 countries. Notably, the WBES provides a wide range of data 
highlighting the burden of corruption for private firms along with key other firm-level 
characteristics. In our study, we use a measure of experiences of corruption in conducting business, 
based on firm’s informal payments in percent of total sales.75   
3.2 Instability measurements 
As stressed in box no.4.1, whilst the ex post effect of instability relies on agent’s experience of 
instability, reflecting the consequences of shocks on well-being or firms’ performance, the ex ante 
effect of instability depends on agents’ perception of it (Elbers et al., 2007; Guillaumont, 2010).  
To test the ex ante and ex post effects of instability, we use two measures of instability based on the 
distribution of export earnings in constant dollar, yt, around a 16-years rolling mixed trend, /it (the 
method is presented in chapters 2 and 3). Considering the export process exhibits both 
deterministic and stochastic paths, 
ttt yty ξχχχ +++= −1210  with tξ  a zero-mean i.i.d disturbance term, 
We estimate each year and for each country, over the current and past 15 years, trend values (/it) as 
follows76, 
1210 ˆˆˆˆ −++= tt yty χχχ  (4.1) 
                                                          
75 Enterprises were asked the following question: “We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts 
or informal payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, 
services etc. On average, what percent of total annual sales, or estimated total annual value, do establishments like this 
one pay in informal payments or gifts to public officials for this purpose?” 
76 This approach of the measurement of volatility has been applied by the United Nations’ Committee for Development 
Policy for the design of the economic vulnerability index. 
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where t is a time trend. We consider the distribution of exports around this trend as stationary, 
hence reflecting only transitory variations in export earnings.77  
Export deviations around an estimated trend are preferred to business cycles that can be extracted 
by two-sided filtering methods, such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter). Since tested 
relationships rely on agents’ past experience and perception of instability, we believe the parametric 
approach of computing the trend more appropriate. Alternative measures of instability based on the 
HP filter are used in section 7 to check the robustness of our results.  
3.2.1.  Estimating the ex post effect of instability 
The empirical literature generally analyses the ex post effect of instability using annual shock 
variables, reflecting the impact of positive or negative shocks on economic decisions (Dercon, 
2002). As stressed by Voors et al. (2011), there may be a time dyssynchrony between export shocks 
– which are annual events in our dataset – and variations in corruption scores – which are of longer 
periodicity. The literature introduces lagged shock variables to study their impact on institutional 
variables (Brückner and Ciccone, 2011; Voors et al, 2011). However, this approach presents the 
major drawback of overlooking the effect of repeated asymmetric shocks on welfare or economic 
performances. Using a panel dataset on rural households from Pakistan, Alderman (1996) finds that 
a negative shock following a positive shock affects consumption patterns in a different way than do 
two consecutive negative shocks. As underlined by Alderman and Paxson (1992, p.13),  
“a negative shock to income may produce little effect on consumption, but two consecutive 
negative shocks may have large effect”.  
Therefore, the shock-variable approach is likely to understate the lasting and persistent effect of 
repeated shocks, especially their effect on institutional outcomes such as corruption, which is 
known to change rather slowly over time. To circumvent these potential drawbacks, we use in this 
chapter an alternative measure of experienced instability, based on the 6-year rolling skewness of 
the distribution of exports around their trend: 
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with T = [t; t-5] (4.2) 
Where yit is the observed value of export in country i at time t, and /it the rolling mixed trend. As a 
reminder, the skewness is the third moment of the probability distribution of a random variable. 
Computed on a short timeframe, it provides a de facto measure of the asymmetry of shocks around a 
                                                          
77 Throughout this chapter, annual variations around this rolling mixed trend are referred as “shocks” or “deviations”. 
The terms “instability” or “fluctuations” are generic, and qualify both annual shocks or an accumulation of shocks. 
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reference value (Rancière et al., 2008). An increase in the value of the skewness corresponds to an 
increase in the size or the frequency of positive shocks compared to negative ones. In addition to 
reflecting the asymmetry of shocks, this measure captures an eventual persistent effect of repeated 
negative or positive shocks.  
The skewness is also an appropriate measure of the frequency and intensity of fluctuations. Indeed, 
Rancière et al. (2008) show that high values of skewness are strongly associated with the occurrence 
of crisis (if negative) or boom (if positive) in a large sample of countries over 1960-2000. They 
stress the strong link between the skewness and the kurtosis of a distribution, the latter reflecting 
the fatness of the tails or the peakedness of a distribution. Chapter 2 and annex 4.B support this 
statement, by showing strong correlations between absolute values of skewness and values of 
kurtosis. Thus, our skewness-based measure of instability is expected to reflect two major 
dimensions of economic instability, namely the asymmetry, and the frequency and size of export 
fluctuations: while a high negative value of skewness reflects the predominance of low-frequency 
large-size negative fluctuations, a small positive value of skewness reflects the predominance of 
high-frequency small-size positive fluctuations. 
Figure 4.5 illustrates the relationship between export shocks, export skewness, and corruption in 
Cameroon, Argentina, Indonesia and Bangladesh. It can be observed that, in these countries, the 
evolution of the skewness of exports fits quite well with the evolution of corruption scores (right-
sided graphs), revealing pro-cyclical relationships in Cameroon and Argentina, and contra-cyclical 
relationships in Indonesia and Bangladesh. Such synchronicity cannot be easily established on the 
sole observation of how corruption responds to annual export shocks (left-sided graphs), which 
supports that our 6-year rolling skewness of exports should better capture the ex post effects of 
instability on corruption than annual shock variables. 
3.2.2. Estimating the ex ante effect of instability 
The ex ante effect of instability refers to adjustments in agents’ behaviours aimed at lowering the 
variability in their income, regardless the impact of output fluctuations on agents’ wealth or well-
being (Elbers et al., 2007). As suggested by Elbers et al. (2007) and following Guillaumont (2009, 
2010), we look for a measure reflecting agents’ perception of instability. We compute this measure as 
the 16-year rolling standard deviation of exports around the rolling mixed trend /it in country i at 
time t: 
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We expect it to be an adequate approximation of agent’s changing perception of aggregate output 
variance. By computing the standard deviation of exports on a rolling basis and over a long time 
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frame, we allow the perception of instability to change over time while giving equal weights to 
remote and present fluctuations. In other words, this measure limits the influence of 
contemporaneous sharp export movements on agents’ perception of instability, while capturing the 
lasting influence of remote fluctuations. Thus, we expect this measure to give more prominence to 
the way agents perceive instability than the way they actually and currently experience it. Figure 4.6 
illustrates the respective evolution of corruption levels and the 16-year standard deviation of 
exports in Thailand, France, Italy and Spain, and shows that the evolution of corruption scores 
clearly tracks that of the standard deviation of exports in these countries. 
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Figure 4.5. Export shocks, export skewness and corruption in Cameroon, Argentina, 
Indonesia, and Bangladesh 
i) Pro-cyclical relationships 
Cameroon 
 
Argentina 
 
ii) Contra-cyclical relationships 
Indonesia 
 
Bangladesh 
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 Figure 4.6. The standard deviation of exports and corruption levels in Thailand, 
France, Italy and Spain 
 
 
 
3.3 Control variables 
We estimate the effects of export instability on corruption with two econometric models. On the 
one hand, we set a dynamic panel framework using panel data on corruption perceptions in 68 
developed and developing countries over the period 1985-2005. On the other hand, we conduct 
cross-section estimations using micro data on informal payments made by more than 9000 firms, 
interviewed between 2008 and 2011, clustered in 23 developing countries. Descriptive statistics and 
data sources are presented in annex 4.A. 
3.3.1. Controlling for the structural determinants of the development process 
Economic development is a major corruption deterrent (see chapter 1), explaining around 75-80% 
of cross-section variation in “Corruption Perception Index” (from Transparency International) and 
“Control of Corruption” (from the World Bank) scores, according to Treisman (2000) and 
estimates of chapter 1 (section 3.2). The economic development process is indeed accompanied by 
several changes in economic, socio-political and legal conditions, expected to directly or indirectly 
impact corruption levels. In empirical studies, economic development is usually proxied by the 
GDP per capita. Including a measure wealth per inhabitants in corruption regressions may however 
correlate with other important determinants of corruption, such as the population size, trade 
openness, or democracy. We rather approximate the effect of the economic development process 
on corruption, by using variables capturing the structural long-term determinants of growth 
evidenced by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). These authors use a Bayesian statistical approach to identify 
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robust traditional determinants of long-term growth, and find strong evidence on the effect of 
human capital variables (primary school enrollment, life expectancy in 1960, malaria prevalence), 
the public sector size (% of government consumption and investment in GDP), the initial level of 
income, the share of mining in GDP, and the geographical location.  
In our empirical specifications, we include the annual growth rate of the population (World 
Development Indicators 2010), as a proxy for human capital conditions. We expect low 
demographic growth rates to result from a healthy and educated population, while high growth 
rates to characterize countries with low human capital which have not achieved their demographic 
transition. We also use the share of governmental spending in GDP (Penn World Tables) as a 
proxy for the effect of public sector size on growth and income levels. We include a measure of 
total natural resource rents (in % of GDP) drawn from the World Bank database, to account for 
the effect of natural resources endowments on long term growth.  
In panel country-level regressions, we expect the country fixed effect to capture the effect of time 
invariant unobserved country characteristics, as well as time invariant growth determinants found 
significant by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) in their growth regressions: initial conditions, the average 
price of goods between 1960 and 1964, and the geographical location. In cross-section firm-level 
regressions, we control for the initial income level using the twenty-year lagged GDP per capita78, 
and account for the effect of geography by including the country latitude, and dummies for 
landlockness and regional location. Following La Porta et al. (1999), we also include a dummy equal 
to one for common-law based legal systems and zero otherwise. 
3.3.2. Controlling for the main determinants of corruption 
In addition, we control for determinants of corruption usually identified by the literature (Treisman, 
2000; Tanzi, 1994; and Mauro, 2004), described in chapter 1: trade openness (using the ratio of 
exports plus imports on GDP, from the Penn World Tables), democracy (using the revised polity2 
indicator from the Polity IV database), the political regime stability (using the regime durability variable 
from the Polity IV database), and the size of the population (using the logarithm of the population 
from the Penn World Tables). It is worth reminding that many variables may both explain long 
term income growth and corruption, e.g. natural resources (Van der Ploeg, 2011) or state 
interventions (Tanzi, 1994; Guriev, 2004).  
In cross-section regressions, following the literature on business corruption using firm-level surveys 
(Clarke, 2011; Jensen et al., 2010; Kaplan and Pathania, 2010), we also control for the firm’s size, 
public ownership (in % of firms), and export orientation (% of direct and indirect exports in total 
sales). This data is drawn from the WBES dataset. 
                                                          
78 Since firms have been interviewed between 2008 and 2011, the lagged GDP per capita is between 1988 and 1991. 
Chapter 4 – When corruption is a response to export instability 
Page | 153 
3.4 Baseline estimation framework 
Following Elbers et al. (2007), we estimate the ex post and the ex ante effects by including in a 
corruption equation our measures of experienced instability (6-year export skewness) and our 
measure of perceived instability (16-year standard deviation of exports) along with other control 
variables: 
Corruptit = α0 [+α1.Corruptit-1] + α2.Skewnessit + α3.Std_devit + α4.Macro_controlsit 
{+α5.Micro_controlsit+α6.timefixed_controls} + λt [+ µ i ]+ εit, (4.4) 
Variables in square brackets are included in country-level dynamic panel regressions only, while 
variables in curly brackets are included in firm-level cross-section estimations only. In panel 
regressions, Corruptit is the ICRG indicator of corruption perception, while in cross-section 
regressions it represents the share of informal payments in total sales made by firm i interviewed at 
time t.  
Thus, corruption is function of its lagged level (in panel regressions only)79, the 6-year rolling 
skewness of exports, the 16-year rolling standard deviation of exports, macro-level control 
variables, micro-level and time-fixed control variables (in firm-level regressions only), time 
dummies, country fixed effects (in panel regressions only), and an i.i.d. error term. Finally, since 
firm-level regressions are cross-section regressions without any time dimension (the time subscript 
may be misleading), time dummies only control for the year of firms interview (2008, 2009, 2010 or 
2011).  
  
                                                          
79 This dynamic empirical framework allows capturing regression-to-the-mean effect, as well as persistence in corruption 
perception scores (Voors et al., 2011). 
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4. Baseline empirical results 
Within fixed effect (FE) panel estimations, instrumental variable (IV) panel estimations, and the 
generalized method of moment in system (sys-GMM) are applied to equation (4.4), using panel data 
from 68 developed and developing countries over 1985-2005 (1144 observations in baseline 
estimations). In parallel, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and IV cross-section estimations with 
standard errors clustered by country are conducted on a sample of 9212 firms from 23 developing 
countries (interviewed between 2008 and 2011). To ensure that measurement errors, omitted 
variables, and reverse causality problems do not bias estimations, we systematically compare i) FE 
and OLS estimates with IV or sys-GMM estimates, and ii) panel country-level estimates with firm-
level cross-section estimates. Comparing panel country-level with firm-level cross-section estimates 
not only enables us to check whether results are sensitive to different corruption measurements and 
different units of observation, it also allows to compare short-term with long term relationships 
(Kennedy, 2008).  Results are presented in table 4.1.  
4.1 Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Fixed Effect (FE) estimates 
Contrary to Voors et al. (2011), FE estimations of equation (4.4) in column (2) show a 10% 
significant negative effect of the export skewness on corruption perceptions.80 An increased 
experience of positive (negative) shocks significantly reduces (increases) country corruption scores, 
which supports the hypothesis of survival corruption prevalence (as illustrated in figure 4.4ii)). In 
contrast to panel estimations, OLS firm-level estimates in column (9) support the hypothesis of 
opportunistic corruption prevalence, as firms’ informal payments are found to increase (decrease) 
with the experience of positive (negative) shocks.  
Concerning the ex ante effect of instability on corruption, firm-level estimates in column (9) show a 
strong positive effect of the standard deviation of exports on firms’ informal payments, which 
cannot be observed in FE estimates. Since the effect of the perception of instability on corruption 
may be observable on the long run rather than on the short run, cross-section regressions may 
reflect such a long term relationship better than does the FE estimator (Kennedy, 2008). 
While this a priori contrasting empirical evidence may simply reflect sample differences, or 
differences between the long run and the short run effects of instability, problems of reverse 
causality or omitted variable bias might have been misleading us. This issue is addressed in the 
following sub-section.  
                                                          
80 The high between-R2 in column (2) may result from problems of multi-colinearity between time dummies and export 
skewness, since universal time-related export shocks may have been captured by time dummies. To check whether 
results are sensitive to the exclusion of time dummies, we run FE estimation of equation (4.4) without them. Results are 
displayed in annex 4.Ei) and show a more significant and stronger negative effect of export skewness on corruption 
score once time dummies are removed. 
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Table 4.1. Export instability and corruption, baseline results. 
Dependent variable: 
 
ICRG  WBES 
 
Within fixed effects 
 
IV-2SLS IV-LIML 
IVGMM-
CUE Sys-GMM  OLS 
 
IV-2SLS IV-LIML 
IVGMM-
CUE 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Lagged Corruption  0.723*** 
(0.00)  
0.695*** 
(0.00) 
0.677*** 
(0.00) 
0.677*** 
(0.00) 
0.706*** 
(0.00) 
0.713*** 
(0.00)       
 
Export skewness 
 
 
-0.0002* 
(0.10)  
-0.001 
(0.24) 
-0.001 
(0.27) 
-0.001* 
(0.07)  
-0.001* 
(0.09)   
0.003† 
(0.11)  
0.002 
(0.16) 
0.003* 
(0.07) 
0.003* 
(0.07) 
0.004*** 
(0.00) 
Export std_dev 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.77)  
-0.051 
(0.18) 
-0.058 
(0.18) 
-0.081** 
(0.05)  
-0.050 
(0.63)   
0.654*** 
(0.00)  
0.560*** 
(0.00) 
0.230*  
(0.09) 
0.230*  
(0.09) 
0.361***  
(0.00) 
Population growth -0.044 
(0.24)  
-0.039 
(0.33)  
0.015 
(0.88) 
0.038 
(0.76) 
0.090 
(0.43)  
-0.523 
(0.42)  
-0.463† 
(0.11) 
-0.423† 
(0.12) 
1.712*** 
(0.00)  
1.374*** 
(0.01) 
0.091  
(0.86) 
0.091  
(0.86) 
0.544  
(0.16) 
Nat. resources 0.007** 
(0.04)  
0.009*** 
(0.01)  
0.010** 
(0.05) 
0.011* 
(0.06) 
0.012** 
(0.02)  
0.047 
(0.29)  
-0.012†  
(0.14) 
-0.012  
(0.17) 
0.108*** 
(0.00)  
0.089*** 
(0.00) 
0.013  
(0.65) 
0.013  
(0.65) 
0.039*  
(0.07) 
Government size -0.011** 
(0.06)  
-0.013** 
(0.04)  
-0.018** 
(0.05) 
-0.019* 
(0.06) 
-0.017* 
(0.07)  
0.028 
(0.53)  
2e-11* 
(0.09) 
2e-11* 
(0.10) 
3e-11*** 
(0.00)  
3e-11*** 
(0.00) 
3e-11*** 
(0.01) 
3e-11*** 
(0.01) 
3e-11*** 
(0.00) 
Log population 0.718*** 
(0.00)  
0.073 
(0.79)  
0.795 
(0.14) 
0.813 
(0.14) 
0.481  
(0.40)  
-2.013 
(0.28)  
0.545** 
(0.04) 
0.560** 
(0.03) 
0.438*** 
(0.00)      
Pol. regime stability 0.001 
(0.74)  
-0.003* 
(0.07)  
-0.004** 
(0.04) 
-0.004** 
(0.04) 
-0.004* 
(0.07)  
0.025 
(0.21)  
-0.019*** 
(0.00) 
-0.019*** 
(0.00) 0.005 (0.59)  
-0.001 
(0.88) 
-0.006 
(0.33) 
-0.006 
(0.33) 
-0.003 
(0.54) 
Democracy -0.015** 
(0.02)  
-0.018*** 
(0.01)  
-0.010 
(0.16) 
-0.010 
(0.19) 
-0.009 
(0.22)  
0.010 
(0.92)  
0.158* 
(0.08) 
0.165* 
(0.08) 
0.831*** 
(0.00)  
0.728*** 
(0.00) 
0.359* 
(0.06) 
0.359* 
(0.06) 
0.518*** 
(0.01) 
Log openness 0.135 
(0.16)  
0.065 
(0.56)   
0.126 
(0.44) 
0.157 
(0.41) 
0.228 
(0.18)  
0.740 
(0.33)  
0.021** 
(0.02) 
0.021** 
(0.02) 
0.023*** 
(0.00)  
0.024*** 
(0.00) 
0.023*** 
(0.00) 
0.023*** 
(0.00) 
0.025*** 
(0.00) 
Latitude 
      
 
   
0.048*** 
(0.00) 
0.048*** 
(0.00) 
0.064*** 
(0.00)      
Landlocked 
      
 
   
2.489*** 
(0.00) 
2.480*** 
(0.00) 
-2.316** 
(0.02)      
Initial GDP per cap 
      
 
   
0.809** 
(0.02) 
0.856** 
(0.02) 
1.395*** 
(0.00)      
Common Law 
      
 
   
-11.26*** 
(0.01) 
-11.05*** 
(0.02) 
-2.869  
(0.50)      
Firm size 
      
 
    
-0.161** 
(0.04) 
-0.159** 
(0.05)  
-0.157** 
(0.03) 
-0.036 
(0.52) 
-0.036 
(0.52) 
-0.039 
(0.47) 
State owned 
      
 
    
0.027 
(0.21) 
0.028   
(0.18)  
0.028 
(0.16) 
-0.005** 
(0.05) 
-0.005** 
(0.05) 
-0.006** 
(0.02) 
Direct exports (% sales) 
      
 
    
-0.001 
(0.54) 
-0.002  
(0.44)  
-0.001 
(0.51) 
0.004 
(0.41) 
0.004 
(0.41) 
0.005  
(0.24) 
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Indirect exports (% sales) 
      
 
    
-0.002 
(0.17) 
-0.002  
(0.31)  
-0.001 
(0.35) 
-0.001 
(0.20) 
-0.001 
(0.20) 
-0.001** 
(0.04) 
Constant -11.44*** 
(0.00) 
 3.763 
(0.44) 
     30.36 
(0.36)  
-2.978 
(0.53) 
-3.362 
(0.59) 
-22.28*** 
(0.00) 
    
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  No No No     
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes     
Region dummies No No No No No No  Yes Yes Yes     
Obs(countries/clusters) 1144 (68) 1144 (68) 700 (46) 700 (46) 700 (46) 1144 (68)  9212 (23) 9212 (23) 9212 (23) 9212 (23) 4210 (23) 4210 (23) 4210 (23) 
R-squared  
Within 
Between 
 
0.604 
0.543 
 
0.641 
0.934 
 
0.561 
 
0.561 
 
0.561 
Wald 
chi2(28) = 
620  
0.083 0.084 0.084 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Weak instrument test     
 
     
    
Kleibergen-Paap stat(critical value)   4.7 (21.7) a 4.7 (4.1) a 4.7 (4.1) a      1.2(16.9)a 5.2(16.9)a 5.2(4.7)a 5.2(4.7)a 
F-test of excluded instruments               
1st stage equation - export skewness 
  6.44 6.44 6.44      8.42 5.86 5.86 5.86 
1st stage equation - export std_dev 
  6.97 6.97 6.97      12.25 9.23 9.23 9.23 
Hansen test (p-val)    0.17 0.19 0.21 0.84     0.04 0.45 0.45 0.50 
Endogeneity test (difference-in-Hansen test), Chi2 p-value:  
6-yr skew + 16-year std-dev exports 
6-yr skew  
16-year std dev of exports 
 
 
 
 
0.32 
0.35 
0.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.81 
0.84 
0.58 
AR(1) test (p-val)    0.00        
AR(2) test (p-val) 
 
      
 
 0.20        
Number of instruments 
 
    6 6 6  49     4 4 4 4 
Standards errors robust to heteroskedasticity in all regressions, and clustered by country for OLS firm-level estimations. In column (5) standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of order 1. P-values 
in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% † significant at 14%. Hansen J-statistic tests for joint instrument validity; null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with 
the error term, and that instruments are correctly excluded from the second-stage equation. IV-estimates are adjusted for small sample bias. 
In the sys-GMM estimation, time dummies are excluded instruments; the skewness of exports is treated as predetermined and instruments the differenced equation by its lagged levels (lags 1 to 10); the standard deviation is 
treated as endogenous and instruments the differenced equation by its lagged levels (lags 2 to 10); lagged corruption is treated as endogenous and instruments the equation in system by its lagged levels and differences (lags 
2 to 11). Instruments are collapsed, orthogonal deviations are preferred to first-difference deviations, and the Windmeijer correction of the two-step estimated variance is applied. 
In columns (10), (11), (12), and (13)  we partialled-out the 20-year lag GDP per capita, geographic and common-law system  dummy variables, and the logarithm of population to make the covariance matrix of the 
orthogonality conditions full rank. In blue-colored columns (11), (12), and (13) we restrict the sample to firms considering that corruption is not an obstacle or is a minor obstacle to their current operations. 
a.When the Kleibergen-Paap statistic is below the Stock-Yogo critical value, then a standard significance test on estimated coefficient with nominal size of 5 percent has a maximal size of 10 percent or more. 
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4.2 Identification strategy 
We conduct instrumental variable (IV) estimations with country-level and firm-level data to ensure 
that measurement errors, omitted variables or reverse causality problems do not bias our results 
(see box no.8). Then, we run system-GMM estimations to check whether autocorrelation between 
residuals induced by the lagged dependent variable does not bias results in panel FE and IV 
regressions (see box no.9). 
4.2.1. Instrumental Variable (IV) estimations 
While instability in real export earnings is mainly structural for small “price-taker” countries, caused 
by natural or trade shocks, fluctuations in exports around their trend may be sometimes generated 
by unstable or poorly designed policies (Chapter 3; Guillaumont 2010, 2009ab).81 Moreover, the 
conceptual framework exposed in section 2 underlines a possible direct contribution of corruption 
to export fluctuations, in particular when corrupt schemes prevail in the custom sector and impact 
export volumes. Last but not least, in so far as corruption influences economic policy, the presence 
in our panel of “price maker” developed and emerging countries such as the United States, China 
or Brazil may bias our results because of a direct effect of their domestic policies on international 
trade. Our objective is hence to control for a possible reverse causality bias, but also for the 
omission of variables correlated with both export instability and corruption.  
Instruments description 
Building on a study on the climate origins of export movements (Jones and Olken, 2010) and the 
literature on the causes and consequences of structural economic vulnerability (Guillaumont, 2010, 
2009ab), we instrument the 6-year skewness and the 16-year standard deviation of exports using a 
set of climatic and natural disasters variables, and a variable reflecting country exposure to trade 
shocks.  
In both panel and cross-section IV-estimations, we use natural shock variables as instruments for 
the instability of exports. We therefore assume that natural shocks impact corruption through their 
effect on exports only. Although Jones and Olken (2010) find strong evidence of an impact of 
weather shocks on agricultural exports and light manufacturing exports of poor countries, this 
exclusion restriction may not hold if there is a direct effect of natural shocks on corruption passing 
                                                          
81 Although it can be certainly advanced that “policy is likely to influence the trend more than it influences fluctuations 
around the trend” (Guillaumont, 2009a, p.191). 
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through variations in domestic (not exported) incomes, infrastructure destructions, health 
damages.82  
On the one hand, we account for the effect of climate on export instability, by using as instruments 
the contemporaneous and lagged values of the 6-year skewness and 16-year standard deviation of 
rainfall levels around their average value. Rainfall-based shock variables have already been used by 
Voors et al. (2011) and Brückner and Ciccone (2011) to identify the effect of income shocks on 
corruption and democracy in Sub-Saharan African countries. Using rainfall data from Global Air 
Temperature and Precipitation: Gridded Monthly and Annual Time Series (Version 2.01)83 treated by 
Guillaumont and Simonet (2011), we expect the instability in rainfall levels to be a direct internal 
cause of export instability in developing countries (Jones and Olken, 2010). On the other hand, we 
include the annual share of people affected by natural disasters – such as drought, tsunami, cyclone, 
floods, earthquakes and others – in the population. The computation of this indicator follows a 
methodology based on the calculation of the homeless index presented in chapter 3 and used by the 
United Nations Committee for Development Policy for the computation of the Economic 
Vulnerability Index (Guillaumont, 2009ab). Raw data is gathered from the Emergency Disaster 
Database (EM-DAT)84, and the computation method is detailed in Annex 4.Di). 
In IV-panel estimations, in addition to natural shock variables, we also use an index of country 
merchandize export concentration as excluded instrument, which has been used for the 
computation of the retrospective EVI in chapter 3. Following Guillaumont (2009ab), we expect 
merchandize export concentration to increase the countries’ exposure to trade shocks and their 
structural vulnerability to them. Its computation method is presented in annex 4.Di). 
First-stage estimation of the following system is conducted: 
Skewnessit = β0 [+β1.Corruptit-1] + β2.Natural_shocksit [+ β3.Concentrationit] + β4.Macro_controlsit {+ 
β5.Micro_controlsit+β6.timefixed_controls} [+ φt + χi ] +υit (4.4a) 
Std_devit = β’0 [+β’1.Corruptit-1] + β’2.Natural_shocks [+ β’3.Concentrationit] + β’4.Macro_controlsit {+ 
β’5.Micro_controlsit+β’6.timefixed_controls} [+ φ’t + χ’i] +υ’it (4.4b) 
where Natural_shocksit and Concentrationit are respectively the set of natural shock variables and 
the merchandise export concentration index. υit and υ’it are random error terms.  
                                                          
82 Brückner and Ciccone (2011) encountered the same kind of issue. In this case, this would lead to understate estimated 
causal effects of export instability on corrupt deals, since corruption mechanisms emphasised in section 2, such as 
survival corruption or resource-locking corruption strategies, are likely to operate in those contexts too. 
83 From the Center for Climatic Research of the University of Delaware. Data is interpolated and documented by Cort J. 
Willmott and Kenji Matsuura, with support from IGES and NASA, University of Delaware (for more information see 
Matsuura and Willmott, 2007). 
84 Data compiled by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED) at the School of Public Health, 
Université Catholique De Louvain. 
Chapter 4 – When corruption is a response to export instability 
Page | 159 
In all regressions, we choose the combination of exogenous instruments that minimize under-
identification and weak identification problems. Correlations between instrumented variables and 
instruments are presented in annex 4.Dii). In panel regressions, we instrument the 6-year skewness 
and the 16-year standard deviation of exports by the following set of instruments: 
• the contemporaneous and 4th lag of the 6-year skewness of rainfall levels. We include the 
fourth lag of rainfall skewness to account for the potential lasting effects of rainfall shocks on 
exports variations, while minimizing the correlation between current and lagged rainfall 
skewness and avoiding instrument redundancy. 
• the contemporaneous and 4th lag value of the annual share of people affected by natural 
disasters. We include the fourth lag of the annual share of people affected by natural disasters 
to account for the lasting effects of past natural disasters on current export skewness, while 
minimizing the correlation between current and lagged values of the annual share of people 
affected by natural disasters and avoiding instrument redundancy. 
• the contemporaneous value of the 16-year standard deviation of rainfall level. 
• the contemporaneous value of the merchandize export concentration index. As this index has 
been calculated for a panel of 128 developing countries from 1984 to 2008 (see chapter 3), 
developed countries are excluded from IV panel estimations. 
In cross-section firm-level IV estimations, our instrument set consists of: 
• the contemporaneous (2008) and 4th (2004) lagged value of the 6-year skewness of rainfall 
levels. We include the fourth lag of rainfall skewness to account for the potential lasting effects 
of rainfall shocks on exports variations, while minimizing the correlation between current and 
lagged rainfall skewness and avoiding instrument redundancy. 
• the contemporaneous value of the 16-year standard deviation of rainfall levels. 
• the 3rd lag (2005) value of the annual share of people affected by natural disasters, which has 
the strongest correlations with instrumented variables (see annex 4.Dii)). 
IV country-level panel estimates 
Second stage country-level panel estimates are presented in columns (3), (4), and (5) of table 4.1. 
First stage results are displayed in annex 4.Diii). Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimates of 
equation (4.4) are displayed in column (3). If the Hansen test does not reject the validity of our 
instrument set, endogeneity tests (robust to heteroskedastic standard errors) do not reject the null 
hypothesis that export instability variables can actually be treated as exogenous, in a 10% 
confidence level. However, the difference-in-Hansen test conducted on the standard deviation of 
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export alone rejects the null of exogeneity in a 14% confidence level. It is therefore plausible that 
estimates of the ex ante effect of export instability on corruption are biased. 
F-tests of excluded instruments are below 10, suggesting that our instrument set is weakly 
correlated with the two measures of export instability. Moreover, the Kliebergen-Paap test of weak 
instrumentation displays statistics which are far below the 2SLS Stock-Yogo critical value, implying 
that a conventional significance test on β2 and β3 with a nominal size of 5% has an actual size of at 
least 10%. To address the problem of weak instruments bias, Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood (LIML) estimation is performed. The LIML estimator has the advantage of being more 
robust to weak instruments than the 2SLS estimator (see box no. 8). Results are displayed in 
column (4). The Hansen test of over-identification does not reject the orthogonality of our 
instrument set, and the Kliebergen-Paap statistic is higher than Stock-Yogo LIML critical value. 
LIML estimates do not support any significant effects of export instability on corruption 
perceptions, at the usual confidence levels.  
 
Box No. 8. Instrumental Variable methods and hypothesis testing. 
Ordinary Least Square estimation of equation (4.4) leads to consistent and unbiased estimates of α2 and α3 as long as 
skewnessit and std_devit are uncorrelated with εit, i.e. when E[skewnessit εit] = E[std_devit εit] = 0. When these moment 
conditions are violated, variations in our instability variables are associated with variations in corruptit and variations in 
εit, leading to inconsistent estimates of α2 and α3. Skewnessit and std_devit are potentially endogenous regressors 
because of measurement errors, omitted variables, or reverse causality.  
An instrumental variable method is conducted to generate variations in skewnessit and std_devit uncorrelated with the 
error term, by regressing them on a set of excluded exogenous regressors (or instruments) along with other explanatory 
variables included in the baseline specification. A valid excluded instrument is a variable respecting the following 
orthogonality conditions: i) it is correlated with our instability variable, ii) without being correlated with the error 
term. While the first condition imposes a direct association between our instruments and our instability variable, the 
second condition excludes instruments from being explanatory variables of corruptit. One necessary additional 
condition for a valid instrumental variable estimation is the order condition for identification, implying that there 
must be at least as many instruments as there are endogenous regressors. If the number of instruments is lower than the 
number of endogenous regressors, then the equation is under-identified. If the number of instruments exceeds the number 
of endogenous regressors, the equation is over-identified. And if the number of instruments equals the number of 
endogenous regressors, the equation is exactly identified.  
Test 1: when instruments outnumber endogenous regressors, i.e. when the equation is over-identified, it is possible to 
test the orthogonality conditions and the correctness of model specification using the J-statistic of Hansen (1982). A 
rejection of the null is a rejection of the hypothesis of valid instruments. This statistic is robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustering. 
Test 2: another test of orthogonality and order conditions is the difference-in-Hansen test or C-test, which consists 
in calculating the difference between the Hansen statistic corresponding to the IV regression with the full set of 
excluded instruments and the Hansen statistic corresponding to the IV regression using a smaller set of excluded 
instruments. This test can be performed to identify weak or invalid instruments among a large set of instruments. A 
rejection of the null is a rejection of the orthogonality conditions on the specified dubious variables. 
Another necessary condition for valid IV estimation is the rank condition, which requires in its simplest formulation 
that the correlation or covariance between instruments and our instability variable is significantly different from 0. If 
this condition is violated, the model is under-identified and the IV estimator is biased. If this condition is respected but 
correlations between excluded instruments and our endogenous regressors are low, the equation is then weakly identified, 
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leading to a weak instrument bias (Hahn and Haussman, 2002).  
Test 3: it possible to test the relevance of excluded instruments by looking at the explanatory power of excluded 
instruments. This can be done using the F-test of joint-significance of excluded regressors or the partial R2 of first-stage 
equations. Such an approach is however not sufficient to ensure the equation is correctly identified, since a high partial 
R2 may arise from valid instruments excluded together with weak instruments. It is possible to address this issue using 
the Shea partial R2 which reflects the explanatory power of each instrument by taking into account inter-correlations 
among all excluded instruments. As a benchmark, a “rule of thumb” proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) suggests that 
weak identification problems are likely to arise when first-stage F-test are below 10 (Baum et al., 2007). 
Test 4: even if first stage statistics point to strong instruments, some of them may still carry insufficient independent 
information. A statistic has been proposed by Cragg and Donald (1993) and by Kleibergen-Paap (2006) in a version 
robust to heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-clustering, to test the relevance of the weakest instrument. A Cragg-donald 
statistic higher than the critical values calculated by Stock and Yogo (2002) leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis 
of the absence of weak instrument problem, according to different levels of bias acceptability. This test requires 
disturbances to be homoscedastic. If not, one may wrongly conclude that the model is correctly identified. Moreover, in 
case of robust-cluster estimations, the comparison between Kleibergen-Paap statistics and Stock-Yogo critical values 
should be undertaken with caution, and one should better apply the previous F-test “rule of thumb”. 
A further alternative for weak instrument problem is to apply the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood Estimator. 
This estimator is more robust to weak instrument than the usual 2-Stage Least Square. The reported Stock-Yogo critical 
values are lower than those reported in 2SLS estimations, as the weak identification bias is lower in LIML estimations. 
One drawback of the LIML estimator is its sensitivity to non-i.i.d disturbances. When the i.i.d. assumption is rejected, a 
solution may consist in applying the GMM version of the LIML estimator, namely the Continuously Updated GMM 
estimator or CUE, which can deal with heteroskedasticity of unknown form (Hansen et al., 1996). 
 
As stressed by Baum et al. (2007), LIML estimates may be biased in presence of heteroskedasticity.  
Following Hansen et al. (1996), we perform the Continuously Updated GMM Estimator (CUE), 
which is an estimator robust to weak instrument problems and heteroskedasticity of unknown 
form. Results are presented in column (5). Hansen and Kliebergen-Paap tests do not reject the 
validity of our instrument set. CUE-GMM estimates support a significant negative effect of both 
the 6-year skewness (7% significant) and the 16-year standard deviation of exports (5% significant) 
on corruption perceptions.  
IV firm-level cross-section estimates 
Second stage firm-level IV estimates are presented in columns (10), (11), (12), and (13) of table 4.1. 
First stage results are displayed in annex 4.Diii). In column (10), estimates do not provide evidence 
of a significant ex post effect of export instability on corrupt transactions, in the usual confidence 
levels. While F-tests of excluded instruments suggest that instrumental variables have a reasonable 
explanatory power, the Hansen test rejects with a 6% confidence level the validity of our 
instrument set. Here, the non-violation of orthogonality conditions relies on the hypothesis that 
country-level natural shock variables impact a firm’s corruption expenses through its own income 
fluctuations. This hypothesis may be unrealistic since a firm’ bribe payments may be caused by 
variations in other economic agents’ income. For instance, rainfall-induced export shocks may 
incite custom officers to extort higher bribes to firms, or may incite a firm to engage in corruption 
because of an intensified competition from other firms for economic rents. It is therefore very 
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likely that the validity of our instrument set is rejected because a firm’s informal payments also 
result from the pressure exerted by other agents affected by common natural shocks. One solution 
to this problem may consist in using measures of instability reflecting idiosyncratic (individual) 
fluctuations only. Such an approach is carried out in sub-section 7.1. The approach followed in this 
sub-section consists in excluding from the sample firms which do not engage proactively in corrupt 
transactions (“passive” firms). Indeed, firms which bribe without feeling compelled to do it are 
expected to engage in corruption because of fluctuations in their own income rather than in other 
economic agents’ income. To distinguish ‘passive’ firms from ‘active’ ones, we combine WBES data 
on firms’ informal payments with WBES data on firms’ perception of corruption. We expect that 
firms considering corruption as “no obstacle” or “a minor obstacle” for their business to be 
proactive corrupters if they declare in parallel making informal payments.85 We perform the same 
2SLS estimation of equation (4.4) on a sample of potentially “active” firms (also including firms 
which declared they did not pay any bribes but considered corruption as no obstacle or a minor 
obstacle to their business).86  
Results are exposed in column (11). The Hansen test does not reject the null hypothesis of 
instrument orthogonality, which tends to advocate the relevance of our identification strategy.87 
Endogeneity tests do not reject the null hypothesis that export instability variables can actually be 
treated as exogenous, in a reliable confidence level. Estimates show a 10% significant positive effect 
of the instrumented export skewness on corruption expenses, similar to that estimated in OLS 
regression. They also support a 10% significant positive effect of the instrumented standard 
deviation of exports on corrupt transactions.  
However, F-tests of excluded instruments and the Kleibergen-Paap statistic are low, which still 
casts doubts on the consistency of 2SLS estimates. To address a possible weak instrument bias, the 
Limited Information Maximum Likelihood procedure is applied to estimate β’2 and β’3. The 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic is higher than the reported Stock-Yogo LIML critical values, suggesting 
that LIML estimates should not be affected by weak instrumentation bias. Estimated parameters of 
instability variables and their corresponding standard errors are very similar those obtained with the 
                                                          
85 Interviewed firms have been asked whether they perceive corruption as an obstacle to business, and to what extent. 
They were asked the following question: “Is corruption ‘No Obstacle’, a ‘Minor Obstacle’, a ‘Moderate Obstacle,’ a 
‘Major Obstacle’, or ‘a Very Severe Obstacle’ to the current operations of this establishment?” (WBES core 
questionnaire, p17). Removing firms which consider corruption as an obstacle to their business also allows to remove 
from the sample firms presenting the risk of “false responses”, i.e. firm considering corruption as an obstacle but which 
did not dare reporting the size of informal payments (Jensen et al., 2010).   
86 It can be objected that this approach may be conceptually imperfect since firms perception of corruption probably 
depends on the cycle (Kaplan and Pathania, 2010). Such procedure may in this case suffer from reverse causality bias. 
87 2SLS estimation of equation (4) has also been conducted on the remaining sample of firms, i.e. firms considering 
corruption as at least a moderate obstacle to their business. Results are presented in the last column of annex D.3, and 
the corresponding Hansen-J statistic significantly rejects the hypothesis of instruments validity. 
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2SLS estimator. However, since 2SLS and LIML estimates are not consistent under 
heteroskedasticity, we again perform the Continuously Updated GMM Estimator (CUE), robust to 
non-i.i.d disturbances. We observe that the strength and significance of estimated instability 
coefficients were understated in both 2SLS and LIML estimations.  
4.2.2. System GMM estimations 
We provide further empirical evidence on the causal effects of export instability on corruption by 
applying the dynamic panel GMM estimator to equation (4.4). This approach is motivated by i) the 
presence of the lagged dependent variable in the right-hand side of the equation, and ii) problems 
of weak instruments that arose in IV panel estimations.  
As the time length of our panel may cause problems of instrument proliferation (Roodman, 2009), 
the number of instruments is minimized by performing difference-GMM on instability variables 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). We consider the skewness of exports as a predetermined variable and 
instrument it in difference by its first and higher order lagged levels (lags 1 to 10). As difference-in-
Hansen test brings the exogeneity of the 16-year standard deviation of exports into question, we 
treat it as an endogenous regressor, and instrument it in difference by its second and higher order 
lagged levels (lags 2 to 10). The lagged level of the corruption perception indicator is considered as 
endogenous and is instrumented in system (Blundell and Bond, 1998) by its second and higher 
order lagged levels and differences (lags 2 to 11). 
Moreover, we prefer the orthogonal deviation transform to the first-difference transform of 
equation (4.4). The “forward orthogonal deviation” transform (Arellano and Bover, 1995) consists 
in removing the fixed effect by subtracting the average of all future available observation of a 
variable (Yt) as follow (Roodman, 2006): 
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The orthogonal deviation transform is usually applied to minimize data losses with unbalanced 
panel data, or when first differencing creates artificial correlations between errors that were 
uncorrelated before the transformation. It has been shown that in balanced panels, both 
transformations produces identical estimators, holding the instrument set fixed (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995). Applying separately first differencing and orthogonal deviation transforms to our 
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GMM specification yields pretty different estimates, which points to problems of unbalanced panel 
data. Notably, performing sys-GMM on equation (4.4) in first-difference produces estimates of the 
lagged dependent variable that are far below the value of FE estimates, which is not consistent with 
the econometric reasoning underlying the use of dynamic panel GMM (see box no.9). By contrast, 
applying the orthogonal deviation transform to equation (4.4) for different GMM specifications 
produces estimates that are higher than FE estimates and lower than OLS estimates (the latter are 
presented in annex 4.E).  
Results are presented in column (6) of table 4.1. Estimates pass the Hansen test of identification 
and the Arellano-Bond test of two-order autocorrelation in a reliable confidence level, and confirm 
the significant negative ex post effect of export instability on corruption perceptions observed in FE 
estimations. In particular, despite differences in the sample (in sys-GMM estimations, developed 
countries are not excluded from the sample) and in the instrumentation technique, estimates of the 
lagged dependent variable and the skewness variable are strikingly similar to those obtained in IV 
estimation (columns (3), (4) and (5)).88 However, the 16-year standard deviation of export does not 
appear significant in sys-GMM estimations, which contrasts with previous GMM-CUE estimates. 
4.3 Summary results 
To make sure that problems of endogeneity do not bias FE country-level and OLS firm-level 
estimates, we conducted Instrumental Variable (IV) estimations and system-GMM (sys-GMM) 
estimations of the effects of export instability on corruption.  
Regarding panel estimations, while endogeneity (difference-in-Hansen) tests on export instability 
variables do not point to serious problems of reverse causality with corruption perceptions, we had 
to check for the consistency of IV panel estimates in presence of i) a probable weak instrument 
bias, and ii) a probable dynamic bias caused by the presence of the lagged dependent variable in the 
right-hand side of equation (4.4). We address the first bias by applying the GMM-CUE estimator to 
equation (4.4), which is robust to weak instruments and non-spherical disturbances. We address the 
second bias by applying the sys-GMM estimator to equation (4.4).  
Regarding cross-section estimations, we had to address an omitted variable bias in IV estimates of 
the effects of aggregate export fluctuations on firms’ informal payments. Our identification strategy 
was aimed at ensuring that the effects of instability in aggregate exports on a firm’s informal 
payments are channelled by fluctuations in its income only, not through movements in other 
economic agents’ income. We circumvented this problem by restricting the sample to “active” 
firms, i.e. firms which consider corruption as no obstacle or minor obstacle to their business and 
                                                          
88 Suggesting that the bias in the value of the estimated coefficient potentially induced by an indirect effect of natural 
shocks passing through other channels than the export channel is somewhat limited. 
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therefore would engage on purpose in bribery. Hansen-J statistic of IV estimations on the sample 
of “active” firms in table 4.1 did not indicate problems of endogeneity (columns (11), (12), and 
(13)), while Hansen-J statistic of IV estimations on the sample of “passive” firms in annex 4.Diii) 
did. Moreover, endogeneity (difference-in-Hansen) tests on export instability variables, conducted 
on the restricted sample of active firms, did not reject in a 10% confidence level orthogonality 
conditions for the specified endogenous regressors. In the next cross-section estimations, we 
therefore prefer the OLS estimator to the IV estimator because of the former has better asymptotic 
properties when regressors of interest are exogenous. Cross-section estimations of the following 
empirical specifications are conducted on both the original sample of firms and the restricted 
sample of “active” firms. In fact, estimating together the direct effect of firms’ income instability 
and the indirect effect of instability via other economic agents’ income is still of interest for our 
analysis. 
Despite methodological and sample differences, GMM and IV panel estimations both point to a 
negative ex post effect of instability on corruption perceptions, similar in strength and in 
significance, suggesting that survival corruption transactions prevail over opportunistic corruption 
transactions during export fluctuations. By contrast, IV cross-section estimations point to a positive 
ex post effect of instability on firms’ informal payments, suggesting that opportunistic corruption 
transactions prevail over survival corruption transactions. We also find contrasting evidence of an 
ex ante effect of export instability on corruption perceptions and firms’ bribe payments. Suspecting 
that such contrasting estimates are driven by sample differences and reflect nonlinear rather than 
inconsistent effects of export instability, we relax the linearity assumption on the effects of 
instability on corruption in the next section. 
Box No. 9. Applying the GMM system estimator89 
OLS estimation of equation (4.4) cannot produce consistent estimates of α2 and α3, because the correlation between 
the lagged dependent variable and the fixed effect creates a dynamic panel bias additional to traditional estimation bias 
addressed earlier: 
Corruptit = α0 + α1.Corruptit-1+ α2.Skewnessit + α3.Std_devit + β.Controls + λt + µi +εit  (4.4) 
with E[Corruptit-1 µi] ≠ 0. Such a correlation biases OLS estimates upward. It attributes spurious explanatory power to 
the lagged dependent variable, Corruptit-1, which is actually attributable to the fixed effect. Unfortunately, addressing 
this problem using the usual within-group fixed effect estimator creates a negative correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the error term, which biases FE estimates downward (Roodman, 2006). Removing 
unobservable heterogeneity by estimating equation (4.4) in first difference may be a solution to this dynamic bias: 
∆Corruptit = α1.∆Corruptit-1+ α2.∆Skewnessit + α3.∆VARit + β.∆Controls + ∆λt +∆εit (4.4’) 
First-differencing does however create artificial correlation between ∆Corruptit-1 and ∆εit because both terms have εit-1 
in common, leading to inconsistent estimates of α2 and α3. A solution stressed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) is to 
                                                          
89 This box has been adapted from a box in Gaëlle Balineau’s thesis “Le commerce équitable: un outil de 
développement?”, University of Auvergne, Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le développement International, 
2010. 
Chapter 4 – When corruption is a response to export instability 
Page | 166 
instrument the first difference of the lagged dependent variable by its second lag in level. This approach produces 
consistent and efficient estimates of α2 and α3, as long as hypotheses of weak exogeneity of regressors (not correlated 
with future disturbances) and no auto-correlation of disturbances are respected, i.e. when E[Corruptit-2 ∆εit] = 0. 
This approach has been further developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), who exploited longer lags of the dependent 
variable in level to instrument its lagged first-difference. However, because lagged levels of the dependent variable may 
be poor predictors of its lagged first difference, particularly for random-walk like variables (Roodman, 2006; Blundell 
and Bond, 1998) the Arellano-Bond estimator may suffer from weak instrumentation bias. Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) address the violation of rank condition by instrumenting the first lagged difference of 
the dependent variable (∆Corruptit-1) by its lagged levels, and the first lagged level by its lagged differences (Corruptit-k  
and ∆Corruptit-k, with k ≥ 2). This approach consists in estimating simultaneously equation (4.4) in level and in 
difference, by applying the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) to the following system of orthogonality 
conditions (the GMM-system estimator): 
E[Corruptit-k  ∆εit] = 0 with k ≥ 2; T=3,…T (a) 
E[∆Corruptit -k  εit] = 0  with k ≥ 2 T=3,…T (b) 
Respecting the above conditions requires instrumenting the lagged difference of the dependent variable by its lagged 
levels of order two or higher (a), and instrumenting the lagged level of the dependent variable by it lagged differences 
of order two or higher (b). Other exogenous regressors of equation (4.4) can also be introduced in level or difference 
as excluded instruments of the system. 
Because of a possible mean-reversal process, the presence of the lagged corruption in the differenced equation may 
bias the estimation of regressors orthogonal to the contemporaneous error term (εit) in equation (4.4). In these 
circumstances, it is probable that export instability variables are correlated with lagged error terms, i.e. are weakly 
exogenous or pre-determined: 
E[Instability_measureit-k  εit-s]≠0 for all s>k 
E[Instability_measureit-k  εit-s]=0 for all s≤k 
To remove such a correlation, a solution consists in instrumenting the pre-determined variable by its first or higher 
order lagged values (in level and/or difference). 
Testing sys-GMM specification 
• Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) test the orthogonality of 
lagged regressors and non GMM-type instruments using the Sargan-Hansen test of over-identification. Because of 
its sensitivity to auto-correlation in error terms, the Hansen test must be performed along with the two-order 
autocorrelation test of Arellano and Bond (Roodman, 2006). 
• Instrument proliferation makes estimators and specification tests misleading. As the time dimension rises the 
number of instrument (lagged variables) mechanically increases, which may overfit endogenous variables and lead the 
Hansen test to under-reject the null of instrument validity. One typical symptom of instrument proliferation is when 
the Hansen J-stat approaches 1. Another check for instrument proliferation is to make sure that the number of 
instrument does not exceed panel width (Roodman, 2009). 
• Roodman (2006) stresses that while OLS estimates of the lagged dependent variable are biased upward, within 
group FE estimates are biased downward. Thus, one simple test of the sys-GMM specification is to ensure that the 
estimated parameter of the lagged dependent variable is lower than OLS estimates but higher than FE estimates. 
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5. Disentangling the ex post and ex ante effects of instability on corruption 
In a first sub-section, we insert simultaneously in the corruption equation a variable of positive 
skewness and a variable of negative skewness, to account for possible asymmetric ex post effects of 
shocks and asymmetric corruption responses to them. In the second and third sub-sections, we 
show that the direction of the ex post and ex ante effects of export instability on corrupt deals 
depends on the size and frequency of export fluctuations.  
5.1. Disentangling the ex post effect of instability: accounting for the asymmetry of 
export fluctuations 
Following Rancière et al. (2008), we insert the negative and the positive skewness of exports 
together in the corruption equation. The negative (positive) skewness of export is computed as a 
variable equal to the absolute value of skewness if the latter is negative (positive) and equal to zero 
otherwise. By doing this, we can identify asymmetric effects of positive and negative shocks – by 
looking at the relative strength of estimated coefficients – and asymmetric corruption responses to positive 
and negative shocks – by looking at the sign of estimated coefficients. We therefore estimate the 
following corruption equation: 
Corruptit= α0 [+ α1.Corruptit-1] + α2a.Positive_skewnessit + α2b.Negative_skewnessit + α3.std_devit + 
α4.Macro_controlsit {+ α5.Micro_controlsit + α6.timefixed_controls} + λt [+ µ i] +εit (4.5) 
Results are presented in table 4.2. Both country-level and firm-level estimations support a ‘global 
deterrent’ ex post effect of export instability on corruption. This evidence is consistent with the 
assumption presented in sub-section 2.1 of a decreasing marginal effect of transitory shocks on 
corruption practices (whether opportunistic or survival), yielding asymmetric corruption responses to 
shocks. Moreover, difference in the asymmetric deterrent effect of positive and negative shocks 
explains why previous panel and cross-section estimations of the ex post ‘net’ effect of instability 
were ambiguous in table 4.1. If the deterrent effect of adverse shocks is not significant in a 10% 
confidence level in FE and GMM estimations, OLS firm-level estimation conducted on the original 
sample of firms (column (4)) shows that adverse shocks have a stronger deterrent effect on 
corruption than positive shocks. Finally, looking at the effect of export shocks on “active” informal 
payments in column (5), neither episodes of positive shocks nor episodes of negative shocks are 
found to significantly impact corruption. 
In the following sub-section, we further disentangle the ex post effects of export instability on 
corruption by testing whether the decreasing or increasing nature of the marginal effect of shocks, 
and therefore the direction of the estimated relationship, depends on the size and frequency of 
export fluctuations. 
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Table 4.2. Accounting for the asymmetry of export fluctuations 
Dependent variable:  ICRG  WBES 
 
 
Within fixed effects  
 
Sys-GMM   OLS 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) 
Lagged Corruption   0.694*** (0.00)  0.714*** (0.00)  0.700*** (0.00)   
Export skewness > 0  -0.0006* (0.06)  -0.001*** (0.01)  -0.001** (0.02) -0.004* (0.08) 0.002 (0.61) 
Export skewness < 0  -0.0002 (0.38)  -0.0003 (0.46)  -0.001 (0.22) -0.013** (0.02) -0.004 (0.47) 
Export std_dev  -0.001 (0.89)  0.001  (0.93)  -0.001 (0.99) 0.813*** (0.00) 0.213  (0.28) 
Population growth  -0.043 (0.32)  -0.039 (0.28)  -0.196 (0.63)  1.380*** (0.00) -0.27 (0.69) 
Nat. resources  0.008*** (0.01)  0.007** (0.04)  0.038 (0.19)  0.125*** (0.00) 0.009 (0.76) 
Government size  -0.013** (0.05)  -0.013** (0.03)  0.014 (0.70)  3e-11*** (0.00) 3e-11*** (0.00) 
Log population  -0.074 (0.79)  0.629*** (0.00)  -0.193 (0.86)  0.448*** (0.00) 0.386** (0.02) 
Pol. regime stability  -0.0031** (0.05)  0.000 (0.99)  -0.005 (0.81)  0.015* (0.08) -0.008 (0.41) 
Democracy  -0.018*** (0.01)  -0.016*** (0.01)  -0.077 (0.36)  0.902*** (0.00) 0.345** (0.05) 
Log openness  0.068 (0.55)  0.178* (0.08)  0.636 (0.40)  0.026*** (0.00) 0.026*** (0.00) 
Latitude        0.080*** (0.00) 0.044*** (0.01) 
Landlocked        -2.672*** (0.00) 0.162 (0.90) 
Initial GDP per cap        1.309*** (0.00) 0.333 (0.28) 
Common Law        -3.147 (0.39) -13.67** (0.02) 
Firm size        -0.154* (0.06) -0.035 (0.52) 
State owned        0.027 (0.17) -0.006** (0.04) 
Direct exports        -0.001 (0.51) 0.003 (0.42) 
Indirect exports        -0.002 (0.27) -0.001** (0.05) 
Constant  2.366 (0.62)  -9.971*** (0.00)  1.871(0.92)  -22.54*** (0.00) 0.153 (0.98) 
Country fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes  No No 
Time dummies  Yes No Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 
(countries/clusters) 
 
1144 (68) 1144 (68) 1144 (68) 
 
9212 (23) 4283 (23) 
R-squared  
Within 
Between 
  
0.642 
0.954 
 
0.609 
0.612 
 
Wald chi2(29) =    
679 
 0.083 0.10 
Hansen test (p-val)     0.36    
AR(1) test (p-val)     0.00    
AR(2) test (p-val)      0.32    
Number of 
instruments      55 
   
When possible, coefficients are rounded to three decimal places. Standards errors robust to heteroskedasticity in all regressions, and 
clustered by country for OLS firm-level estimations. P-values in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%. Hansen J-statistic tests for joint instrument validity; null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid, i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly from the second-stage equation. In the sys-GMM 
estimation, time dummies are excluded instruments; the skewness of exports is treated as predetermined and instrument the 
differenced equation by its lagged levels (lags 1 to 9); the standard deviation of exports is treated as endogenous and instrument the 
differenced equation by its lagged levels (lags 2 to 9); lagged corruption is treated as endogenous and instrument the equation in 
system by its lagged levels and differences (lags 2 to 10). Instruments are collapsed, orthogonal deviations are preferred to first-
difference deviations, and the Windmeijer correction of the two-step estimated variance is applied. Hansen J-statistic tests for joint 
instrument validity; null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly from the second-stage equation. 
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5.2. Disentangling the ex post effects of instability: accounting for the frequency and 
size of export fluctuations 
Following Alderman (1996), Dercon (2002), Collier (2002) or Wolf (2005), we posit that the 
direction of the ex post of instability may differ according to the destabilizing nature of output 
variations. As Dercon (2002, p.2) points out, 
“Other characteristics of income risk include the frequency and intensity of shocks, and the 
persistence of their impact (…). Relatively small but frequent shocks are more easily to deal than 
large, infrequent negative shocks.” 
Following Olson (1993)’s analysis of economic development under different political system, 
opportunist roving bandits, motivated by a strong appetite for wealth accumulation during periods of 
political or economic disarray, are likely to spread during sudden and sharp transitory booms, when 
usual institutional safeguards against malpractices are overwhelmed by rent-seeking behaviours. 
Survival corruption is also likely to expand during sharp unexpected busts, when usual coping 
mechanisms cannot fully absorb their negative consequences on income or welfare. Conversely, 
institutional and financial constraints may not bind during normal fluctuations, which may increase 
the opportunity cost of engaging in corruption during moderate positive shocks while enabling 
agents to (at least partly) cushion the consequences of moderate adverse shocks on income. It is 
therefore likely that the decreasing or increasing nature of the marginal effect of exports shocks on 
corruption, illustrated in graphs 4.4iii) and 4.4iv) of section 2.1, depends on the destabilizing nature 
of export variations.  
Rancière et al. (2008) stress that the coefficient of skewness is a bi-dimensional measure that 
appraises both the asymmetry and the tail’s fatness of a distribution. Chapter 2 and annex 4.B 
support their findings by highlighting a strong and positive relationship between absolute values of 
skewness and the kurtosis of exports.90 Thus, to account for nonlinear ex post effects reliant on the 
abruptness of export fluctuations, we introduce together in the corruption equation the quadratic 
terms of the positive and negative 6-year rolling skewness of exports (equation (4.6a)). As an 
additional test for such nonlinearities, we replace the quadratic terms by the interactions of the 6-
                                                          
90 The kurtosis is a measure of both the peakedness and tails’ fatness of a random variable’s probability distribution. 
Often referred as “the instability of instability”, the kurtosis measures the extent to which observed values far from the 
mean (or their trend) are frequent in comparison to those in the neighborhood of the mean (or their trend). We compute 
the k-year rolling kurtosis of exports as follows: 
 
with T = [t; t-k], yt the observed value of export earnings and Yt their trend value. 
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year rolling kurtosis of exports with the positive and negative 6-year rolling skewness of exports 
(equation (4.6b)).  
Panel fixed effect, sys-GMM, and cross-section OLS firm-level estimations of the following 
equations are conducted: 
Corrupt
it
= α0 [+ α1.Corruptit-1] + β2a.Positive_skewnessit + β2b.Negative_skewnessit + 
β2c.Positive_skewness2it + β2d.Negative_skewness2it + α3.std_devit + α4.Macro_controlsit {+ 
α5.Micro_controlsit + α6.timefixed_controls} + λt [+ µ i] + εit (4.6a) 
and 
Corrupt
it
= α0 [+ α1.Corruptit-1] + β’2a.Positive_skewnessit + β’2b.Negative_skewnessit + 
β’2c.Positive_skew*6yr_kurtosisit + β’2d.Negative_skew*6yr_kurtosisit + β’2e.6yr_Kurtosisit + α3.std_devit + 
α4.Macro_controlsit {+ α5.Micro_controlsit + α6.timefixed_controls} + λt [+ µ i] + εit (4.6b) 
Results are presented in table 4.3. FE estimates of equations (4.6a) and (4.6b) highlight a significant 
U-shaped ex post effect of export instability on corruption perceptions. Below a 6-year skewness of 
150% and a 6-year kurtosis of 286%91, we find a 1%-significant ‘global deterrent’ ex post effect of 
export instability on corruption perceptions (as illustrated in figure 4.4iii of section 2.1). Above 
these threshold values, the sign of the relationship reverses and a 1 or 3%-significant ‘global 
boosting’ ex post effect of instability is evidenced (as illustrated in figure 4.4iv of section 2.1). Sys-
GMM estimates of equation (4.6a) also support the existence of an 11-15% significant U-shaped ex 
post effect of export instability on corruption, with a turning point corresponding to an absolute 
skewness of 125-150%. Sys-GMM estimation of equation (4.6b) does not however display 
significant evidence of a similar relationship. 
OLS firm-level estimates of equations (4.6a) and (4.6b) with the original sample of firms are 
presented in left-sided uncoloured columns of table 4.3, while estimates obtained with the sample 
of “active” firms are presented in right-sided blue columns. Estimations of equation (4.6b) 
conducted on both the whole sample and the sample of “active” firms support a similar U-shaped 
ex post effect of export instability on firms’ corruption expenses. Estimation of equation (4.6b) 
conducted on the whole sample of firms supports the evidence of a 15%-significant U-shaped 
effect of both positive and negative skewness of exports, with a kurtosis threshold of 220% and 
226%, respectively. When the sample is restricted to “active” firms, estimates of equation (4.6b) 
support the evidence of a 1%-significant U-shaped effect of both positive and negative skewness of 
exports, with a kurtosis threshold of 328% and 186%, respectively.  
                                                          
91 A value of kurtosis surprisingly close to the kurtosis of a normal distribution (300%). 
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Thus, we highlight a ‘global deterrent’ ex post effect of instability, resulting from the decreasing 
marginal effect of moderate and frequent shocks on corruption (as explained in figure 4.4iii of 
section 2.1). We also find a ‘global boosting’ ex post effect of instability, resulting from the 
increasing marginal effect of large and infrequent shocks on corruption (as explained in figure 4.4iv 
of section 2.1). 
5.3. Disentangling the ex ante effects of instability: accounting for the “normal” or 
“abnormal” nature of export instability  
Distinct effects of “normal” and “systemic” risk on insurance patterns have been underlined by 
Collier (2002), who points out the existence of a “paradox of insurance provision”. Although 
insuring against systemic risk should be the desirable practice, it appears that the most common 
practice is the opposite pattern: small-size, frequent, idiosyncratic shocks are better insured than 
economy-wide, infrequent and large shocks. Considering that corruption activities can act as an 
insurance against income fluctuations when they are undertaken to secure future resource inflows, a 
positive relationship between perceptions of instability and resource-locking corrupt transactions 
should be empirically observed in case of “normal” or “humdrum” fluctuations; while a negative 
relationship should be observed in case of “abnormal” or “systemic” fluctuations.  
Nonlinearities depending on the size and frequency of economic fluctuations may therefore 
characterize the ex ante effect of instability and corruption. We consider that the long-run kurtosis 
of the distribution of exports around their trend provides additional information on the way 
economic agents perceive instability. For a given 16-year standard deviation of exports, a low 
rolling 16-year kurtosis characterizes contexts where agents perceive economic instability as the 
result of “normal” fluctuations. By contrast, a high 16-year kurtosis of exports rather characterizes 
contexts where agents perceive instability as the result of “abnormal” fluctuations.   
Therefore, we disentangle the ex ante effect of instability on corruption by inserting into the 
corruption equation the product of the 16-year rolling kurtosis of exports with the 16-year rolling 
standard deviation of exports: 
Corrupt
it
= α0 [+ α1.Corruptit-1] + α2a.Positive_skewnessit + α2b.Negative_skewnessit + β3a. std_devit + 
β3b.std_devit*16yr_kurtosis + β3c.16yr_Kurtosisit + α4.Macro_controlsit {+ α5.Micro_controlsit+ 
α6.timefixed_controls} + λt [+ µ i] + εit (4.7) 
Results are presented in table 4.3. FE estimates of equation (4.7) show a significant kurtosis 
threshold equal to 400%, beyond which the statistical relationship between the 16-year standard 
deviation of exports and corruption becomes highly significant and negative. In other words, when 
perceptions of instability result from “abnormal” fluctuations corruption is found to decrease, 
which is consistent with the “paradox of insurance provision” previously mentioned.  
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To address the potential endogeneity bias in the relationship between the standard deviation of 
exports corruption in panel estimations92, we instrument the standard deviation and the interaction 
term in equation (4.7) by our natural disaster variable, the 16-year standard deviation of rainfall, and 
the products of the 16-year export kurtosis with these two excluded regressors. First-stage 
estimations are hence conducted on the following system: 
Std_devit = γ0 + γ1.Corruptit-1 + γ2.Natural_shocksit + γ3.Natural_shocks*16yr_export_kurtosisit + 
γ4.16yr_Kurtosisit + γ5.controlsit + οt + πi +ωit (4.7a) 
Std_dev*16yr_export_kurtosisit = γ’0 + γ’1.Corruptit-1 + γ’2.Natural_shocksit + 
γ’3.Natural_shocks*16yr_export_kurtosisit + γ’4.16yr_Kurtosisit + γ’5.controlsit + ο’t + π’i +ω’it (4.7b) 
where Natural_shocksit is a vector including the natural disaster and the rainfall instability variables. 
2SLS and GMM-CUE regressions are run on equations (4.7), (4.7a) and (4.7b). Second-stage results 
are presented in table 4.3, and first-stage results are presented in annex 4.Civ).  
2SLS and GMM-CUE estimations pass the Hansen test of over-identification restrictions, and do 
not seem to suffer from weak identification bias. Both estimations support a hump-shaped ex ante 
effect of export instability on corruption. Below a kurtosis threshold of 635% (2SLS) and 675% 
(GMM-CUE), a 1% significant positive ex ante effect of instability is found, while above these 
thresholds the direction of the effect reverses in a 1% confidence level. Thus, corruption is found 
to significantly increase when perceptions of export instability arise from “normal” fluctuations, 
while corruption is found to significantly decrease when perceptions of export instability arise from 
“abnormal” fluctuations.  
It could be rightly objected that very few observations exhibit a kurtosis exceeding 635%93, which 
suggests that the hump-shaped relationship between the standard deviation of exports and 
corruption should be considered with caution. Nevertheless, a robust significant positive ex ante 
effect of perceptions of “normal” instability is evidenced in both panel IV estimations and in cross-
section OLS estimations, which is still consistent with the paradox of insurance provision 
emphasised earlier. According to our results, resource-locking corruption strategies are likely to 
spread where and when perceptions of instability arise from “normal” fluctuations. 
 
  
                                                          
92 As a reminder, the endogeneity test conducted on the standard deviation of exports alone rejects in a 14% confidence 
level the exogeneity assumption. 
93 58 observations in 9 countries: Cuba (3), Denmark (9), Finland  (3), Greece (8), Guyana (12), Indonesia (3), Madagascar 
(11), Mali (4), and Portugal (5) 
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5.4. Summary results 
In this section, we tried to disentangle the ex post and ex ante effects of instability on corruption by 
emphasising the asymmetry and the occurrence of extreme variations in the distribution of exports 
around their trend. First, we relaxed the symmetry assumption on the effects of positive and 
negative shocks and corruption responses to them, by separating the effect of a negative skewness 
of exports from the effect of a positive skewness of exports on corruption incidence in empirical 
estimations. Second, we further characterized how exports fluctuate, by considering the size and 
frequency of export fluctuations in our estimations of the ex post and ex ante effects of instability.  
We find country-level and firm-level evidence of a ‘global deterrent’ ex post effect of repeated and 
moderate export fluctuations on corruption. We support that this effect is driven by the asymmetric 
corruption responses to shocks, which result from the decreasing marginal effect of frequent and 
moderate fluctuations on corrupt transactions. We also provide country-level and firm-level 
evidence of a ‘global boosting’ ex post effect of infrequent and large fluctuations on corruption. We 
support that this effect is driven by the asymmetric corruption responses to shocks which result 
from the increasing marginal effect of abrupt fluctuations on corrupt transactions. 
We find a strong and robust positive ex ante effect of perceptions of “normal” instability in both 
country-level and firm-level estimations. Such evidence supports the hypothesis of resource-locking 
corrupt transactions acting as an effective insurance against humdrum fluctuations. Evidence of a 
hump-shaped ex ante effect of instability, depending on the size and frequency of export 
fluctuations, is weaker but observable in FE and IV country-level estimations. This suggests that 
resource-locking corrupt transactions may not enable to protect against abnormal fluctuations.  
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Table 4.3. Nonlinear ex post and ex ante effects of instability 
Dependent variable:  ICRG   WBES  
 
 
Within fixed effects  IV-2SLS GMM-CUE  Sys-GMM  
 
OLS 
 
Equations:  (4.6a) (4.6b) (4.7)  (4.7)  (4.6a) (4.6b) (4.7)  (4.6a) (4.6b) (4.7) 
Lagged Corruption  
 
0.694*** 
(0.00) 
0.692*** 
(0.00) 
0.690*** 
(0.00) 
 0.674*** 
(0.00) 
0.676*** 
(0.00)  
0.742*** 
(0.00) 
0.747*** 
(0.00) 
0.721*** 
(0.00)  
 
   
 
Skew>0  
 
-0.003*** 
(0.00) 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.001* 
(0.06) 
 -0.001** 
(0.03) 
-0.001** 
(0.03)  
-0.005** 
(0.03) 
-0.003† 
(0.14) 
-0.001* 
(0.09) 
-0.002  
(0.94) 
-0.027 
(0.33) 
-0.112† 
(0.14) 
-0.328*** 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.30) 
-0.003 
(0.43) 
Skew<0 
 
-0.003*** 
(0.00) 
-0.002*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0003 
(0.39) 
 -0.0004 
(0.28) 
-0.0003 
(0.30)  
-0.003* 
(0.09) 
-0.002 
(0.50) 
-0.001 
(0.35) 
0.016   
(0.51) 
-0.017 
(0.69) 
-0.068* 
(0.09) 
-0.186*** 
(0.00) 
-0.013** 
(0.02) 
-0.005 
(0.44) 
[Skewness>0]2 
 
1e-05*** 
(0.00)   
 
 
 
 
2e-05† 
(0.11)   
7e-06   
(0.96) 
0.0001 
(0.32)    
 
[Skewness<0]2 
 
1e-05*** 
(0.00)   
 
  
1e-05† 
(0.15)   
-0.0002 
(0.29) 
4e-05 
(0.87)    
 
[Skew>0]*6Kurt 
  
7e-06** 
(0.02)  
 
   
1e-05 
(0.24)   
 0.0005† 
(0.13) 
0.001*** 
(0.00)  
 
[Skew<0]*6Kurt 
  
7e-06** 
(0.03)  
 
   
8e-06 
(0.48)   
 0.0003† 
(0.11) 
0.001*** 
(0.00)  
 
Export std_dev 
 
-0.003  
(0.84) 
-0.003  
(0.84) 
0.020 
(0.19) 
 0.127** 
(0.02) 
0.135*** 
(0.01)  
-0.051 
(0.59) 
-0.039 
(0.64) 
0.007 
(0.99) 
0.884*** 
(0.00) 
0.275 
(0.32) 
0.980*** 
(0.00) 
0.602*** 
(0.00) 
0.867*** 
(0.00) 
0.299* 
(0.10) 
Std_dev*16Kurt 
   
-4e-05*** 
(0.01) 
 -2e-04*** 
(0.01) 
-2e-04*** 
(0.01)    
-5e-05 
(0.90)  
 
  
-0.0002 
(0.42) 
-0.0002 
(0.35) 
Kurtosis 
  
-0.001* 
(0.10) 
0.0005** 
(0.03) 
 0.001*** 
(0.01) 
0.001*** 
(0.01)   
-0.002 
(0.24) 
-0.0003 
(0.62)  
 -0.066* 
(0.09) 
-0.173*** 
(0.00) 
1e-05 
(0.99) 
0.0005 
(0.75) 
Population growth 
 
-0.046  
(0.24) 
-0.043  
(0.34) 
-0.038 
(0.37) 
 -0.037 
(0.35) 
-0.037  
(0.34)  
-0.213 
(0.69) 
-0.222 
(0.65) 
-0.254 
(0.71)  
1.842*** 
(0.01) 
-0.712 
(0.52) 
1.543*** 
(0.00) 
-1.977*** 
(0.00) 
1.306*** 
(0.00) 
-0.355 
(0.63) 
Nat. resources 
 
0.008** 
(0.02) 
0.008** 
(0.02) 
0.008** 
(0.02) 
 0.006†   
(0.11) 
0.006† 
(0.12)  
0.043† 
(0.15) 
-0.003 
(0.64) 
0.026 
(0.72)  
0.143*** 
(0.00) 
0.008 
(0.86) 
0.164*** 
(0.00) 
0.052** 
(0.04) 
0.128*** 
(0.00) 
0.016 
(0.60) 
Government size 
 
-0.012* 
(0.07) 
-0.012* 
(0.07) 
-0.014** 
(0.02) 
 -0.013* 
(0.06) 
-0.013* 
(0.06)  
0.075* 
(0.07) 
-0.005 
(0.91) 
0.041 
(0.51)  
2e-11   
(0.63) 
7e-12 
(0.87) 
5e-11*** 
(0.00) 
1e-11   
(0.45) 
4e-11*** 
(0.00) 
4e-11*** 
(0.00) 
Log population 
 
-0.117  
(0.66) 
-0.051  
(0.85) 
-0.245 
(0.39) 
 -0.463 
(0.21) 
-0.489  
(0.18)  
0.044 
(0.98) 
-0.332 
(0.73) 
0.486 
(0.86)  
0.850   
(0.36) 
1.001 
(0.40) 
0.389 
(0.28) 
1.399*** 
(0.01) 
0.494*** 
(0.00) 
0.418** 
(0.03) 
Pol. regime stability 
 
-0.003* 
(0.06) 
-0.003* 
(0.06) 
-0.003* 
(0.06) 
 -0.002 
(0.36) 
-0.002  
(0.33)  
-0.016 
(0.45) 
-0.018 
(0.58) 
-0.043 
(0.33)  
0.020† 
(0.11) 
0.0002 
(0.99) 
0.029† 
(0.14) 
0.045** 
(0.03) 
0.007 
(0.22) 
-0.015 
(0.33) 
Democracy 
 
-0.019*** 
(0.00) 
-0.019*** 
(0.00) 
-0.017*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.014** 
(0.04) 
-0.014** 
(0.04)  
-0.037 
(0.62) 
-0.059 
(0.44) 
-0.135 
(0.31)  
0.953*** 
(0.00) 
0.298† 
(0.12) 
0.851*** 
(0.00) 
-0.361** 
(0.02) 
0.998*** 
(0.00) 
0.454*** 
(0.01) 
Log openness 
 
0.066  
(0.57) 
0.068   
(0.55) 
0.0480 
(0.66) 
 -0.034 
(0.77) 
-0.048  
(0.68)  
0.918 
(0.32) 
0.214 
(0.83) 
1.063 
(0.45)  
0.032   
(0.21) 
0.033* 
(0.09) 
0.034*** 
(0.00) 
0.048*** 
(0.00) 
0.022*** 
(0.00) 
0.022*** 
(0.04) 
Latitude 
    
    
     
0.075*** 
(0.00) 
0.049*** 
(0.00) 
0.055*** 
(0.00) 
-0.020  
(0.18) 
0.084*** 
(0.00) 
0.048*** 
(0.01) 
Landlocked 
    
    
     
-3.08*** 
(0.00) 
0.665 
(0.67) 
-3.764*** 
(0.00) 
-0.071  
(0.93) 
-2.713*** 
(0.00) 
0.009 
(0.99) 
Initial GDP per cap 
    
    
     
1.932** 
(0.05) 
0.739 
(0.59) 
1.433*** 
(0.00) 
0.551*** 
(0.01) 
1.108*** 
(0.00) 
0.117 
(0.78) 
Common Law 
    
    
     
-2.008 
(0.59) 
-14.31** 
(0.02) 
-5.867† 
(0.11) 
-20.55*** 
(0.00) 
-3.360*** 
(0.00) 
-14.05*** 
(0.01) 
Firm size              -0.155** -0.027 -0.146* -0.031  -0.1649 -0.043 
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(0.05) (0.61) (0.07) (0.57) (0.16) (0.43) 
State owned  
    
   
    
0.027   
(0.18) 
-0.006** 
(0.05) 
0.025 
(0.20) 
-0.005* 
(0.10) 
0.028 
(0.53) 
-0.006** 
(0.05) 
Direct exports  
    
  
    
-0.001  
(0.52) 
0.003 
(0.40) 
-0.001 
(0.63) 
0.005   
(0.28) 
-0.001 
(0.28) 
0.003 
(0.45) 
Indirect exports  
    
  
    
-0.002  
(0.26) 
-0.001* 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.31) 
-0.001** 
(0.05) 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.001** 
(0.04) 
Constant  3.199   (0.49) 
2.181 
(0.64) 
5.112 
(0.31) 
  4.335 
(0.89) 
7.505 
(0.66) 
-10.43 
(0.83)  
-36.34* 
(0.10) 
11.28 
(0.74) 
-12.50* 
(0.10) 
-15.21* 
(0.09) 
-21.90*** 
(0.00) 
1.098 
(0.90) 
Country fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  No No No No No No 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. (countries)  1144 (68) 1144 (68) 1144 (68)  1143 (67) 1143 (67)  1144 (68) 1144 (68) 1144 (68)  9212(23) 4283(23) 9212(23) 4283(23) 9212(23) 4283(23) 
Thresholds:     
    
      
 
   
 
 ∂Corr/∂(skew>0) = 0  150% 286%       125%      220% 328%   
 ∂Corr/∂(skew<0) = 0  150% 286%       150%      226% 186%   
∂Corrupt/∂std_dev= 0    400%  635% 675%            
Weak instrument test     
 
     
     
Kleibergen-Paap stat(critical value)   10.8 (11) a 10.8 (4.7) a           
F-test of excluded instruments                
Export std_dev   11.2 11.2           
Export std_dev*Kurtosis   7.9 7.9           
Hansen test (p-val)    0.67 0.67 0.85 0.35 0.75        
R-squared: 
Within 
Between  
 
0.645 
0.931 
 
0.644 
0.964 
0.643 
0.842 
  
0.626 
 
0.623 
 
Wald (31) 
=    962 
Wald (32) 
=    953 
Wald (31) 
=   511  0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
AR(1) test (p-val) 
 
   
   
 0.00 0.00 0.00        
AR(2) test (p-val) 
 
   
  
 0.28 0.33 0.58        
Number of instruments 
   4 4  56 51 44        
When possible, coefficients are rounded to three decimal places. Standards errors robust to heteroskedasticity in all regressions and clustered by country in OLS firm-level estimations. P-values in parenthesis. †significant at 
15% *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. In estimations (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), and (8), the variable Kurtosis corresponds to the 6-year rolling kurtosis of exports. In estimations (3), (6) and (9), the 
variable Kurtosis corresponds to the 16-year rolling kurtosis of exports. Hansen J-statistic tests for joint instrument validity; null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that 
instruments are correctly excluded from the second-stage equation. 2SLS and GMM-CUE estimates are adjusted for small sample bias. GMM-CUE estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation.  
Sys-GMM estimation of equation (4.6a): The positive and negative skewness of exports, and the squared terms are treated as predetermined and instrument the differenced equation by their lagged levels (lags 1 to 6). 
Lagged corruption is treated as endogenous and instruments the equation in system by its lagged levels and differences (lags 2 to 8). The standard deviation of exports is treated as endogenous and instruments the 
differenced equation by its lagged levels (lags 2 to 6). Sys-GMM estimation of equation (4.6b): The positive and negative skewness of exports, the 6-year kurtosis and the interaction terms are treated as predetermined, 
and instrument the differenced equation by their lagged levels (lags 1 to 4). Lagged corruption is treated as endogenous and instruments the equation in system by its lagged levels and differences (lags 2 to 6). The standard 
deviation is treated as endogenous and instruments the differenced equation by its lagged levels (lags 2 to 6). Sys-GMM estimation of equation (4.7): The 16-year kurtosis of exports is an excluded instrument. The positive 
and negative skewness of exports, and the squared terms are treated as predetermined and instrument the differenced equation by their lagged levels (lags 1 to 6). Lagged corruption is treated as endogenous and instruments 
the equation in system by its lagged levels and differences (lags 2 to 8). The standard deviation of exports and the interaction term are treated as endogenous and instrument the differenced equation by their lagged levels 
(lags 2 to 5). In all sys-GMM estimations, time dummies are excluded instruments, instruments are collapsed, orthogonal deviations are preferred to first-difference deviations, and the Windmeijer correction of the two-step 
estimated variance is applied. 
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6. The role of the liquidity constraint in channelling the effects of export 
instability on corruption 
As a reminder, Alderman and Paxson (1992), Dercon (1996), Sarris (2000) and Agenor and 
Aizenman (2004) stress that access to credit and insurance markets determines households’ 
strategies for smoothing their consumption or income path. Notably, it has been argued that 
informal “risky” risk-coping and risk-managing strategies, such as prostitution (Robinson and Yeh 
(2011)) or crime (Guillaumont and Puech (2006)), may be adopted when financial markets do not 
enable agents to fully protect against fluctuations in their revenue. It is hence likely that survival or 
resource-locking corruption strategies are undertaken by liquidity-constrained agents to alleviating 
the adverse effects of income instability.  
Moreover, by increasing or reducing the opportunity cost of engaging in illegal income-generating 
activities, access to lending may also determine the nature of the marginal ex post effect of income 
shocks on corrupt transactions (whether they are driven by survival or opportunistic motives). As a 
result, it can be hypothesised that the ‘global deterrent’ ex post effect arising from the decreasing 
marginal effect of shocks on corruption (see graph 4.4iii)) holds in situations of soft budget constraint. 
On the contrary, it is plausible that the ‘global boosting’ ex post effect arising from the increasing 
marginal effect of shocks on corruption (see graph 4.4iv)) holds in situations of hard budget constraint. 
An analysis of the role of agents’ liquidity constraint in driving the ex post and ex ante effects of 
instability on corruption is therefore a logical next step in our empirical analysis. We use the 
logarithm of the credit provided to the private sector in % of GDP (credit_market) as a proxy for 
formal financial markets access, and insert it as interaction term with the skewness and the standard 
deviation of exports in the corruption equation.  
In equation (4.8a), we test whether financial market access is a key channel for the ex post effect of 
instability on corruption: 
Corruptit= α0 [+ α1.Corruptit-1] + ρ2a.Positive_skewnessit + ρ2b.Negative_skewnessit + 
ρ2c.Positive_skewit*credit_marketit + ρ2d.Negative_skewit*credit_marketit + ρ2e.credit_marketit  + 
α3.std_devit + α4b.Macro_controlsit {+ α5.Micro_controlsit+ α6.timefixed_controls} + λt [+ µ i] +εit (4.8a) 
In equation (4.8a), we test whether financial market access is a key channel for the ex ante 
effect of instability on corruption: 
Corruptit= α0 [+ α1.Corruptit-1] + α2a.Positive_skewnessit + α2b.Negative_skewnessit + ρ3a.std_devit + 
ρ3b.std_devit*credit_marketit + ρ3b.credit_marketit + α4b.Macro_controlsit {+ α5.Micro_controlsit+ 
α6.timefixed_controls} + λt [+ µ i] +εit (4.8b) 
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Fixed effect, sys-GMM panel estimates, and OLS firm-level estimates of equations (4.8a) and (4.8b) 
are presented in table 4.4. In cross-section OLS regressions, we run equations (4.8a) and (4.8b) on 
the original sample of firms (left-sided uncoloured columns) and on the restricted sample of 
potentially “active” firms (right-sided blue columns). 
6.1. Credit market as a channel for the ex post effects of instability 
In regards to the ex post effects of instability (equation (4.8a)), FE estimates evidence a ‘global 
deterrent’ effect of instability on corruption when access to credit is improved. Estimation of 
equation (4.8a) without time dummies (column (2)) suggests that above a respective 8.5% and 
12.2% credit threshold, episodes of positive and negative shocks are both found to deter 
corruption. Below this threshold, a ‘global boosting’ effect of instability on corruption level is 
evidenced, but not in the usual confidence level (with a 22% and an 11%-significant level for the 
positive and negative skewness, respectively). Following our conceptual framework presented in 
section 2.1, FE estimations therefore support that a softened (hardened) liquidity constraint is 
associated with a decreasing (increasing) marginal effect of export shocks on corruption. Thus, the 
liquidity constraint appears as a credible channel for the nonlinear ex post effect of instability 
evidenced in section 5 and depicted in section 2. 
OLS firm-level estimates of equation (4.8a), conducted on the original sample of firms (column 
(8)), support the existence of a 5% credit threshold beyond which the relationship between the 
negative skewness of exports and firms’ corruption expenses reverses and becomes negative. 
Estimation of equation (4.8a) on the sample of ‘active’ firms (column (9)) provides significant 
evidence of a hump-shaped relationship between the negative skewness of exports and firms’ 
informal payments, with a 5% significant turning point corresponding to a credit threshold of 20% 
of GDP. This evidence is consistent with FE estimates of equation (4.8a), which also show that the 
credit-channel is more significant during negative shocks than during positive shocks. Thus, 
estimations support that survival bribe payments are made to cope with adverse shocks, when 
access to lending is imperfect94.  
 
 
 
                                                          
94 In section 7, we further investigate how firms’ cash surplus drives the effect of positive shocks on bribe payments. 
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6.2. Credit markets as a channel for the ex ante effect of instability 
FE country-level estimates of equation (4.8b), displayed in columns (3) and (4), highlight a hump-
shaped relationship between the standard deviation of exports and firms’ informal payments. In 
fact, the first-order condition of equation (4.8b) shows that a higher perception of export instability 
is significantly and positively associated with corruption when the share of credit provided to the 
private sector is below 24% of GDP, while it is significantly and negatively associated with 
corruption beyond this threshold. A similar hump-shaped relationship is evidenced in firm-level 
estimation of equation (4.8b), when the sample is restricted to “active” firms (column (11)). We 
observe that the effect of the standard deviation of exports on bribe payments is 1%-significant and 
positive below a credit threshold of around 60% of GDP; while it is 1%-significant and negative 
above it. As a consequence, access to credit markets also appears as a key channel for the ex ante 
effect of export instability on corruption. 
 
Evidence on the role of financial markets in channelling the ex post and ex ante effects of export 
instability on corruption is striking and strongly supports that corruption may allow liquidity-
constrained agents to cope with and insure against adverse shocks. We also stress that the liquidity 
constraint is likely to drive the nonlinear ex post effect of instability evidenced in section 5. In the 
following section, we check the robustness of our conclusions by addressing additional empirical 
issues. 
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Table 4.4. The role of the liquidity constraint in channelling the ex post and ex ante effects of instability on corruption 
Dependent variable: 
 
ICRG  WBES 
 
 
 
Within fixed effects  Sys-GMM  
 
OLS 
Equations 
 (4.8a) (4.8b)  (4.8a) (4.8b)  (4.8a) (4.8b) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Corruption t- 1   0.691*** (0.00) 0.711*** (0.00) 0.685*** (0.00) 0.706*** (0.00)  0.733*** (0.00) 0.701*** (0.00)      
Export skew>0  0.001 (0.42) 0.001 (0.22) -0.0005* (0.07) -0.001*** (0.00)  -0.006 (0.36) -0.001† (0.11)  -0.043 (0.17) 0.060 (0.40) -0.004* (0.06) 0.003 (0.42) 
Export skew<0  0.002 (0.26) 0.002† (0.11) -0.0003 (0.44) -0.0002 (0.57)  -0.007 (0.21) -0.001† (0.13)  0.017 (0.41) 0.048** (0.04) -0.014*** (0.01) -0.015** (0.02) 
Skew>0*credit access  
-0.0004 (0.21) -0.001* (0.06)    0.001  (0.45)   0.009 (0.25) -0.016 (0.35)   
Skew<0*credit access  
-0.0005 (0.19) -0.001* (0.08)    0.002  (0.25)   -0.011* (0.08) -0.016** (0.05)   
Export std_dev  
-0.001 (0.93) -0.001 (0.91) 0.050** (0.05) 0.057*** (0.00)  -0.005 (0.92) -0.134 (0.62)  0.961*** (0.00) 0.110 (0.51) 1.223*** (0.00) 2.648*** (0.00) 
Std_dev* credit access  
  -0.016* (0.07) -0.018** (0.02)   0.066 (0.47)    -0.104 (0.38) -0.647*** (0.00) 
Credit to private sector  0.055 (0.34) 0.098† (0.11) 0.010† (0.11) 0.122** (0.03)  -0.212 (0.47) -0.558 (0.37)  -0.272 (0.57) -0.131 (0.91) 0.731** (0.03) 1.951*** (0.00) 
Population growth  
-0.035 (0.42) -0.027 (0.45) -0.056 (0.19) -0.052† (0.13)  0.063  (0.78) -0.101 (0.80)  1.003** (0.03) -0.504 (0.69) 1.399*** (0.00) -0.203 (0.77) 
Nat. resources  0.008*** (0.01) 0.008** (0.02) 0.007** (0.03) 0.007** (0.05)  0.037  (0.23) 0.003 (0.91)  0.138*** (0.00) 0.016 (0.43) 0.129*** (0.00) 0.080*** (0.00) 
Government size  
-0.014** (0.02) -0.014** (0.02) -0.013** (0.04) -0.012** (0.04)  0.003 (0.94) -0.014 (0.70)  3e-11*** (0.00) 3e-11 (0.36) 5e-11*** (0.00) 5e-11*** (0.00) 
Log population  
-0.0413 (0.88) 0.635*** (0.00) -0.108 (0.70) 0.544*** (0.00)  -0.058 (0.86) 0.805 (0.18)  0.324 (0.01) 0.612† (0.15) 0.228** (0.04) 0.155 (0.51) 
Pol. regime stability  
-0.003* (0.06) -0.0001 (0.94) -0.003** (0.07) 0.0003 (0.86)  -0.011 (0.30) -0.012 (0.58)  0.027** (0.02) 0.014 (0.53) 0.012 (0.13) 0.016** (0.05) 
Democracy  
-0.018*** (0.01) -0.015*** (0.01) -0.016*** (0.01) -0.013** (0.03)  -0.052 (0.38) -0.149** (0.03)  0.938*** (0.00) 0.521*** (0.00) 0.922*** (0.00) 0.847*** (0.00) 
Log openness  0.060 (0.59) 0.166* (0.10) 0.078 (0.48) 0.178* (0.08)  0.918 (0.30) -0.043 (0.94)  0.024*** (0.00) 0.046*** (0.00) 0.020*** (0.00) 0.034*** (0.01) 
Latitude  
    
    0.086*** (0.00) 0.051*** (0.00) 0.091*** (0.00) 0.100*** (0.00) 
Landlocked  
    
    
-2.980*** (0.00) -0.106 (0.91) -2.793*** (0.00) -1.745* (0.06) 
Initial GDP per cap  
    
    1.111*** (0.00) 0.183 (0.64) 1.262*** (0.00) 0.388* (0.09) 
Common Law  
    
    
-5.802 (0.17) 13.70* (0.07) -2.573 (0.46) -11.14*** (0.00) 
Firm size  
    
    
-0.158** (0.05) -0.050 (0.38) -0.157* (0.06) -0.05 (0.36) 
State owned   
    
    0.026 (0.19) -0.006* (0.08) 0.027 (0.17) -0.004† (0.14) 
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Direct exports  
    
    
-0.001 (0.57) 0.003 (0.43) -0.001 (0.58) 0.004 (0.38) 
Indirect exports  
    
    
-0.002 (0.30) -0.001** (0.03) -0.001 (0.31) -0.001** (0.03) 
Constant 
 
1.652 (0.73) -10.38*** (0.00) -2.549 (0.60) -8.995*** (0.00)  -1.104 (0.87) -8.902 (0.42)  -17.09*** (0.00) --5.082 (0.55) -21.63*** (0.00) -12.96** (0.02) 
Country fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Yes Yes  No No No No 
Time dummies  Yes No Yes No 
 Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (countries/cluster)  1130 (67) 1130 (67) 1130 (67) 1130 (67) 
 1130 (67) 1130 (67)  9212(23) 4283(23) 9212 (23) 4283(23) 
Thresholds:      
        
∂Corrupt/∂(skew>0) =0  
 8.5%   
        
 ∂Corrupt/∂(skew<0) =0   12.2%       4.7% 20.1 %   
∂Corrupt/∂std_dev = 0 
 
  22.8% 23.6%        59.7% 
R-squared: 
Within 
Between  
 
0.895 
0.966 
 
0.606 
0.628 
 
0.647 
0.933 
 
0.649 
0.645 
 
Wald chi2(32)= 
2143 
Wald chi2(31) =   
1037     0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 
Hansen test (p-val) 
 
     0.76 0.83      
AR(1) test (p-val) 
 
     0.00 0.00      
AR(2) test (p-val) 
 
     0.21 0.34      
Number of 
instruments       55 53   
   
When possible, coefficients are rounded to three decimal places. Standards errors robust to heteroskedasticity in all regressions, and are clustered by country in OLS firm-level estimations. P-values in parenthesis. † significant at 
15% *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Hansen J-statistic tests for joint instrument validity; null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly from the second-stage equation. Sys-GMM estimation of equations (4.8a): The positive and negative skewness of exports are treated as predetermined and instrument the differenced equation by their 
lagged levels (lags 1 to 5). Lagged corruption and the interaction terms are treated as endogenous and instrument the equation in system by their lagged levels and differences (lags 2 to 7). The standard deviation of exports is treated 
as endogenous and instruments the differenced equation by its lagged levels (lags 2 to 6). Sys-GMM estimation of equations (4.8b): Time dummies are excluded instruments. The positive and negative skewness of exports are 
treated as predetermined, and instrument the differenced equation by their lags 1 to 7. Lagged corruption is treated as endogenous and instrument the equation in system by its lagged levels and differences (lags 2 to 7). The standard 
deviation of exports is treated as endogenous and instrument the differenced equation by its lagged levels (lags 2 to 7). In all GMM estimations, time dummies are excluded instruments, instruments are collapsed, orthogonal 
deviations are preferred to first-difference deviations, and the Windmeijer correction of the two-step estimated variance is applied. 
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7. Robustness checks 
In this last section, we address empirical issues that could potentially improve or weaken our 
results. First, we check whether previous estimated relationships hold when we look at the effects 
of idiosyncratic export fluctuations. Then, we ensure that OLS firm-level standard errors are not 
biased downward because of inappropriate clustering, by applying the multi-way cluster-robust 
OLS estimators to the previous equations. Finally, we test the sensitivity of our results when 
measures of standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of exports are based on HP-filtered export 
data.  
7.1. Idiosyncratic versus common export fluctuations 
We check whether nonlinear relationships previously evidenced hold when we emphasise the 
effects of idiosyncratic export fluctuations on firms’ informal payments. As stressed by Dercon 
(2002, p.4),  
“the nature of the shocks is important to understand the possibilities to deal with its consequences 
(…) Common (aggregate, economy-wide, covariate) risk is distinguished from individual 
(idiosyncratic) risk: the former affects everybody in a particular community or region; the latter only 
affects a particular individual in this community”.95  
Most shocks are not purely idiosyncratic or purely covariates, but have both idiosyncratic and 
covariate components. To account for firms’ individual experience and perception of export 
instability, we weight measures of skewness and standard deviation of exports by the share of direct 
and indirect exports96 in firm’s total sales:  
Idiosyncratic instability = (instability measure) × (% of exports in total sales) (4.9) 
We test the effects of idiosyncratic export fluctuations by inserting into equations (4.5), (4.6a), 
(4.6b), (4.7), (4.8a) and (4.8b) our measures of idiosyncratic instability. Previous indicators of 
aggregate export instability are maintained in the corruption equation to control for the separate 
effects of aggregate fluctuations. The resulting OLS estimates, presented in table 4.5, tell an 
interesting story.  
First, estimated effects of aggregate instability indicators in column (1) are strikingly similar to those 
of equation (4.5) in table 4.2 (column (4)), suggesting that these previous estimations were merely 
reflecting the ex ante and ex post effects of common fluctuations on firms’ bribe payments, not the 
joint effects of common and idiosyncratic fluctuations. Second, estimates of equation (4.5) 
(columns (1) and (2)) suggest that the ‘global deterrent’ ex post effect of instability evidenced in table 
                                                          
95 Dercon, S. (2002) “Income risk, coping strategies, and safety nets”, Discussion Paper No.2002/22, UNU/WIDER. 
96 Indirect exports are merchandizes and services sold domestically to exporter third party. 
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4.2 also holds for idiosyncratic fluctuations. By contrast, the ex ante effect of perceived instability 
holds for economy-wide exports fluctuations only, suggesting that i) resource-locking strategies act 
as a protection against common shocks, or ii) firms’ perception of instability is more influenced by 
economy-wide fluctuations than individual ones. 
7.1.1. Emphasising the size and frequency of idiosyncratic export fluctuations 
In columns (3) to (8), evidence of an ex ante and ex post effects of idiosyncratic export instability 
nonlinear in the size and frequency of shocks cannot be established in the same confidence levels as 
for aggregate instability (see table 4.3). To ensure that estimated standard errors are not inflated by 
problems of multicolinearity between the many instability variables inserted in our specification, we 
computed the variance inflation factors (VIF) of equations (4.6a), (4.6b), and (4.7) without time 
dummies.97 VIF statistics are presented in annex 4.Fii). Multicolinearity is present in equations 
(4.6a) and (4.7), and very worrying in equation (4.6b). This suggests that the statistical significance 
of the relationship tested in equation (4.6b) may be understated by inflated standard errors.  
In spite of these inflated standard errors, estimates of equation (4.6a) in column (3) and (4) are 
highly consistent with FE and sys-GMM estimates in table 4.3. We indeed find significant evidence 
of a ‘global deterrent’ ex post effect of small and frequent idiosyncratic export fluctuations, and (less 
significant) evidence of a ‘global boosting’ ex post effect of large and infrequent idiosyncratic export 
fluctuations on firms’ informal payments. However, there are no evidence of a nonlinear ex ante 
effect of idiosyncratic export instability depending on normal/abnormal patterns of export 
fluctuations (columns (7) and (8) in table 4.5). 
7.1.2. How liquidity-constrained firms respond to idiosyncratic export fluctuations 
In columns (9) to (12), we emphasise the role of the liquidity constraint in channelling the ex post 
and ex ante effects of idiosyncratic instability. We use two proxies of firms’ liquidity constraint. As 
done previously, we use the logarithm of the domestic credit provided to the private sector, as a 
country-level proxy for the ease with which firms accede to lending. We also use the share of the 
firms’ working capital financed by internal funds or retained earnings (drawn from the WBES 
database) as a micro-level proxy for firms’ actual cash position.98 Estimates of equation (4.8a) are 
displayed in columns (9) and (10), and estimates of equation (4.8b) are displayed in columns (11) 
and (12).  
                                                          
97 It is generally considered that problems of colinearity may be problematic when a VIF exceeds 10. 
98 It is worth mentioning that estimates of the cash-surplus channel should be considered with caution given a plausible 
bi-directional relationship between firms’ informal payments and cash position. As an illustration, a firm’s cash surplus 
may feed corrupt networks, it may also stem from corrupt activities, or simply may incite public official to extort more 
money. 
Chapter 4 – When corruption is a response to export instability 
Page | 183  
Estimates of equation (4.8a) in column (9) support that an increase in the share of credit provided 
to the private sector dampens the positive effect of negative idiosyncratic shocks on firms’ informal 
payments. In parallel, using the firm’s share of working capital financed by internal funds as a proxy 
for its actual liquidity constraint (column 10), we find that, in a 9% confidence level, an improved 
cash position reduces the deterrent effect of episodes of positive idiosyncratic shocks on firms’ 
informal payments. In other words, while an improved access to credit is found to mitigate the 
boosting effect of adverse idiosyncratic shocks on survival bribe payments, a favourable cash 
position is found to mitigate the deterrent effect of favourable idiosyncratic shocks on survival 
bribe payments. 
Estimates of equation (4.8b) in column (11) do not support that access to lending is a significant 
channel for the ex ante effect of idiosyncratic instability on firms’ informal payments. However, 
estimates of equation (4.8b) in column (12) show a significant negative ex ante effect of idiosyncratic 
instability on corruption when firms’ cash position improves. Thus, while access to credit is found 
to mitigate the positive ex ante effects of aggregate instability on bribe payments (see table 4.4 
columns (3), (4) and (11)), cash surplus is found to mitigate the positive ex ante effect of 
idiosyncratic instability on bribe payments.  
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Table 4.5. The effects of idiosyncratic and aggregate export fluctuations (controls not reported) 
Dependent variable: WBES 
 
Eq (4.5)  Eq(4.6a)  Eq(4.6b)  Eq(4.7)  Eq (4.8a)  Eq (4.8b) 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Aggregate fluctuations                   
Positive skewness  -0.003 (0.16) 
-0.003 
(0.31) 
 -0.003† 
(0.15) 
-0.003 
(0.30) 
 0.002 
(0.28) 
0.003† 
(0.15)  
 -0.002 
(0.25) 
-0.002  
(0.34) 
 -0.003* 
(0.09) 
-0.003 
(0.16) 
 -0.003† 
(0.12) 
-0.002 
(0.32) 
Negative skewness  -0.012 ** (0.02) 
-0.009*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.012** 
(0.02) 
-0.009*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.006 
(0.24) 
-0.003 
(0.29)  
 -0.013*** 
(0.01) 
-0.011*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.013*** 
(0.01) 
-0.013*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.013*** 
(0.01) 
-0.010*** 
(0.00) 
Std_dev  0.813*** (0.00) 
0.814*** 
(0.00) 
 0.817*** 
(0.00) 
0.819*** 
(0.00)    
 0.814*** 
(0.00) 
0.823*** 
(0.00)  
 0.828*** 
(0.00) 
0.830*** 
(0.00) 
 0.847*** 
(0.00) 
0.824*** 
(0.00) 
 0.851*** 
(0.00) 
0.912*** 
(0.00) 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Idiosyncratic fluctuations  
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Positive skew  -0.009* (0.06) 
-0.010** 
(0.02) 
 -0.020** 
(0.05) 
-0.020** 
(0.02)   
 -0.003 
(0.84) 
-0.005 
(0.72) 
 -0.009* 
(0.07) 
-0.010** 
(0.02) 
 -0.042 
(0.35) 
-0.012** 
(0.03) 
 -0.009† 
(0.12) 
-0.010*** 
(0.01) 
Negative skew  -0.007* (0.06) 
-0.008** 
(0.03) 
 -0.027* 
(0.10) 
-0.026* 
(0.09)    
 -0.004 
(0.61) 
-0.004 
(0.61)  
 -0.006* 
(0.09) 
-0.007* 
(0.06) 
 0.015 
(0.21) 
-0.010† 
(0.13) 
 -0.006 
(0.24) 
-0.008** 
(0.03) 
Positive skew2  
  
 0.0001 
(0.19) 
5e-05† 
(0.15)  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Negative skew2  
  
 0.0001 
(0.26) 
0.0001 
(0.25) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Positive skew * Kurtosis  
  
 
  
 2e-05 
(0.64) 
1e-05 
(0.76) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Negative skew * Kurtosis  
  
 
  
 -6e-06 
(0.87) 
1e-05 
(0.72) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Positive skew *credit  
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 0.009 
(0.44)  
 
  
Negative skew *credit  
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 -0.007** 
(0.05)  
 
  
Positive skew *intern funds 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
5e-05* 
(0.09) 
 
  
Negative skew *intern funds 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
7e-05 
(0.42) 
 
  
Export std_dev 
 
-0.022 
(0.83) 
-0.001 
(0.99) 
 -0.011 
(0.91) 
0.009  
(0.93)    
 -0.041 
(0.72) 
-0.018 
(0.87) 
 -0.051 
(0.64) 
-0.026 
(0.80) 
 0.061 
(0.72) 
-0.044 
(0.68) 
 -0.037 
(0.79) 
-0.001 
(0.99) 
Export std_dev* Kurtosis  
  
 
  
 
  
 5e-05 
(0.95) 
3e-05 
(0.87) 
 
  
 
  
Export std_dev*credit  
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 0.001 
(0.67)  
Export std_dev*intern funds  
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
-0.001** 
(0.03) 
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6 or 16-year Kurtosis  
  
 
 
  -0.006*** 
(0.00) 
-0.006*** 
(0.00)   
 -0.001*** 
(0.00) 
-0.001*** 
(0.00) 
 
  
 
  
Log domestic credit  
  
 
 
  
  
    0.330* 
(0.09)  
 0.386** 
(0.03)  
Intern funds  
  
 
  
 
  
    
 
-0.005** 
(0.05) 
 
 
0.004 
(0.17) 
Country fixed effects  
 
No No  No No  No No  No No  No No  No No 
Time dummies  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations (clusters) 
 
9212(23) 
R-squared   0.10 
When possible, coefficients are rounded to three decimal places. Standards errors robust to heteroskedasticity in all regressions and clustered by country. P-values in parenthesis. † significant at 15% *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Controls not reported. 
n.a. : non applicable because of very low confidence level. The “Kurtosis” variable refers to the 6-year kurtosis of exports when it enters in interaction with the skewness of exports, while it refers to the 16-year kurtosis 
when it enters in interaction with the standard deviation of exports. 
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7.2. Robust inference with two-way clustered standard errors 
The hierarchical relationship in our cross-section data may have been misrepresented in the previous OLS 
firm-level regressions, so that intra-class correlations within a missing cluster lower standard errors (Baum 
et al., 2010). Notably, it is plausible that correlations between errors within sectors of activity lead us to 
over-state the statistical significance of tested relationships. To address this issue, we implement the two-
way cluster-robust OLS estimator proposed by Cameron et al. (2006) to equations (4.5), (4.6a), (4.6b), 
(4.7), (4.8a), and (4.8b), clustering standard errors by country and sector of activity. Results are presented 
in annex 4.Fiii). Columns entitled “idiosync.” refer to regressions including measures of aggregate and 
idiosyncratic export instability. Two-way clustered robust estimates of equations (4.5), (4.6a), (4.6b), (4.7), 
(4.8a), and (4.8b) suggest that relationships are robust to the procedure, but their corresponding standard 
errors were sometimes slightly understated. Thus, though not really questioning the robustness of our 
previously estimated relationships, it seems that clustering standard errors by country and sector of activity 
reduces their significance.  
7.3. Estimations with HP-based instability indicators 
As stressed in Chapter 2, great discrepancies arise between trend computation methods when addressing 
the asymmetry of export deviation around their trend – measured by the skewness of a distribution – or 
the occurrence of extreme deviations – measured by the kurtosis of a distribution. To check whether 
results are robust to an alternative trend computation method, we apply the HP filter to export revenue 
data. As a reminder, the HP filter isolates the cyclical component by optimizing the following program in 
relation to HP: 
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The parameter λ is the “smoothing parameter”, and is set at 6.25 (Maravall and del Rio, 2001). Formula 
(4.2) and (4.3) are applied to the resulting cycle, 
   −
∗, yielding new measures of experienced 
and perceived instability of exports. The 6-year and 16-year kurtosis of exports around their HP-filtered 
values are also calculated according to the formula specified in section 5.2. Then, we re-estimate equations 
(4.4), (4.5), (4.6a), (4.6b), (4.7), (4.8a), and (4.8b) using these alternative measures of export instability.  
Results of country-level panel regressions and those of firm-level cross-section regressions with two-way 
clustered standard errors are presented in annexes 4.Fiv) and v). Within FE do not provide evidence of 
significant ex post and ex ante effects of instability, whereas firm-level OLS estimates in annex 4.Fv) are 
strikingly close to estimates presented in annex 4.Fiii).  
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Suspecting that problems of autocorrelation inflate estimated standard errors in panel regressions, we 
perform the Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) estimator, including time and country dummies, 
with standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation.99 Despite the strong 
differences between the two approaches of measuring instability (see chapter 2), new estimates of equation 
(4.4) and (4.5) are consistent with those evidenced in table 4.1 (column (2)) and table 4.2 (column (1)). 
However, evidence of non-linear ex post and ex ante effects of instability depending on the size and 
frequency of export fluctuations and on the liquidity constraint are less robust to the use of alternative 
instability indicators.  
8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we set a conceptual framework for an empirical analysis of the effects of export instability 
on corruption. We assumed that export instability has ex post and ex ante effects on corruption, considering 
that corrupt transactions may result from strategies implemented by economic agents to protect against 
economic fluctuations.  
Regarding the ex post effects of instability on corruption, i.e. the effect of instability through agents’ 
experience of shocks, we invoked two corruption schemes, acting in opposite way: opportunistic corruption, 
resulting from the mechanical increase (decrease) in rents during positive (negative) shocks; and survival 
corruption, spreading (lessening) when resources are lacking (abounding). As for the ex ante effect of 
instability on corruption, i.e. the effect of instability through agents’ perception of shocks, we drew a parallel 
between certain corruption strategies and risk-management strategies aimed at reducing the risk in the 
income process. In this regard, we posited that agents perceiving their economic environment as unstable 
may reduce ex ante the variance of their income by securing future resource inflows through bribery.  
Our empirical strategy is built around two measures of instability based on moments 2 and 3 of the 
distribution of exports around a 16-year rolling mixed trend. On the one hand, we tested the ex post effect 
of instability using a measure of experienced instability based on the 6-year rolling skewness of exports 
around their trend. On the other hand, we tested the ex ante effect of instability on corruption using an 
indicator of perceived instability based the 16-year rolling standard deviation of exports. 
We estimated the ex ante and ex post effects of instability on country corruption perceptions in a dynamic 
panel analysis, and on firms’ bribes payments in a cross-section analysis. Despite the strong discrepancies 
between perceptions and experiences of corruption, and in spite of differences in the econometric 
framework and the scope of micro and macro samples, we found robust, consistent, and nonlinear 
corruption responses to export instability.  
                                                          
99 We ran the Wooldridge test of autocorrelation in panel data (Wooldridge, 2002) and reject the null of no first-order auto-
correlation of residuals. 
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First, we found macro and micro evidence of a nonlinear ex post effect of instability depending on the 
asymmetry, and the frequency and size of export fluctuations. On the one hand, we highlighted a ‘global 
deterrent’ ex post effect of episodes of positive and negative shocks, when export fluctuations are repeated 
and moderate. We explain this evidence by the asymmetric corruption responses to shocks arising from 
the decreasing marginal effect of regular fluctuations on corruption incidence. On the other hand, we 
highlighted a ‘global boosting’ effect of export booms and busts. We explain this evidence by the 
(reversed) asymmetric corruption responses arising from the increasing marginal effect of large and 
infrequent fluctuations on corruption incidence.   
Then, we provided empirical evidence of a positive ex ante effect of export instability on corruption, when 
perceptions of instability result from frequent and small export fluctuations. Estimates suggest that 
resource-locking corrupt transactions spread in a context of “normal” export fluctuations, which is 
consistent with “the paradox of insurance provision” emphasised by Collier (2002). FE and IV panel 
estimates even pointed that resource-locking corrupt transactions decrease in a context of “abnormal” 
instability, driven by large but infrequent fluctuations. However, this additional empirical evidence is weak; 
it should hence be taken with careful consideration. 
In a logical next step, we tested the role of economic agents’ liquidity constraint in channelling the effects 
of export instability on corruption. Regarding the ex post effects of instability, FE estimates suggest that 
above a credit threshold of 12.2% and 8.5% of GDP, episodes of negative and positive shocks are both 
found to deter corruption. Below these thresholds, a ‘global boosting’ effect of instability on corruption 
level is observed, but not in a 10% confidence level. Following our conceptual framework, these findings 
support that a better (lesser) access to credit is associated with a decreasing (increasing) marginal effect of 
export shocks on corruption. In addition, firm-level OLS estimations support a hump-shaped effect of 
episodes of adverse export shocks on firms’ informal payments, depending on firms’ access to credit. This 
evidence suggests that survival corruption may be a substitute for lending when hardships occur and 
firms’ cash position worsens. A hump-shaped ex ante effect of instability on corruption incidence is also 
evidenced in panel and firm-level estimations, suggesting that resource-locking corrupt transactions are 
undertaken by liquidity-constrained agents to reduce their income variance. To summarize, export 
instability is found to have ex post and ex ante boosting effects on corruption when the liquidity constraint 
binds, while it is found to have deterrent effects when the liquidity constraint relaxes.   
  
 
 
General conclusion 
 
Summary 
This thesis is an attempt to improve the understanding of the causes of corruption emergence and 
incidence around the world. It highlights a new feature of corrupt transactions, that is, their 
contribution to informal risk-coping and risk-management mechanisms used by economic agents to 
protect against economic fluctuations.  
To address this issue, we proposed in a first introductory chapter a general state of art of current 
and past researches on corruption definitions, measurements, typologies and determinants. 
Notably, we stressed that the incidence of corruption in a given country results from individual 
costs and benefits to engage in corrupt transactions, and that these incentives are strongly shaped 
by the international environment (trade and financial globalization process, private sector growth, 
tax havens, etc.) and domestic factors (public sector size, political stability, national wealth, natural 
resource endowments, the legal system, etc.). We also pointed out that, holistically, corruption can 
be considered as an informal institutional arrangement which may coexist with dysfunctional legal 
institutions. In this institutional setting, corrupt transactions are undertaken when formal rules and 
practices are not fully integrated by economic agents or when they do not allow to fully relieving 
uncertainty prevailing upon market and non-market exchanges.  
In chapters two and three, we focused on export instability issues, by first addressing its 
measurement and then highlighting its damaging effects in developing economies. In chapter two, 
we explained, applied and compared standard methods of computing instability indicators using 
export revenue data. We compared parametric and filter methods of computing the trend around 
which exports fluctuate. We stressed that both methods converge on the measurement of the 
average amplitude of economic fluctuations (using variance-based instability indicators for 
instance), but diverge on the measurement of the asymmetry or the occurrence of extreme events. 
We also stressed that these latter dimensions of instability – that is the asymmetry and the tail’s 
fatness of a statistical distribution of an economic variable around its trend – should be more 
systematically considered in the study of the effects of economic instability on economic outcomes.  
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In chapter three, we built a retrospective economic vulnerability index for a sample of 128 
developing countries over the period 1984-2008, consistent with the definitions of the EVI 
provided by the UNCDP 2009 review. The economic vulnerability index is a composite index 
reflecting the risk for a country of seeing its development hampered by natural and trade shocks. 
According to this retrospective index, vulnerability in developing countries slightly declined from 
1987 to 2008, but less rapidly in Low-Income and Least-Developed Country categories (LICs and 
LDCs). We also stressed that the export instability component is the greatest driver of changes in 
vulnerability scores over time, and also one of the greatest factor of difference between the most 
vulnerable groups (LDCs and LICs) and the least vulnerable groups of countries (non-LDCs and 
non-LICs).  
In chapter 4, we build on the previous chapters to study the effects of export instability on 
corruption in both developed and developing countries. We decompose these effects into ex post 
effects, resulting from agent’s experience of shocks, and an ex ante effect, resulting from their 
perception of instability. We used instability measurements emphasised in chapters 2 and 3 to 
identify these effects, and evidenced nonlinear relationships which depend on the frequency and 
size of export fluctuations. On the one hand, export instability is found to have a deterrent ex post 
effect on corruption when fluctuations are moderate and frequent, while it is found to have a 
boosting ex post effect when fluctuations are large and infrequent. On the other hand, export 
instability is found to have a strong and robust positive ex ante effect on corruption when 
fluctuations are moderate and frequent. Evidence of a deterrent ex ante effect of instability when 
export fluctuations are large and infrequent was also found, but should be taken with caution. 
Finally, we highlighted the liquidity constraint as a key channel for the ex post and ex ante effects of 
instability on corruption: when the liquidity constraint hardens export instability is found to 
increase corruption; while when it softens, export instability is found to reduce it. 
Research implications 
Building on the works of Elbers et al. (2007) and Rancière et al. (2008), this thesis proposes a novel 
approach of studying the effects of output fluctuations on economic behaviours. It is indeed a first 
attempt to estimate the ex post and ex ante effects of economic instability using together skewness-
based and variance-based measures of instability. Applied to our problematic, this approach yields 
interesting results. First, using the skewness of the distribution of an economic variable around its 
trend as a measure of experienced economic instability enables to i) identify distinct corruption 
responses to asymmetric fluctuations, while ii) capturing eventual persistent impact of repeated 
asymmetric shocks on economic outcomes. This feature is particularly interesting when the effects 
of negative shocks on economic outcomes differ from those of positive shocks, and when 
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economic outcome variations are of medium or long periodicity – as for institutional outcomes like 
democracy or corruption. Second, using the skewness refines the analysis of the consequences of 
economic fluctuations on economic behaviours: while low absolute values of skewness reflect the 
proper effect of high-frequency low-size variations, high absolute values of skewness reflect the 
proper effect of low-frequency large-size variations. In this regard, we stressed that corruption 
responses display strong nonlinearities, depending on these diverging patterns of instability.  
One another interesting finding is the strong consistency of estimations based on country 
perceptions of corruption on the one hand, and firms’ bribe payments on the other hand. The fact 
that we found similar effects with the ICRG data on corruption perceptions as with the WBES data 
on firms’ informal payments suggests that the effects picked up in chapter 4 are real effects rather 
than artefacts of the data. Therefore, despite the many studies raising legitimate questions on the 
reliability and comparability of corruption measurements, this thesis is an invitation to check the 
consistency of estimated corruption relationships, by comparing macro and micro corruption data, 
perception-based and experience-based corruption data.  
Finally, an interesting avenue for future research would be to extend the problematic to other forms 
of crime. Our framework for the analysis of the effects of economic fluctuations on corrupt 
behaviours could indeed be applied to the analysis of other criminal behaviours – such as murders 
and theft (as in Guillaumont and Puech, 2006), or petty and organized crime – using for instance 
the International Crime Victim Survey dataset or data from Interpol already used by Neumayer 
(2003, 2005).  
Policy implications 
The long-run cultural foundations of corruption prevalence and the endogenous nature of usual 
policy levers against it, call for further efforts to identify additional and less endogenous entry 
points to combat this phenomenon. Hopefully, this thesis opens new rooms for anti-corruption 
interventions.  
Policy implications stemming from results of chapter 4 are strongly related to the problems of 
structural economic vulnerability to shocks and governments capacity for reacting to them 
emphasised in chapters 2 and 3. In particular, results point out the damaging institutional effects of 
export instability in fragile states, since corrupt strategies may spread as a substitute for imperfect 
financial markets and/or a low state resilience to external fluctuations. We find here an additional 
argument in support to the reinforcement of state capacity for mitigating the consequences of 
shocks and policies lowering country’s exposure to them. Moreover, the credit lever appears to be a 
strong corruption deterrent, inasmuch it does not translate into corruption in the banking sector 
(Barth et al., 2009). In fact, the liquidity constraint appears in our estimations as a key determinant 
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of the direction of the ex post and ex ante effects of export instability upon corrupt transactions: 
when it hardens export instability is found to increase corruption; while when it softens, export 
instability is found to decrease it. Therefore improving access to credit, in broader extent the access 
to formal and informal financial services, is expected to yield significant anti-corruption outcomes. 
Last but not least, evidence of boosting ex post and ex ante effects of instability on corruption 
strategies also points to the role of external factors of output stability, such as aid and remittances 
(Guillaumont and Le Goff, 2010; Guillaumont, 2005), in improving the quality of governance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Annex 1.A. Forms of public sector corruption 
Bribery, that is “the bestowing of a benefit in order to unduly influence an action or decision. It can be initiated by 
a person who seeks or solicits bribes or by a person who offers and then pays bribes”.100 Bribery is a regular part 
of many developing countries citizens’ daily routine, and spreads at all level of the government and 
public administration. It generally affects the poorest and most vulnerable segment of the society. 
Bribery between an individual and a public official may occur to get the latter doing what he is paid 
for.  For instance, a bureaucrat may accept bribe from someone or an enterprise to get a driving 
license. Or, bribery may occur to get a public officer doing what he is not expected to do. As an 
example, a custom official may accept bribes to overlook smuggling, forgery, or other illegal/illicit 
trade flows, or a procurement officer may be bribed by an enterprise to favour it during a public 
tender.  
Embezzlement. Embezzlement is the “theft of resources by a person entrusted with authority and control over 
anything of value”.101 This form of corruption can involve public officials, private individuals or 
companies. For instance, it occurs when a public enterprise director employs company workers to 
build his own house; or when low-level officials charged with the administration of a local road 
project steal construction materials and re-sell it through parallel distribution networks. In certain 
cases, embezzlement feeds large networks of corrupt politicians and high-level officials and strongly 
undermines the delivery of basic public services, such as the education or health sector programs or 
public works. 
                                                          
100 UNODC, United Nations Anti-corruption Toolkit, Chapter 1 Introduction, 2004, p.11 
101 UNODC, “Value Added of Partnership In the Fight Against Corruption”, Global Programme Against Corruption 
Conferences, Centre for International Crime Prevention, CICP-11, 2001, p.3. 
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Fraud. Fraud refers to “any behaviour designed to trick or fool another person or entity for one’s own or a third 
party’s benefit”.102 Typical examples of fraud include cases of forgery or other complex schemes 
unduly exempting g someone from his legal or professional obligations such as taxation, office 
attendance, etc.). Another possible illustration of fraud is when intimidations and ballot box 
stuffing occur during local or national elections. 
Extortion. Extortion refers to any person/company/institution “forcing [another party] to pay money 
or other valuables in exchange of acting or failing to act”.103 Dutt and Traca (2010) define extortion as the 
act of public officials requesting bribes to do what they are supposed to do.104 For instance, a 
checkpoint police officer may charge drivers additional payments to let them go, or a custom 
officer can threaten exporters to over-report the value their merchandize if the latter does not pay 
bribes. 
Abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion occurs when someone uses is “vested authority to give undue 
preferential treatment to any group or individuals or to discriminate against any group or individuals” 105 for 
personal gain. For instance, a procurement officer in charge of public tender (e.g. health, water, 
etc.) may favour an enterprise in which he holds personal interest during the bidding process. Or, a 
politician may favour (neglect) the delivery of public services in (outside) his constituency. 
Creation or exploitation of conflicting interests. A conflict of interest in the public sector arises 
from the interference between a public official’s duty to serve the general interest and his own 
private interests. The OECD (2005) proposes the following definition: “A ‘conflict of interest involves a 
conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private […] 
interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities”.106 As an 
illustration, a conflict of interest arises when an elected municipal official owns real estate in a city’s 
area where he granted the permission for the implementation of a large a public work, expected to 
raise the value of the surrounding properties. 
Favouritism, nepotism and cronyism. The U4 defines favouritism as “the normal human inclination 
to prefer acquaintances, friends and family over strangers. […] [Corruption occurs] when officials demonstrate 
favouritism to unfairly distribute positions and resources”. Nepotism and cronyism are specific cases of 
favouritism. The former refers to the case where an official offers unfair favours to family 
members, while the latter refers to the favourable treatments of friends (Europeaid, 2011). 
However, cases of favouritism may go beyond ties of kinship and extend to geographical, ethnic, or 
                                                          
102 UNODC, “Value Added of Partnership In the Fight Against Corruption”, Global Programme Against Corruption 
Conferences, Centre for International Crime Prevention, CICP-11, 2001, p.3. 
103 Ibid  
104  while they refer to evasion when officials request bribes to do what they are not supposed to do. 
105 Ibid. 
106 OECD, OECD guideline for managing conflict of interest in the public service, September 2005 
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cultural ties. In an illustrative article, Garicano et al. (2005) analyzed how and to which extent 
soccer referees may favour the home team in order to satisfy the crowd of the stadium. 
Illegal political contributions. Illegal or improper political contributions arise when “political 
parties or a government receive bribes in exchange for non-interference [or favouritism] with the affairs of the group 
or entity making the contribution”.107 Illegal political contributions encompass activities such as the 
diversion of public resources to fund political parties, or the extortion of donations from the 
private sector. Illegal political party financing feeds grand corruption in extended networks of 
corrupt politicians and high-level officials induces strong economic distortions, social injustices and 
strongly undermines democratic principles.  
                                                          
107  UNODC, “Value Added of Partnership in the Fight against Corruption”, Global Programme Against Corruption 
Conferences, Centre for International Crime Prevention, CICP-11, 2001, p.4. 
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Annex 1.B. Variables’ definitions 
Bureaucratic Compensation: concerns the change of bureaucratic compensation relative to the 
private sector. It is an equal-weight index of the following two questions:  
(1) How would you estimate the salaries (and perquisites, not including bribes or other extra legal 
sources of income) of higher officials in these agencies relative to those of private sector managers 
with roughly comparable training and responsibilities? (“less than 50%”, “50–80%”, “80–90%”, 
“Comparable”, “Higher”) ;  
(2) Over the period in question (roughly 1970–1990) what was the movement of legal income in 
these agencies relative to salaries in the private sector? (“declined dramatically”, “declined slightly”, 
“maintained the same position”, “improved their position”). 
Career opportunities: The respondents were asked to choose ‘the four most important agencies in 
the central state bureaucracy in order of their power to shape overall economic policy’. “Career 
Opportunities” is an equal-weight index, ranging from 0 to 1, of the following five questions: 
(1) Roughly how many of the top levels in these agencies are political appointees (e.g. appointed by 
the President or Chief Executive)? “none”, “just agency chiefs”, “agency chiefs and vice-chiefs”, 
“all of top 2 or 3 levels”; 
(2) Of political appointees to these positions, what proportion is likely to already be members of 
the higher civil service? “less than 30%”, “30–70%”, “more than 70%”; 
(3) Of those promoted to the top 2 or 3 levels in these agencies (whether or not they are political 
appointees), what proportion come from within the agency itself or its associated ministry(ies) if the 
agency is not itself a ministry? “less than 50%”, “50–70%”, “70–90%”, “over 90%”; 
(4) What is roughly the modal number of years spent by a typical higher level official in one of 
these agencies during his career? “1–5 years”, “5–10 years”, “10–20 years”, “entire career”; 
(5) What prospects for promotion can someone who enters one of these agencies through a higher 
civil service examination early in his / her career reasonably expect? Assuming that there are at least 
a half dozen steps or levels between an entry-level position and the head of the agency, how would 
you characterize the possibilities for moving up in the agency? If respondent circled ‘if performance 
is superior, moving up several levels to the level just below political appointees is not an 
unreasonable expectation’ or ‘in at least a few cases, could expect to move up several levels within 
the civil service and then move up to the very top of the agency on the basis of political 
appointments’ and not ‘in most cases, will move up one or two levels but no more’ or ‘in most 
cases, will move up three or four levels, but unlikely to reach the level just below political 
appointees’. 
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Annex 1.C. Procurement process and associated risks of corruption 
Stage of the procurement 
process Description Main risks 
A. Decision to contract 
Purchase of good and 
services 
The decision aims at benefiting to an individual or an organisation rather than following a policy 
rationale 
B. Identification/Definition 
of contract characteristics 
Identification of 
government needs. 
Definition of the terms of 
contract. 
Contract’s characteristics favour special supplier or contractor. 
Bidding process biased towards single source process. 
Limited participation of stakeholders, implying contracts maladapted to local needs. 
Evaluation criteria are not set adequately, making them prone to abuse. 
C. Contracting process 
The contracting process 
starts and should comply 
the rules set by the law 
(open or single source 
bidding process) 
Invitation to tenders is not publicized 
When short lists are used, companies bribe to access it. 
Invitation to tender is publicized in a very short timeframe, so that bidders without prior knowledge 
of the contract tend to be excluded. 
Abuse of confidentiality creates unequal playing field for bidders 
Collusion between bidders to share the market by artificially loosing bids or not presenting offers 
D. Contract award 
Selection of winning 
bidder (in open bid) or the 
contractor (single source) 
Evaluation criteria are not clearly stated, leading to unjustified decisions. 
Evaluation of bids is subjective and/or biased. 
Contract awards are not publicized nor the ground for the decision. 
E. Contract 
implementation and 
supervision 
The contract is signed with 
the selected bidder 
Supervising entities are unduly influenced to change the content of their reports.  
Contractor's claims are false or inaccurate and are protected by those in charge of revising them. 
Subcontractors and partners are chosen in a non-transparent way, are unaccountable or are used to 
channel bribes. 
Source: Anti-Corruption Resource Centre – U4
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Annex 2.A. Overview of indicators of instability and their application in the literature. 
Indicators Authors Expected measure of Variables concerned (yt) 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
/
f
i
r
s
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
Standard deviation or coefficient of variation of growth rate 
Servén (1997), Acemoglu et al. 
(2003), Mobarak (2005), Koren 
and Tenreyro (2006), Raddatz 
(2007), Di Giovanni and 
Levchenko (2007), Malik and 
Temple (2009), Ploeg and 
Poelhekke (2009) 
Variability 
GDP/inhabitant, inflation, terms 
of trade, actual exchange rate, 
black-market premium, 
international interest rate 
(LIBOR), development 
aid/inhabitant, public spending, 
ratio of wheat cultivation yields 
to national yield 
Variance of growth rate over five years Koren and Tenreyro (2006) variability Annual growth rate of work productivity 
F
i
l
t
e
r
s
 
Decline in GDP: decrease of more than 1% of the (annual) series log smoothed by the 
HP filter (lambda=1000)  Mauro and Becker (2006) Variability GDP 
Standard deviation of the cyclical component, i.e. the standard deviation of the 
difference between series smoothed by the HP or BK filter and actual series. 
Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005); 
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2007), 
Afonso and Furceri (2010) 
Variability 
Aid, export revenues, GDP, 
budget variables (transfers, 
subsidies, public spending, tax 
revenues, etc.) 
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Average over five years of the ratio of the absolute deviation between the observed 
value of export revenues (X) and the value filtered using the ratio of export five-year 
moving average process over GDP (Y): 
INST = 1
T − 4
X j −
1
5
X k
k = j − 2
j + 2
∑
Y jj = 3
T − 2
∑
 
Dawe (1996) Variability Export revenues 
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e
c
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s
t
s
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s
t
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e
s
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The standard deviation of the residual ɛit is seen as a measure of instability reflecting 
uncertainty. This approach is adopted for the whole of the sample, and for each country. 
Ramey and Ramey (1995) Uncertainty Growth rate of GDP 
The standard deviation of the residual ɛit, obtained using a regression of yt on a linear 
trend:  yt =  + βt + ɛit 
Pritchett (2000), Mobarak (2005) Variability 
Growth rate of GDP per 
inhabitant, growth rate of 
capital per worker 
Rolling standard deviation or average absolute deviation  of the residual ɛit obtained 
based on a regression of yt on a rolling mixed trend: yt =  + βt + γyt-1 + ɛit 
Guillaumont and Combes (2002), 
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2007), 
Servén (1998) 
Variability/uncertainty   
Development aid, exports, 
terms of trade, inflation rate, 
relative price of capital, actual 
exchange rate, growth rate of 
GDP. 
Standard deviation of the residual ɛit, in a regression of FDI over three lags and a 
temporal trend:  yt =  + βt + γ1yt-1 + γ2yt-2 + γ3yt-3 + ɛit 
Lensink and Morrissey (2006) 
 
Uncertainty FDI/GDP, FDI 
They estimate instability measures for each country based on the following 
GARCH(1,1) model: 
ittititit Dyytty εβββααα +++∆+++=∆ −− 322112210  
where t=1…,T and D the vector of mute quarterly variables. 
They impose the following conditions on individual variance: 
2
13
2
1,10
2
−−
++= ittiit σγεγγσ
 
The estimated value of itσˆ  reflects the uncertainty in yit.
 
Dehn (2000), Servén (1998) Uncertainty 
Prices of raw materials, 
inflation rate, price of capital 
relative to actual exchange rate 
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Annex 2.B. Mixed trends and correlograms of residuals 
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Annex 2.C. Correlograms of export revenue cycles smoothed by the HP filter 
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Annex 2.D. Comparative evolution of deviations (residuals or cycles), in % of trend values 
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Annex 2.E. Kernel densities of the distribution of exports around the global mixed trend, 
HP100, and HP6.5, in Mexico 
 
 
 Global mixed trend HP6.5 HP100 
 Std. Dev. = 8%  Std. Dev. = 6%  Std. Dev. = 11% 
 Skewness = −87%  Skewness = −45%  Skewness = −3% 
 Kurtosis = 369%  Kurtosis = 333% Kurtosis = 191% 
 
 
Annex 2.F. Graphical illustration of correlations between coefficients of skewness of 
export distributions around different reference values 
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Annex 2.G. Graphical illustration of correlations between coefficients of kurtosis of 
export distributions around different reference values 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Annex 3.A. List of countries 
Country LIC LDC Country LIC LDC Country LIC LDC 
Afghanistan X X Gambia X X Papua New Guinea X eligible 
Algeria    Ghana X   Paraguay    
Angola X X Grenada    Peru    
Antigua and Barbuda    Guatemala    Philippines    
Argentina    Guinea X X Qatar    
Bahamas    Guinea-Bissau X X Rwanda X X 
Bahrain    Guyana X   Saint Kitts and Nevis    
Bangladesh X X Haiti X X Saint Lucia    
Barbados    Honduras X   Saint Vincent and.    
Belize    India X   Samoa  X 
Benin X X Indonesia X   Sao Tome and Principe X X 
Bhutan X X Iran, Islamic Republic of    Saudi Arabia    
Bolivia    Iraq    Senegal X X 
Botswana    Jamaica    Seychelles    
Brazil    Jordan    Sierra Leone X X 
Burkina Faso X X Kenya X   Singapore    
Burundi X X Kiribati  X Solomon Islands X X 
Cambodia X X Korea, Republic of    Somalia X X 
Cameroon X   Lao PDR X X South Africa    
Cape Verde    Lebanon    Sri Lanka X   
Central African Republic X X Lesotho X X Sudan X X 
Chad X X Liberia X X Suriname    
Chile    Libyan Arab Jamahiriya    Swaziland    
China X   Madagascar X X Syrian Arab Republic    
Colombia    Malawi X X Tanzania, United Rep. of X X 
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Country LIC LDC Country LIC LDC Country LIC LDC 
Comoros X X Malaysia    Thailand    
Congo,Rep of X   Maldives X X Timor-Leste  X 
Costa Rica    Mali X X Togo X X 
Côte d'Ivoire X   Mauritania X X Tonga    
Cuba    Mauritius    Trinidad and Tobago    
Dem. Peo's Rep.Korea X   Mexico    Tunisia    
Dem. Rep. of the Congo X X Mongolia X   Turkey    
Djibouti  X Morocco    Tuvalu  X 
Dominica    Mozambique X X Uganda X X 
Dominican Republic    Myanmar X X United Arab Emirates    
Ecuador    Namibia    Uruguay    
Egypt X   Nepal X X Vanuatu, Republic of  X 
El Salvador    Nicaragua X   Venezuela    
Equatorial Guinea X X Niger X X Viet Nam X   
Eritrea X X Nigeria X   Yemen X X 
Ethiopia X X Oman    Zambia X X 
Fiji    Pakistan X   Zimbabwe X eligible 
Gabon     Panama           
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Annex 3.B. Econometric estimations of homeless due to natural disasters 
Dependent variable: Log of annual mean 
% of homeless in the population. 
Sierra Leone 
(1) 
Timor Leste 
(2) 
Independent variables :   
Log of annual mean % of displaced due to 
natural disasters in the population 
0,426 
(0,253) 
0,696 
(0,173) 
Constant -1,871 
(0,001) 
-1,404 
(0,016) 
Observations 5 5 
R2 0,23 0,43 
P-values are between brackets. (1) Estimations of the annual mean share of homeless in the population of Sierra Leone. 
Data is averaged over the 1970-2008 period, of the following neighboring countries: Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali and Senegal.  (2) Estimations of the annual mean share of homeless in the population of Timor Leste. Data is 
averaged over the 1970-2008 period, of the following neighboring countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, and Thailand.  
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Annex 3.C. Additional results 
i) Average values for the retrospective economic vulnerability index and its components, by developing country category, 1984-2008. 
  
  
Country category N 
Economic Vulnerability Index 
EVI 
  
  
Exposure Index 
  
  
Shock Index 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000
-08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000
-08 
Developing countries 121 42,9 43,6 41,3   49,3 48,4 45,9   36,4 38,8 36,7 
Low income countries (LICs) 63 41,7 43,4 42,3   48,8 47,9 44,8   34,6 38,9 39,8 
Non-LICs 58 44,2 43,8 40,3   49,9 48,9 47,2   38,4 38,7 33,4 
Least developed countries (LDCs) 48 46,4 48,8 47,5   55,7 54,9 51,8   37,0 42,6 43,2 
Non-LDCs 71 40,4 40,0 37,0   44,8 43,8 41,8   36,1 36,1 32,2 
Low-income LDCs 45 44.5 46.5 46.1  53.5 52.7 49.5  35.5 40.2 42.7 
Low-income non LDCs 83 34.7 35.7 32.8  37,0 36,0 33.1  32.3 35.5 32.5 
Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) 30 53,6 55,4 52,2   67,1 67,0 66,1   40,2 43,8 38,2 
Non-SIDS 91 39,3 39,7 37,8   43,5 42,3 39,3   35,2 37,2 36,2 
LDCs Non-SIDS 39 43,5 45,5 44,6   51,4 50,4 46,5   35,6 40,6 42,8 
LDCs SIDS 11 57,4 61,5 56,9   71,2 71,1 70,7   43,6 52,0 43,1 
SIDS Non-LDCs 19 51,4 51,9 49,4   64,6 64,7 63,4   38,2 39,0 35,5 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 48 43,9 45,3 44,6   54,1 53,4 50,6   33,7 37,3 38,7 
Non SSA 73 42,2 42,5 39,2   46,2 45,1 42,9   38,2 39,8 35,4 
SSA LDCs 33 45,4 47,5 46,7   54,4 53,9 50,8   36,4 41,1 42,6 
SSA Non-LDCs 15 40,6 40,4 40,1   53,4 52,2 50,1   27,9 28,7 30,1 
In addition to Timor Leste, Israel and Brunei, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, the Bahamas, Qatar, Singapore and South Korea have been excluded from 
the sample, because of their level of GDP per capita. 
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ii)  Wilcoxon tests on average values for the retrospective economic vulnerability index and its components, 1984-2008. 
  
  
  
  
Wilcoxon P-values 
Economic Vulnerability Index 
EVI 
  
  
Exposure Index 
  
  
Shock Index 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
Non LICs/LICs Wilcoxon-z -0,09 -0,85 -2,17  -1,01 -1,04 -0,73  0,64 -0,51 -3,62 
  pvalue 0,926 0,393 0,030   0,312 0,296 0,468   0,525 0,608 0,000 
Non LDCs/LDCs Wilcoxon-z -3,52 -3,56 -3,91  -4,10 -4,05 -3,98  -1,49 -1,54 -2,92 
  pvalue 0,000 0,000 0,000   0,000 0,000 0,000   0,137 0,123 0,004 
In addition to Timor Leste, Israel and Brunei, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, the Bahamas, Qatar, Singapore and South Korea have been 
excluded from the sample, because of their high level of GDP per capita. 
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iii) Average values for the retrospective economic vulnerability index and its components, by developing country category, 1984-2008 (Exposure Index). 
  
  
Country category N 
Exposure Index 
Population 
  
  
Remoteness 
  
  
Exports concentration 
  
  
Share of Agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries in 
GDP 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000
-08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
Developing countries 121 48,6 46,1 43,6   60,4 62,6 60,6   39,2 39,2 39,4   40,2 38,3 32,6 
Low income countries (LICs) 63 41,4 38,7 35,6   63,4 65,1 62,0   41,3 42,9 42,7   56,6 55,6 49,2 
Non-LICs 58 56,3 54,2 52,3   57,2 60,0 59,2   37,0 35,1 35,9   22,4 19,5 14,6 
Least developed countries (LDCs) 48 52,1 49,3 45,8   66,9 68,8 65,9   45,6 47,9 48,6   58,2 56,9 50,6 
Non-LDCs 71 46,1 44,0 42,0   55,9 58,2 56,9   34,7 33,1 32,9   27,6 25,3 19,9 
Low-income LDCs 45 47.1 44.2 40.6  66.4 68.1 65.0  45.2 48.4 49.0  61.6 60.4 54.3 
Low-income non LDCs 18 27.1 25.0 23.2  55.8 57.5 54.3  31.5 29.1 26.7  44.1 43.7 36.4 
Small Islands Developing States 
(SIDS) 
30 84,0 82,8 81,4   61,6 65,5 65,2   43,3 42,7 46,5   33,9 31,3 26,1 
Non-SIDS 91 36,8 34,0 31,1   60,1 61,7 59,1   37,9 38,0 37,1   42,3 40,7 34,7 
LDCs Non-SIDS 39 42,8 39,7 36,0   66,8 68,3 65,0   45,1 47,9 45,3   60,9 59,7 52,6 
LDCs SIDS 11 84,9 83,0 80,8   67,0 70,9 69,4   47,3 48,0 60,3   48,8 46,8 43,5 
SIDS Non-LDCs 19 83,5 82,7 81,8   58,4 62,4 62,8   40,9 39,6 38,5   25,3 22,3 16,1 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 48 49,8 46,8 43,3   68,3 70,2 68,2   47,2 50,2 49,5   49,8 49,3 45,3 
Non SSA 73 47,7 45,7 43,7   55,3 57,6 55,6   34,0 32,0 32,7   33,9 31,1 24,2 
SSA LDCs 33 48,8 45,8 41,9   66,1 68,1 66,1   49,4 52,9 51,9   58,6 59,0 54,5 
SSA Non-LDCs 15 52,0 48,9 46,4   73,0 74,8 72,7   42,3 44,1 44,4   30,5 28,0 25,0 
In addition to Timor Leste, Israel and Brunei, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, the Bahamas, Qatar, Singapore and South Korea have been excluded from the sample, because of 
their high level of GDP per capita. 
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iv) Average values for the retrospective economic vulnerability index and its components, by developing country category, 1984-2008 (Exposure Index). 
Wilcoxon P-values 
Exposure Index 
Population 
  
  
Remoteness 
  
  
Exports concentration 
  
  
Share of Agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries in 
GDP 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
Non LICs/LICs Wilcoxon-z 2,44 2,51 2,70  -1,65 -0,90 -0,17  -0,90 -1,91 -1,52  -7,98 -8,31 -8,07 
  pvalue 0,015 0,012 0,007   0,098 0,371 0,866   0,367 0,056 0,128   0,000 0,000 0,000 
Non LDCs/LDCs Wilcoxon-z -1,24 -1,13 -0,88  -3,05 -2,52 -2,02  -2,96 -3,89 -3,62  -6,81 -6,76 -6,44 
  pvalue 0,214 0,258 0,376   0,002 0,012 0,044   0,003 0,000 0,000   0,000 0,000 0,000 
In addition to Timor Leste, Israel and Brunei, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, the Bahamas, Qatar, Singapore and South Korea have been excluded from the sample, because 
of their high level of GDP per capita. 
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v) Average values for the retrospective economic vulnerability index and its components, by developing country category, 1984-2008 (Shock Index). 
  
  
Country category N 
Shock index 
Homeless 
  
 
Agricultural instability 
  
 
Exports instability 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
Developing countries 121 34,1 46,9 55,0   25,7 25,1 23,4   43,0 41,6 34,3 
Low income countries (LICs) 63 29,1 42,7 53,8   21,2 22,0 21,8   44,1 45,4 41,7 
Non-LICs 58 39,5 51,4 56,3   30,6 28,6 25,1   41,8 37,5 26,2 
Least developed countries (LDCs) 48 27,7 44,9 54,7   26,0 27,3 26,0   47,1 49,2 46,1 
Non-LDCs 71 38,6 48,3 55,2   25,5 23,6 21,6   40,1 36,3 25,9 
Low-income LDCs 45 28.5 42.5 53.6  23.2 24.7 25.1  45.2 46.9 46,0 
Low-income non LDCs 83 30.8 43.2 54.5  16.2 15.3 13.6  41.2 41.6 31.0 
Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) 30 36,1 58,3 63,8   32,4 32,5 27,8   46,2 42,2 30,6 
Non-SIDS 91 33,5 43,1 52,1   23,5 22,7 21,9   41,9 41,4 35,5 
LDCs Non-SIDS 39 27,9 39,2 52,0   25,0 27,1 27,9   43,8 46,9 46,6 
LDCs SIDS 11 27,0 65,1 64,5   29,4 27,9 19,4   59,0 57,5 44,1 
SIDS Non-LDCs 19 41,3 54,3 63,4   34,0 35,2 32,7   38,8 33,3 22,8 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 48 20,4 32,2 47,3   25,4 27,3 25,9   44,5 44,8 40,8 
Non SSA 73 43,1 56,5 60,0   25,9 23,7 21,7   42,0 39,5 29,9 
SSA LDCs 33 25,5 37,0 48,3   24,2 27,1 27,4   47,9 50,2 47,4 
SSA Non-LDCs 15 9,2 21,7 45,2   28,1 27,6 22,5   37,1 32,8 26,4 
In addition to Timor Leste, Israel and Brunei, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, the Bahamas, Qatar, Singapore and South Korea have been excluded from the sample, 
because of their high level of GDP per capita. 
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vi) Average values for the retrospective economic vulnerability index and its components, by developing country category, 1984-
2008 (Shock Index). 
 
Wilcoxon P-values 
Shock index 
Homeless   
 
Agricultural instability   
 
Exports instability 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
1984-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
08 
Non LICs/LICs Wilcoxon-z 1,76 1,61 0,66  2,79 1,89 1,31  -0,70 -2,15 -4,14 
  pvalue 0,079 0,108 0,507   0,005 0,058 0,191   0,487 0,032 0,000 
Non LDCs/LDCs Wilcoxon-z 1,77 0,54 0,07  0,36 -1,05 -1,41  -1,75 -3,11 -5,22 
  pvalue 0,076 0,589 0,941   0,720 0,292 0,158   0,080 0,002 0,000 
In addition to Timor Leste, Israel and Brunei, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, the Bahamas, Qatar, Singapore and South Korea have been 
excluded from the sample, because of their high level of GDP per capita. 
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vii) Ranking of LDCs according to the retrospective EVI, 2008. 
Country EVI 2008 Rank Country EVI 2008 Rank Country EVI 2008 Rank 
Kiribati 69,31 1 Timor-Leste 50,02 25 (Papua New Guinea) 41,58 57 
Gambia 64,13 4 Mauritania 49,72 26 Madagascar 40,92 60 
Solomon Islands 60,13 5 Sudan 48,46 31 Somalia 40,38 64 
(Zimbabwe) 59,76 6 Sao Tome and Principe 48,18 33 Niger 39,84 66 
Samoa 57,71 7 Bhutan 48,11 34 Burkina Faso 39,65 67 
Chad 57,31 9 Rwanda 46,63 39 Mali 39,42 70 
Comoros 56,47 10 Angola 46,58 40 Togo 39,04 72 
Burundi 56,13 12 Dem. Rep. of the Congo 44,51 44 Benin 37,61 76 
Maldives 55,64 13 Lao PDR 44,40 45 Myanmar 37,18 79 
Guinea-Bissau 55,24 14 Lesotho 44,13 47 Cambodia 37,04 82 
Vanuatu, Republic of 55,08 15 Yemen 43,59 48 Uganda 35,86 83 
Liberia 53,88 16 Haiti 43,31 49 Senegal 35,42 87 
Equatorial Guinea 52,88 17 Sierra Leone 43,24 50 Nepal 30,08 96 
Zambia 52,48 19 Central African Republic 42,91 51 Tanzania, United Rep. of 27,07 105 
Malawi 52,11 21 Djibouti 42,75 53 Guinea 26,04 106 
Eritrea 51,13 23 Mozambique 42,42 54 Ethiopia 24,79 109 
Tuvalu 50,51 24 Afghanistan 42,25 56 Bangladesh 22,16 112 
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Annex 3.D. List of countries ordered by decreasing ranking differences (in absolute value) 
between the retrospective EVI and the UNCDP 2009 review.  
 
Country 
EVI 
retro 
2006 
ranking 
retro EVI, 
2006 
EVI 
UNCDP 
2009 
review 
Ranking 
UNCDP 
2009 review 
Absolute 
difference in 
scores 
 
Ranking 
difference 
Grenada 56,94 14 42,87 66 14,07 52 
Uganda 37,28 82 51,91 35 14,63 -47 
Somalia 46,33 44 62,63 7 16,30 -37 
Lao PDR 45,51 47 59,89 12 14,38 -35 
Ghana 32,69 91 44,45 60 11,76 -31 
Gabon 45,14 51 38,60 79 6,53 28 
St Vincent and Grenadines 52,09 24 46,81 52 5,27 28 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 39,61 71 32,71 95 6,90 24 
Dominican Republic 31,19 97 41,07 74 9,88 -23 
Bhutan 45,20 49 52,93 28 7,74 -21 
Madagascar 40,45 65 37,17 86 3,28 21 
Equatorial Guinea 50,73 29 60,54 9 9,81 -20 
Nicaragua 36,27 84 43,25 64 6,97 -20 
Mauritania 49,46 32 47,13 51 2,33 19 
Namibia 43,01 57 39,81 75 3,20 18 
Eritrea 59,78 7 55,46 24 4,33 17 
Gambia 65,45 3 56,27 20 9,19 17 
Botswana 49,63 31 57,32 15 7,69 -16 
Sierra Leone 43,78 55 50,67 39 6,88 -16 
Oman 40,46 64 38,38 80 2,09 16 
Saint Lucia 52,47 23 50,79 38 1,68 15 
Singapore 39,61 72 36,55 87 3,06 15 
Bolivia 37,90 79 42,90 65 5,00 -14 
Jamaica 37,91 78 34,60 92 3,31 14 
Qatar 44,61 54 42,56 68 2,06 14 
Burkina Faso 38,58 76 43,81 63 5,23 -13 
Cambodia 48,80 36 55,63 23 6,84 -13 
Niger 40,36 67 45,84 54 5,47 -13 
Cape Verde 48,71 37 48,06 49 0,65 12 
Haiti 52,48 22 52,19 34 0,29 12 
Lesotho 44,63 53 49,94 41 5,31 -12 
Sudan 47,34 42 52,86 30 5,52 -12 
Yemen 45,99 45 44,90 57 1,08 12 
Honduras 31,72 96 37,39 84 5,67 -12 
Saudi Arabia 32,09 93 30,08 105 2,01 12 
Swaziland 42,45 59 48,47 47 6,02 -12 
Fiji 48,21 39 48,05 50 0,16 11 
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Country 
EVI 
retro 
2006 
ranking 
retro EVI, 
2006 
EVI 
UNCDP 
2009 
review 
Ranking 
UNCDP 
2009 review 
Absolute 
difference in 
scores 
 
Ranking 
difference 
Benin 37,78 80 42,50 69 4,73 -11 
Chad 56,28 16 53,53 27 2,75 11 
Chile 35,41 86 32,53 96 2,88 10 
Guyana 48,92 34 49,39 44 0,47 10 
Tuvalu 57,56 11 79,69 1 22,14 -10 
Iraq 44,94 52 43,88 62 1,06 10 
Vanuatu, Republic of 54,94 18 62,30 8 7,36 -10 
Lebanon 29,50 100 35,74 90 6,24 -10 
Mauritius 40,91 63 45,96 53 5,05 -10 
Nigeria 42,14 60 42,42 70 0,28 10 
Suriname 71,46 1 59,90 11 11,55 10 
Viet Nam 20,72 118 26,51 108 5,79 -10 
Barbados 45,82 46 45,62 55 0,19 9 
El Salvador 35,29 88 32,47 97 2,82 9 
Liberia 57,01 13 65,46 4 8,44 -9 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 57,59 10 56,48 19 1,11 9 
Bahamas 47,54 41 52,44 33 4,90 -8 
Belize 40,38 66 44,87 58 4,49 -8 
Congo, Rep of 43,26 56 48,29 48 5,03 -8 
Indonesia 19,09 124 23,00 116 3,91 -8 
Afghanistan 39,98 69 39,52 77 0,46 8 
Malaysia 19,91 120 25,53 112 5,62 -8 
Ecuador 34,77 90 37,47 83 2,70 -7 
Iran, Islamic Republic of 40,03 68 43,89 61 3,86 -7 
Comoros 58,15 9 56,94 16 1,21 7 
Senegal 34,80 89 37,58 82 2,77 -7 
Mongolia 51,64 25 52,74 32 1,10 7 
Brazil 21,39 116 20,96 122 0,43 6 
Solomon Islands 59,52 8 57,98 14 1,53 6 
Pakistan 22,77 112 22,25 118 0,52 6 
Egypt 16,84 126 20,99 121 4,15 -5 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 45,19 50 49,27 45 4,07 -5 
Tanzania, United Rep. of 30,39 98 31,02 103 0,63 5 
Togo 41,25 62 42,79 67 1,54 5 
Zambia 51,44 26 52,79 31 1,35 5 
Sri Lanka 28,53 103 32,43 98 3,90 -5 
Antigua and Barbuda 49,14 33 51,02 37 1,88 4 
Bahrain 38,27 77 38,01 81 0,26 4 
Colombia 20,13 119 20,87 123 0,74 4 
Costa Rica 35,80 85 36,08 89 0,29 4 
Guatemala 29,01 102 29,20 106 0,19 4 
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Country 
EVI 
retro 
2006 
ranking 
retro EVI, 
2006 
EVI 
UNCDP 
2009 
review 
Ranking 
UNCDP 
2009 review 
Absolute 
difference in 
scores 
 
Ranking 
difference 
India 19,43 123 17,55 127 1,89 4 
Angola 48,44 38 49,77 42 1,33 4 
Maldives 56,05 17 58,18 13 2,13 -4 
Syrian Arab Republic 27,01 106 25,76 110 1,25 4 
Argentina 26,81 107 30,15 104 3,34 -3 
Cameroon 27,61 105 31,29 102 3,68 -3 
Côte d'Ivoire 28,10 104 31,48 101 3,38 -3 
Mexico 19,51 122 18,96 125 0,55 3 
Rwanda 50,90 28 55,05 25 4,15 -3 
Thailand 15,53 127 20,56 124 5,04 -3 
United Arab Emirates 37,51 81 39,11 78 1,60 -3 
China 21,82 115 22,91 117 1,09 2 
Jordan 24,56 109 25,72 111 1,15 2 
Morocco 21,25 117 22,12 119 0,87 2 
Papua New Guinea 41,41 61 44,57 59 3,16 -2 
Bangladesh 22,68 113 23,21 115 0,53 2 
Burundi 56,71 15 56,81 17 0,10 2 
Central African Republic 42,77 58 45,06 56 2,29 -2 
Guinea-Bissau 57,15 12 60,53 10 3,38 -2 
Kiribati 65,30 4 75,25 2 9,95 -2 
Malawi 53,84 20 55,88 22 2,04 2 
Mozambique 45,50 48 48,68 46 3,18 -2 
Myanmar 36,42 83 37,39 85 0,97 2 
Tunisia 23,34 111 24,92 113 1,58 2 
Uruguay 38,99 74 42,25 72 3,26 -2 
Algeria 31,72 95 33,25 94 1,53 -1 
Kenya 18,57 125 18,39 126 0,18 1 
Korea, Republic of 19,60 121 21,81 120 2,21 -1 
Panama 32,53 92 35,17 91 2,64 -1 
Philippines 23,44 110 26,37 109 2,93 -1 
Seychelles 50,15 30 52,90 29 2,75 -1 
Djibouti 48,83 35 51,20 36 2,37 1 
Ethiopia 29,03 101 32,04 100 3,00 -1 
Guinea 25,63 108 27,90 107 2,27 -1 
Tonga 69,59 2 69,05 3 0,54 1 
Trinidad and Tobago 38,86 75 39,76 76 0,90 1 
Mali 39,78 70 42,32 71 2,54 1 
Nepal 31,76 94 33,65 93 1,89 -1 
Sao Tome and Principe 51,43 27 54,97 26 3,54 -1 
Venezuela 35,33 87 36,29 88 0,96 1 
Timor-Leste 54,85 19 56,70 18 1,86 -1 
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Country 
EVI 
retro 
2006 
ranking 
retro EVI, 
2006 
EVI 
UNCDP 
2009 
review 
Ranking 
UNCDP 
2009 review 
Absolute 
difference in 
scores 
 
Ranking 
difference 
Cuba 39,01 73 41,97 73 2,96 0 
Dem. Peo's Rep.Korea 48,12 40 50,19 40 2,07 0 
Dominica 52,97 21 56,20 21 3,23 0 
Paraguay 46,75 43 49,60 43 2,85 0 
Peru 29,66 99 32,28 99 2,62 0 
South Africa 22,19 114 23,73 114 1,53 0 
Turkey 13,44 128 15,32 128 1,88 0 
Samoa 60,04 6 64,29 6 4,24 0 
Zimbabwe 62,61 5 64,32 5 1,71 0 
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Annex 3.E. The EVI in the UNCDP 2012 review 
 
“The EVI incorporates eight indicators, which are grouped into two broad areas comprising an 
exposure index and a shock index. The weights attached to each indicator in each composite index 
and sub-index are as follows: 
 
The various sub-indices of the EVI denoted in the figure above are the simple averages of the 
index values of their components. Thus, the overall EVI score is a weighted rather than a simple 
average of the eight indicators. As for the HAI, original data for each EVI component are 
converted into index numbers using a max-min procedure and re-scaled to remove significant 
outliers.  
The EVI described above incorporates the refinements introduced in 2011, namely, the share of 
the population living in low elevated coastal zones and victims of natural disasters to better capture 
structural vulnerability to climate change. Moreover, the weighting of sub-indices has been 
harmonized and some sub-indices have been renamed.” 
Source: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_criteria.shtml#criteria   
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Annex 3.F. Glossary 
CERDI: Centre for Studies and Researches on International Development 
EVI: Economic Vulnerability Index 
DC: Developing Countries 
LICs: Low income countries 
LDCs: Least developed countries 
LDC-also-LICs: Least Developed Countries also Low Income Countries 
LIC-non-LICs: Low Income Countries non Least Developed Countries 
UNCDP: United Nations Committee for Development Policy 
UNDESA: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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CHAPTER 4 
Annex 4.A. Descriptive statistics and data sources 
i) Country-level panel data 
country Obs country Obs country Obs 
Algeria 19 France 19 Norway 19 
Argentina 19 Gabon 19 Pakistan 19 
Australia 14 Greece 19 Papua New Guinea 17 
Austria 19 Guatemala 19 Paraguay 19 
Bangladesh 19 Guyana 11 Peru 19 
Belgium 19 Honduras 19 Philippines 19 
Bolivia 9 Hungary 19 Portugal 19 
Botswana 4 India 19 Senegal 19 
Brazil 19 Indonesia 19 South Africa 19 
Burkina Faso 14 Ireland 19 Spain 19 
Cameroon 19 Italy 19 Sudan 19 
Canada 19 Japan 19 Sweden 19 
Chile 19 Jordan 3 Syria 4 
China 1 Kenya 19 Thailand 19 
Colombia 5 Madagascar 19 Togo 19 
Costa Rica 19 Malawi 19 Trinidad and Tobago 16 
Cuba 9 Malaysia 19 Tunisia 18 
Cyprus 4 Mali 12 United Kingdom 19 
Denmark 19 Mexico 19 United States 9 
Dominican Republic 19 Morocco 19 Uruguay 19 
Ecuador 19 Netherlands 19 Zambia 19 
El Salvador 19 New Zealand 19 Zimbabwe 3 
Finland 19 Nicaragua 19   
East Asia and Pacific = 13% of total sample   
Europe and Central Asia = 1,7% of total sample (Hungary)  
Latin America and Caribbean = 28,2% of total sample  
Middle East and North Africa = 9% of total sample   
North America = 2,5%  of total sample (Canada, USA)  
South Asia = 5%  of total sample (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan)  
Sub Saharan Africa = 19,9% of total sample   
Western Europe = 20,7% of total sample   
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ii) Firm-level cross section data. 
country Obs country Obs country Obs 
Argentina 794 (8%) Gabon 13 (0.1%) Mexico 87 (1%) 
Bolivia 302 (3%) Guatemala 556 (6%) Nicaragua 319 (3%) 
Botswana 235 (2%) Honduras 321 (3%) Panama 31 (0.3%) 
Chile 970 (10%) Indonesia 1,152 (12%) Paraguay 254 (3%) 
Colombia 836 (9%) Lesotho 12 (0.1%) Peru 828 (9%) 
Costa Rica 35 (0.4%) Madagascar 63 (1%) Philippines 1,115 (12%) 
Dom. Republic 318 (3%) Malawi 122 (1.32%) Uruguay 512 (6%) 
Ecuador 330 (4%) Mauritius 7 (0.1%)   
East Asia and Pacific = 25% of total sample   
Latin America and Caribbean = 70% of total sample  
Sub Saharan Africa = 5% of total sample  
iii) Summary statistics of panel data 
 
Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable       
ICRG PRS group 1144 2.61014 1.431315 0 6 
Instability variables 
Export 16-year std dev 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
2010 
1144 6.995185 3.620236 1.899827 20.58558 
Export 6-year skewness 1144 18.36777 124.2091 -242.9317 242.9239 
Export 6-year skewness > 0 1144 66.80871 69.34003 0 242.9239 
Export 6-year skewness < 0 1144 48.44095 64.35557 0 242.9317 
Export 6-year kurtosis 1144 233.2955 83.85703 109.9743 593.4952 
Export 16-year kurtosis 1144 319.7907 166.7265 146.7546 1386.653 
Rainfall 16-year std dev Maatsura and 
Willmott 
(2007) 
1144 12.81215 5.239885 2.756109 29.84307 
Rainfall 6-year skewness 1144 -32.14799 106.1514 -204.6579 230.3528 
People affected by natural 
disaster 
EM-DAT 
(2012) 1144 1.275625 2.295293 0 20.65531 
Export concentration CERDI 775 27.08626 20.96736 0 91.88235 
Controls       
Population growth (in %) 
WDI 2010 1144 1.49221 .991445 -.6979211 6.047563 
Log population 1144 16.56923 1.372346 13.52666 20.98849 
Log credit to private sector 
(in %) 
 
1130 3.544881 0.964273 0 5.442772 
Natural resources (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank 
1144 5.203671 8.15379 0 59 
Political regime stability 
Polity IV 1144 29.46416 33.17404 0 196 
Democracy 1144 5.369755 5.858688 -9 10 
Govt expenditures (% of 
GDP) 
Penn World  
Tables 2010 1144 15.69565 5.862845 4.652345 53.25081 
Log openness (const. LCU) 1144 4.031649 .5520936 2.396314 5.35706 
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iv) Summary statistics of firm-level data 
 Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable       
% of annual sales paid as 
informal payments 
WBES 2008 – 
2011 9212 0.7733391 4.090082 0 100 
Instability variables (in % of the trend) 
Export 16-year std dev 
World 
Development 
Indicators 2010 
23 6.340868 2.396597 2.551279 12.998 
Export 6-year skewness 23 63.55887 76.90412 -179.9973 166.0257 
Export 6-year skewness > 0 23 76.55234 49.78118 0 166.0257 
Export 6-year skewness < 0 23 12.99347 38.03289 0 179.9973 
Export 6-year kurtosis 23 189.6478 47.9019 116.4359 416.3812 
Export 16-year kurtosis 23 363.3209 180.9741 185.497 739.2167 
Rainfall 16-year std dev 2008 
Maatsura and 
Willmott (2007) 
23 12.57644 4.866297 5.373374 22.89103 
Rainfall 6-year skewness 2008 23 18.86488 121.7952 -178.599 182.2015 
Rainfall 6-year skewness 2004 23 56.85211 111.7317 -196.032 173.3912 
People affected by natural 
disaster 2005 
EM-DAT 
(2012) 
23 1.26377 1.335354 0.035672 7.292787 
Macro – controls       
Gov expenditures (cst 
USD2000) 
WDI 2010 
23 1.36e+10 1.42e+10 3.82e+08 6.74e+10 
Trade (in % of GDP) 23 69.83776 22.65299 38.29338 170.9021 
Population growth (in %) 23 1.385411 0.5141451 .3047784 2.77755 
Log population 23 17.08152 1.272961 14.05363 19.24198 
Log GDP per cap t – 20 23 7.36509 0.81249 4.89926 8.762737 
Log credit to private sector  23 3.410941 0.5103423 2.146021 4.57458 
Natural resources (% of GDP) World Bank 23 10.02095 9.668229 0 57 
Political regime stability 
Polity IV 
23 20.49989 12.93696 6 89 
Democracy 23 8.175423 1.212451 -4 10 
Common law La Porta et al. (1999) 23 0.0400564 0.1961023 0 1 
Latitude 
  
23 -7.94213 19.16726 -36.676 18.561 
Landlockness 23 0.1004125 0.3005655 0 1 
Firm’s characteristics       
Size (1: small; 2:medium; 
3:large) 
WBES 2008-
2011 
9212 1.871581 0.7907208 1 3 
State/govt ownership (% of 
firm) 9212 0.161637 2.93871 0 90 
Direct exports (%of firm’s 
sales) 9212 8.128745 22.52709 0 100 
Indirect exports (%of firm’s 
sales) 9212 3.050369 13.97412 0 100 
% of working capital financed 
by internal funds 9212 61.99436 38.17022 0 100 
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Annex 4.B. Correlations between the standard deviation and the skewness of export 
distributions 
i) Correlation coefficients 
 Standard deviations 
(rolling, 16 years) 
Skewness  
(rolling, 16 years) 
Kurtosis  
(rolling, 16 years) 
 Whole sample – Observations: 1122 
Standard deviations (rolling, 15 years) 1.0   
Skewness (rolling, 16 years) 0.2243* 1.0  
Kurtosis (rolling, 16 years) 0.3007* 0.2529* 1.0 
Positive skewness (when 16-year skewness > 0) – Observations: 630 
Standard deviations (16 years) 1.0   
Skewness (16 years) 0.2415* 1.0  
Kurtosis (16 years) 0.3967* 0.7615* 1.0 
Negative skewness (when 16-year skewness < 0) – Observations: 492 
Standard deviations (16 years) 1.0   
Skewness (16 years) 0.1003 1.0  
Kurtosis (16 years) 0.0271 -0.7121* 1.0 
* 1% significant.  
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ii) Graph correlations 
  
16-year standard deviation versus 16-year skewness 
 
16-year standard deviation versus 16-year kurtosis 
 
16-years skewness versus 16-year kurtosis 
 
6-years skewness versus 6-year kurtosis  
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Annex 4.C. Graph correlations between corruption perception indicators 
ICRG versus CPI 
spearman rank correlation = 47% 
 
ICRG versus Control of Corruption 
spearman rank correlation = 55% 
 
Sample of 93 low and middle-income countries in 2004. 
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Annex 4.D. Instrumental variable and GMM estimations: instruments and first stage 
estimates. 
i) Instruments description 
Annual share of people (total) affected by natural disasters in the population 
We compute each year the ratio between the yearly-averaged number of total affected by natural 
disasters and the national population, which consists in applying the following formula: 
Annual % of people affectedt= 100 ×
∑ 01234	35567268029:
0
;<=>?@A<B2
 
Total affected is the sum of injured, homeless, and people requiring immediate assistance during 
the period of emergency following a natural disaster. It can also include displaced or evacuated 
people. Further detailed on the database is provided at http://www.emdat.be/criteria-and-
definition.  
6-year skewness of rainfall levels 
This is the 6-year rolling skewness of the distribution of rainfall levels (rit) around their average 
value (Rit). We compute it in country i at time t as follow: 
Skew_rainfallit  
16-year standard deviation of rainfall levels 
This is the 16-year rolling standard deviation of the distribution of rainfall levels (rit) around their 
average value (Rit). We compute this measure in country i at time t as follow: 
Stddev_rainfallit  
The export concentration index 
This variable is drawn from the retrospective EVI database constructed in chapter 3. The export 
concentration index is derived from the Herfindhal index applied to export of merchandises 
(excluding services) as categorized by the three-digit level of the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC). This index is between 0 and 1, a high level of concentration being associated 
with a score close to 1. A country exporting only one product would score 1 according to this 
index. The derived Herfindhal Index formula is the following: 
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Where j is the country index, xi is the value of exports of commodity I, Xj the total exports of 
country j, and n the number of products at the three-digit SITC level. The resulting data is then 
normalized using the min-max procedure with the bounds specified below. 
 
Boundaries used for normalization. 
Variables/components Lower boundary Upper boundary 
Export concentration 0.100 0.950 
 
H j =
x i
X j
 
 
  
 
 
  
2
i=1
n
∑ − 1 n
1 − 1 n
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ii) Correlations between instruments and measures of export instability  
 
Panel country-level data 
Export 
std-dev 
Export 
skewness 
Rainfall 
skewness 
Rainfall 
skewness 
t-1 
Rainfall 
skewness 
t-2 
Rainfall 
skewness 
t-3 
Rainfall 
skewness 
t-4 
Rainfall 
stddev 
Rain 
stddev 
t-1 
Rain 
stddev 
t-2 
Rain 
stddev 
t-3 
Rainfall 
stddev 
t-4 
Annual 
% 
affected 
Annual 
% of 
affected 
t-1 
Annual 
% of 
affected 
t-2 
Annual 
% of 
affected 
t-3 
Annual 
% of 
affected 
t-4 
Export 
concentration 
Export std_dev 1.0000  
Export skewness 0.0305 1.0000  
Rainfall skewness -0.0008 -0.0284 1.0000  
Rainfall skewness t-1 0.0040 -0.0399 0.7679 1.0000  
Rainfall skewness t-2 0.0044 -0.0420 0.6001 0.7761 1.0000  
Rainfall skewness t-3 -0.0031 -0.0174 0.4373 0.6044 0.7718 1.0000  
Rainfall skewness t-4 -0.0159 -0.0021 0.2769 0.4491 0.6043 0.7764 1.0000  
Rainfall std_dev -0.0906 0.0222 0.0032 -0.0040 -0.0027 -0.0044 -0.0014  1.0000  
Rainfall std_dev t-1 -0.1012 0.0297 0.0101 0.0051 -0.0008 -0.0025 -0.0074  0.9829 1.0000  
Rainfall std_dev t-2 -0.1113 0.0374 0.0168 0.0127 0.0093 0.0018 -0.0012  0.9641 0.9830 1.0000  
Rainfall std_dev t-3 -0.1187 0.0510 0.0184 0.0180 0.0161 0.0120 0.0033  0.9454 0.9656 0.9839 1.0000  
Rainfall std_dev t-4 -0.1268 0.0660 0.0218 0.0198 0.0194 0.0174 0.0110  0.9252 0.9472 0.9669 0.9841 1.0000  
Annual % of affected 0.2227 -0.1228 0.0695 0.0783 0.0965 0.0990 0.0887  0.0601 0.0513 0.0413 0.0317 0.0169 1.0000  
Annual % of affected t-1 0.2050 -0.0930 0.0596 0.0612 0.0744 0.0927 0.0858  0.0572 0.0522 0.0437 0.0327 0.0195 0.9249 1.0000  
Annual % of affected t-2 0.1843 -0.0619 0.0370 0.0494 0.0580 0.0652 0.0752  0.0534 0.0485 0.0433 0.0330 0.0188 0.8449 0.9158  1.0000  
Annual % of affected t-3 0.1631 -0.0236 0.0045 0.0412 0.0549 0.0595 0.0586  0.0569 0.0480 0.0447 0.0401 0.0266 0.8034 0.8387  0.9108 1.0000  
Annual % of affected t-4 0.1359 0.0336 -0.0208 0.0086 0.0462 0.0560 0.0511  0.0571 0.0527 0.0452 0.0427 0.0356 0.7825 0.7950  0.8311 0.9075 1.0000  
Export concentration 0.2843 0.0737 -0.0481 -0.0457 -0.0626 -0.0830 -0.0898  0.0633 0.0655 0.0773 0.0874 0.0917 0.0654 0.0627  0.0563 0.0569 0.0621 1.0000  
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Cross-section firm-level data 
 
Export 
std_dev 
Export 
skewness 
Rainfall 
skewness 
Rainfall 
skewness 
t-1 
Rainfall 
skewness 
t-2 
Rainfall 
skewness 
t-3 
Rainfall 
skewness 
t-4 
Rainfall 
stddev 
Rain 
stddev 
t-1 
Rain 
stddev 
t-2 
Rain 
stddev 
t-3 
Rainfall 
stddev 
t-4 
Annual 
% 
affected 
Annual 
% of 
affected 
t-1 
Annual 
% of 
affected 
t-2 
Annual 
% of 
affected 
t-3 
Annual 
% of 
affected 
t-4 
Export 
concentration 
Export std_dev 1.0000  
Export skewness 0.2514 1.0000  
Rainfall skewness -0.2949 -0.0837 1.0000  
Rainfall skewness t-1 -0.3197 -0.0617 0.2527 1.0000  
Rainfall skewness t-2 -0.2459 0.1321 0.2737 0.9291 1.0000  
Rainfall skewness t-3 -0.1206 0.2089 0.1716 0.7698 0.9258 1.0000  
Rainfall skewness t-4 -0.1269 0.2532 0.1028 0.6486 0.8299 0.9355 1.0000  
Rainfall std_dev 0.5884 0.0772 -0.1532 -0.2072 -0.1614 -0.0858 -0.1427  1.0000  
Rainfall std_dev t-1 0.6139 0.0514 -0.2194 -0.2653 -0.2356 -0.1754 -0.2077  0.9777 1.0000  
Rainfall std_dev t-2 0.6178 0.0546 -0.2332 -0.2781 -0.2509 -0.1910 -0.2143  0.9729 0.9987 1.0000  
Rainfall std_dev t-3 0.6446 0.0703 -0.2750 -0.2954 -0.2781 -0.2157 -0.2409  0.9752 0.9908 0.9926 1.0000  
Rainfall std_dev t-4 0.6372 0.1007 -0.3157 -0.2605 -0.2401 -0.1758 -0.2059  0.9716 0.9847 0.9863 0.9968 1.0000  
Annual % of affected 0.1447 -0.1732 0.4882 0.2055 0.2618 0.2212 0.2296  0.2005 0.1163 0.1165 0.1036 0.0722 1.0000  
Annual % of affected t-1 0.1480 -0.2016 0.4615 0.1988 0.2487 0.2078 0.2217  0.2004 0.1237 0.1242 0.1099 0.0786 0.9978 1.0000  
Annual % of affected t-2 0.1439 -0.2153 0.4389 0.1760 0.2277 0.1930 0.2098  0.2177 0.1391 0.1400 0.1281 0.0967 0.9958 0.9970  1.0000  
Annual % of affected t-3 0.1230 -0.2472 0.4223 0.1737 0.2119 0.1734 0.1959  0.1953 0.1250 0.1269 0.1137 0.0830 0.9891 0.9947  0.9964 1.0000  
Annual % of affected t-4 0.1188 -0.2037 0.4707 0.1950 0.2422 0.2038 0.2019  0.2130 0.1313 0.1306 0.1142 0.0821 0.9935 0.9929  0.9940 0.9900 1.0000  
Export concentration -0.0624 -0.0345 -0.4485 0.1709 0.1063 -0.0128 -0.0515  -0.0673 0.0358 0.0213 0.0036 0.0369 -0.3124 -0.2744  -0.2835 -0.2479 -0.2713 1.0000  
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iii) Instability and corruption: Instrumental variable estimations of equation (4.4) – first stage estimates (included instruments not reported) of equations (4.4.a) and (b). 
 
 
 ICRG   WBES  
 
 
     
 
“Active” firms  “Passive” firms 
2nd stage estimates 
 
IV-2SLS IV-LIML 
 
GMM-CUE 
 
2SLS 2SLS  LIML GMM-CUE  2SLS 
Lagged Corruption   0.677*** (0.00) 0.677*** (0.00)  0.706*** (0.00)   
   
 
 
 
Export skewness 
 
-0.001 (0.24) -0.001 (0.27)  -0.001* (0.08)  0.002 (0.16) 0.003* (0.07)  0.003* (0.07) 0.004*** (0.00) 
 
0.004*** (0.00) 
Export std_dev  -0.051 (0.18) -0.058 (0.18)  -0.081* (0.06)  0.560*** (0.00) 0.230* (0.09)  0.230* (0.09) 0.361***  (0.00) 
 
0.495*** (0.01) 
1st stage estimates (a): export skewness              
Lagged Corruption  -5.82 (0.43) -5.82 (0.43)  -5.82 (0.43)      
Annual share of affected (% pop) (t) 
 
-16.06*** (0.00) -16.06*** (0.00)  -16.06*** (0.00) 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Annual share of affected (% pop) (t-3) 
 
  
 
 
 
-31.34*** (0.01) -33.05*** (0.00) 
 
-33.05*** (0.00) -33.05*** (0.00)  -28.71** (0.05) 
Annual share of affected (% pop) (t-4) 
 
13.59*** (0.00) 13.59*** (0.00) 
 
13.59*** (0.00) 
 
  
 
    
Export concentration index  0.609 (0.21) 0.609 (0.21)  0.609 (0.21)         
5-yr skewness of rainfall (t) 
 
-0.037 (0.40) -0.037 (0.40)  -0.037 (0.40)  -0.158  (0.51) 0.126 (0.64)  0.126 (0.64) 0.126 (0.64)  -0.139 (0.53) 
5-yr skewness of rainfall (t-4)  0.043 (0.38) 0.043 (0.38)  0.043 (0.38)  0.362 (0.22) 0.372 (0.24)  0.372 (0.24) 0.372 (0.24)  0.424* (0.09) 
15- year standard deviation of rainfall  -4.538** (0.04) -4.538** (0.04)  -4.538** (0.04)  13.21*** (0.01) 12.33** (0.04)  12.33** (0.04) 12.33** (0.04)  12.81*** (0.00) 
F(5,514)  6.44 6.44  6.44  8.42 5.86  5.86 5.86  15.35 
Shea partial R2  0.04 0.04  0.04  0.44 0.42  0.42 0.42  0.47 
1st stage estimates (b): export std_dev 
 
  
   
    
 
  
Lagged Corruption 
 0.129 (0.11) 0.129 (0.11)  0.129 (0.11)         
Annual share of affected (% pop) (t)  0.393*** (0.00) 0.393*** (0.00)  0.393*** (0.00)         
Annual share of affected (% pop) (t-3)       0.093 (0.64) -0.020 (0.92)  -0.020 (0.92) -0.020 (0.92)  0.242* (0.09) 
Annual share of affected (% pop) (t-4)  0.039 (0.44) 0.039 (0.44)  0.039 (0.44)         
Export concentration index  0.021*** (0.01) 0.021*** (0.01)  0.021*** (0.01)         
5-yr skewness of rainfall (t)  0.002*** (0.00) 0.002*** (0.00)  0.002*** (0.00)  -0.014*** (0.00) -0.015*** (0.00)  -0.015*** (0.00) -0.015*** (0.00)  -0.013*** (0.00) 
5-yr skewness of rainfall (t-4)  0.001*** (0.00) 0.001*** (0.00)  0.001*** (0.00)  0.009** (0.02) 0.012*** (0.01)  0.012*** (0.01) 0.012*** (0.01)  0.006** (0.02) 
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15- year standard deviation of rainfall  0.050** (0.04) 0.050** (0.04)  0.050** (0.04)  0.168*** (0.01) 0.156*** (0.01)  0.156*** (0.01) 0.156*** (0.01)  0.200*** (0.00) 
F(5,514)  6.97 6.97  6.97  12.25 9.23  9.23 9.23  16.42 
Shea partial R2  0.12 0.12  0.12  0.57 0.62  0.62 0.62  0.61 
Weak instrument test 
 
  
   
    
 
 
 
Kleibergen-Paap stat(critical value)  4.7 (21.7) a 4.7 (4.1) a  4.7 (4.1) a  1.24(16.9)a 5.18 (16.9)a  5.18 (4.72)a 5.18 (4.72)a 
 
0.20(9.9)a 
Hansen test (p-val)  0.17 0.19  0.21  0.04 0.45  0.45 0.50  0.04 
Endogeneity test, Chi2 p-value:  
6-yr skew + 16-year std-dev exports 
6-year export skewness  
16-year std dev of exports 
 
 
0.04 
0.25 
0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
Country fixed effects   Yes Yes  Yes  No No  No No  No 
Time dummies 
 Yes Yes  No  No No  No No  No 
Observations (countries or clusters)  700 (46) 700 (46)  700 (46)  9212(23) 4210 (23)  4210 (23) 4210 (23)  3387(23) 
R squared       0.02 0.02  0.02 0.02  0.03 
Number of instruments  5 5  5  4 4  4 4  4 
When possible, coefficients are rounded to three decimal places. Included instruments not reported. Standards errors robust to heteroskedasticity in all regressions, to autocorrelation in GMM-CUE estimations, and 
are clustered by country in OLS firm-level estimations. P-values in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% † significant at 14%. Hansen J-statistic tests for joint instrument 
validity; null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly from the second-stage equation. In columns “active firms”, we restrict 
the sample to firms considering that corruption is not an obstacle or is a minor obstacle to their current operations. In column “passive firms”, we restrict the sample to firms considering that corruption is a 
moderate, major, and very severe obstacle to their current operations. 
a.When the Kleibergen-Paap statistic exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical value, then a standard significance test on estimated coefficient with nominal size of 5% has a maximal size of 10% or more. 
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iv) Instability and corruption: Instrumental variable estimations of equation (4.7) – first stage estimates of 
equations (4.7a) and (4.7b) (included instruments not reported). 
 
 ICRG 
2nd stage estimates 
 
IV-2SLS 
 
GMM-CUE 
Lagged Corruption   0.674*** (0.00)  0.676*** (0.00) 
Skewness>0 
 
-0.001** (0.03)  -0.001** (0.03) 
Skewness<0 
 
-0.0004 (0.28)  -0.0004 (0.30) 
Export std_dev  0.127** (0.02)  0.135** (0.02) 
Export std_dev*16-year kurtosis  -0.0002*** (0.01)  -0.0002*** (0.01) 
1st stage estimates (a): export std_dev     
Lagged Corruption  0.105* (0.07)  0.105* (0.07) 
Annual share of homeless 
 
0.171* (0.07)  0.171* (0.07) 
16-year standard deviation of rainfall  0.008 (0.81)  0.008 (0.81) 
Annual share of homeless*16-year kurtosis 
 
0.0005** (0.04)  0.0005** (0.04) 
16-year standard deviation of rainfall*16-year kurtosis  0.0001 (0.46)  0.0001 (0.46) 
F(5,514)  11.19  11.19 
Shea partial R2  0.06  0.06 
1st stage estimates (b): export std_dev*16-year kurtosis 
 
 
  
Lagged Corruption 
 1.670 (0.96)  1.670 (0.96) 
Annual share of homeless  -91.54 (0.23)  -91.54 (0.23) 
16-year standard deviation of rainfall  76.02** (0.03)  76.02** (0.03) 
Annual share of homeless*16-year kurtosis  0.726* (0.07)  0.726* (0.07) 
16-year standard deviation of rainfall*16-year kurtosis  -0.181† (0.11)  -0.181† (0.11) 
F(5,514)  7.89  7.89 
Shea partial R2  0.08  0.08 
Country fixed effects   Yes  Yes 
Time dummies 
 Yes  Yes 
Observations (countries or clusters)  1143 (67)  1143 (67) 
R squared  0.626  0.623 
Number of instruments  4  4 
When possible, coefficients are rounded to two or three decimal places. Included instruments not reported. Standards errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity (2SLS; GMM-CUE) and autocorrelation (GMM-CUE). P-values in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1% † significant at 14%.  
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Annex 4.E. Benchmarks for baseline estimations of equation (4.4)  
i) Fixed effect estimation of equation (4.4), without time dummies 
Dependent variable : ICRG Coefficient P-value 
Lagged Corruption  0.716***  0.00 
Export skewness -4e-04***  0.00 
Export std_dev -0.003  0.78 
Population growth -0.035  0.30 
Nat. resources 0.008**  0.03 
Government size -0.013**  0.03 
Log population 0.616***  0.00 
Pol. regime stability 2e-04  0.91 
Democracy -0.015**  0.02 
Log openness 0.177*  0.08 
Constant -9.835*** 0.00 
   
Observations(country) 1144(68) 
R-squared  
Within 
Between 
 
0.608 
0.617 
Country fixed effects  Yes 
Time dummies No 
Region dummies No 
When possible, coefficients are rounded to three decimal places. Standards errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity. P-values in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% † significant at 14%. 
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ii) OLS estimates of equation (4.4) 
Dependent variable : ICRG Coefficient P-value 
Lagged Corruption  0.862*** 0.00 
Export skewness -0.0001 0.33 
Export std_dev 0.009* 0.06 
Population growth 0.018 0.22 
Nat. resources 0.004*** 0.00 
Government size -0.002 0.61 
Log population 0.046*** 0.00 
Pol. regime stability -0.018*** 0.00 
Democracy -0.009*** 0.00 
Log openness 0.045 0.14 
Constant -0.589*** 0.00 
   
Observations(country) 1144(68) 
R-squared 0,91 
Country fixed effects  No 
Time dummies Yes 
Region dummies No 
When possible, coefficients are rounded to three decimal places. Standards errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity. P-values in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% † significant at 14%. 
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Annex 4.F. Robustness checks 
i) Random effect estimator 
 Eq(4.4) Eq(4.5) Eq(4.6a) Eq(4.6b) Eq(4.7) Eq(4.8a) Eq(4.8b) 
Corruption t-1 0.862*** (0.00) 
0.860*** 
(0.00) 
0.860*** 
(0.00) 
0.860*** 
(0.00) 
0.857*** 
(0.00) 
0.858*** 
(0.00) 
0.857*** 
(0.00) 
Standard deviation 0.009* (0.10) 
0.018** 
(0.04) 
0.010* 
(0.07) 
0.010* 
(0.06) 
0.019*** 
(0.00) 
0.011** 
(0.04) 
-0.002  
(0.84) 
Standard deviation*Kurtosis     -0.0001† (0.11)   
Standard deviation*credit       0.004   (0.28) 
Skewness -0.0001 (0.22)       
Positive skewness   -0.001*** (0.01) 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.001** 
(0.04) 
-0.001** 
(0.03) 
-0.0002  
(0.81) 
-0.001*** 
(0.01) 
Negative skewness  -0.0004* (0.06) 
-0.003*** 
(0.00) 
-0.002*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0004* 
(0.10) 
0.0001   
(0.93) 
-0.0005* 
(0.06) 
Positive skewness2    7e-06* (0.07)     
Negative skewness2   0.00001*** (0.00)     
Positive skewness* Kurtosis     3e-06 (0.30)    
Negative skewness* Kurtosis    4e-06† (0.12)    
Positive skewness* credit      -0.0001  (0.69)  
Positive skewness* credit      -0.0001  (0.61)  
Observations 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144 1064 1064 
R2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Haussman test random effect versus fixed effect estimator - Chi-2 stat (p-value): 96.95(0.00)   
When possible, coefficients are rounded to three decimal places. P-values in parenthesis. † significant at 15%; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Controls are not reported. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. 
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ii) Variance inflation factors for the independent variables, table 4.5. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
Equation (4.6a) without time dummies 
Positive skewness 6.49 0.154197 
Negative skewness 4.96 0.201716 
Idiosyncratic positive skew 30.91 0.032348 
Idiosyncratic negative skew 17.93 0.055769 
Idiosyncratic positive skew2 11.77 0.084951 
Idiosyncratic negative skew2 14.10 0.070910 
Std_dev 24.31 0.041135 
Idiosyncratic std_dev 14.68 0.068117 
Mean VIF 14.93 
Equation (4.6b) without time dummies 
Positive skewness 14.85 0.065362 
Negative skewness 11.07 0.089086 
Idiosyncratic positive skew 23.82 0.003971 
Idiosyncratic negative skew 23.17 0.027550 
Idiosync positive skew * idiosync. Kurtosis 18.58 0.004011 
Idiosync negative skew * idiosync Kurtosis 20.68 0.020283 
Std_dev 24.48 0.040583 
Idiosyncratic std_dev 17.58 0.057971 
Kurtosis 8.86 0.109476 
Mean VIF 20.06 
Equation (4.7) without time dummies 
Positive skewness 6.58 0.151920 
Negative skewness 5.11 0.195760 
Idiosyncratic positive skew 7.68 0.129635 
Idiosyncratic negative skew 1.90 0.527480 
Std_dev 24.37 0.041023 
Idiosyncratic std_dev 40.69 0.020563 
Idiosyncratic std_dev*idiosync. Kurtosis 22.05 0.015996 
Kurtosis 3.55 0.279813 
Mean VIF 14.64 
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iii) Firm-level OLS estimations with 2-way clustering. 
  Eq(4.5)  Eq(4.6a)  Eq(4.6b)  Eq(4.7)  Eq(4.8a)  Eq(4.8b) 
  idiosync.  idiosync.  idiosync.  idiosync.  idiosync.  idiosync. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Aggregate fluctuations            
Positive skew  -0.004 (0.28) 
-0.003 
(0.47) 
-0.005 
(0.69) 
-0.003 
(0.46) 
-0.069* 
(0.10) 
-0.003 
(0.40) 
-0.003  
(0.50) 
-0.002  
(0.64) 
-0.050 
(0.26) 
-0.003  
(0.48) 
-0.003 
(0.50) 
-0.004 
(0.39) 
-0.003 
(0.52) 
-0.003 
(0.52) 
Negative skew -0.010*** (0.00) 
-0.009*** 
(0.00) 
0.023 
(0.47) 
-0.009*** 
(0.00) 
-0.043† 
(0.15) 
-0.003 
(0.39) 
-0.012*** 
(0.00) 
-0.011*** 
(0.00) 
0.025* 
(0.09) 
-0.010*** 
(0.00) 
-0.010*** 
(0.00) 
-0.013*** 
(0.00) 
-0.010** 
(0.00) 
-0.010*** 
(0.00) 
Positive skew2    3e-05 (0.95)            
Negative skew2   -0.0002 (0.35)            
Positive skew* Kurt      0.0003* (0.08)          
Negative skew* Kurt     0.0002 (0.17)          
Positive skew* credit         0.011 (0.34)      
Positive skew* credit         -0.014** (0.02)      
Export std_dev 0.818*** (0.00) 
0.814*** 
(0.00) 
0.884*** 
(0.00) 
0.818*** 
(0.00) 
0.918*** 
(0.00) 
0.823*** 
(0.00) 
0.867*** 
(0.00) 
0.830*** 
(0.00) 
0.983*** 
(0.01) 
0.841*** 
(0.00) 
0.852*** 
(0.00) 
1.411*** 
(0.00) 
0.844*** 
(0.00) 
0.951*** 
(0.00) 
Std_dev*Kurt       -0.0001 (0.56)        
Std_dev *credit            -0.157* (0.07)   
Idiosyncratic fluctuations              
Positive skew  -0.010** (0.05)  
0.019** 
(0.03)  
-0.005 
(0.72)  
-0.010* 
(0.07)  
-0.47  
(0.31) 
-0.013** 
(0.03)  
-0.010* 
(0.06) 
-0.011** 
(0.02) 
Negative skew  -0.007 (0.16)  
-0.026† 
(0.15)  
-0.004 
(0.76)  
-0.007 
(0.26)  
0.20  
(0.15) 
-0.011* 
(0.09)  
-0.007 
(0.28) 
-0.008† 
(0.12) 
Positive skew2    6e-05 (0.24)           
Negative skew2    0.0001 (0.33)           
Positive skew*Kurt      9e-06 (0.88)         
Negative skew*Kurt      1e-05 (0.74)         
Positive skew*credit          0.10  (0.41)     
Negative skew*credit          -0.009* (0.08)     
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Positive skew *intern 
funds           
5e-05 
(0.36)    
Negative skew*intern 
funds           
7e-05 
(0.72)    
Export std_dev  -0.001 (0.99)  
0.008 
(0.93)  
-0.018  
(0.87)  
-0.026 
(0.82)  
0.90  
(0.58) 
-0.018 
(0.87)  
-0.016 
(0.90) 
0.003 
(0.97) 
Export std_dev*Kurt        2e-05  (0.90)       
Export std_dev*credit             0.001 (0.75)  
Export 
std_dev*intern funds              
-0.001* 
(0.08) 
Observations 
9200 
When possible, coefficients are rounded to three decimal places. Standard errors are two-way clustered by country (23) and sector of activity (14). P-values in parenthesis. † significant at 15%; * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Controls not reported. Time dummies are excluded from all equations. The “Kurtosis” variable refers to the 6-year kurtosis of exports when it enters in interaction with 
the skewness of exports, while it refers to the 16-year kurtosis when it enters in interaction with the standard deviation of exports. 
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iv) Country-level panel regressions with HP-based export instability measures 
 Eq(4.4) Eq(4.5) Eq(4.6a) Eq(4.6b) Eq(4.7) Eq(4.8a) Eq(4.8b) 
 
Within  
FE 
FGLS 
dummy 
variable 
Within   
FE 
FGLS 
dummy 
variable Within FE 
FGLS 
dummy 
variable Within FE 
FGLS 
dummy 
variable 
Within  
FE 
FGLS 
dummy 
variable Within FE 
FGLS 
dummy 
variable Within FE 
FGLS 
dummy 
variable 
Corruption t-1 0.691*** (0.00) 
0.690*** 
(0.00) 
0.691*** 
(0.00) 
0.690*** 
(0.00) 
0.691*** 
(0.00) 
0.691*** 
(0.00) 
0.691*** 
(0.00) 
0.694*** 
(0.00) 
0.689*** 
(0.00) 
0.691*** 
(0.00) 
0.690*** 
(0.00) 
0.689*** 
(0.00) 
0.689*** 
(0.00) 
0.688*** 
(0.00) 
Standard deviation 
0.011   
(0.64) 
-0.007 
(0.68) 
0.011   
(0.67) 
-0.003 
(0.85) 
0.011   
(0.66) -0.003 (0.89) 
0.011   
(0.67) 
-0.003 
(0.85) 
0.04  
(0.30) 
0.026 
(0.40) 
0.011 
(0.65) 
-0.001 
(0.93) 
0.068 
(0.28) 
-0.012 
(0.77) 
Standard deviation*Kurtosis         -0.0001* (0.08) 
-0.0001 
(0.18)     
Standard deviation*credit             -0.20 (0.38) 
0.002 
(0.85) 
Skewness 0.0002 (0.41) 
-0.0003** 
(0.04)             
Positive skewness    5e-05 (0.93) 
-0.0007** 
(0.03) 
-0.0003 
(0.89) 
-0.0003 
(0.76)  
-0.0005 
(0.80) 
-0.001 
(0.21) 
-0.0001  
(0.90) 
-0.0005† 
(0.11) 
-0.002  
(0.32) 
0.0004 
(0.78) 
0.0001  
(0.91) 
-0.0007** 
(0.04) 
Negative skewness   0.0004 (0.51) 
-0.0001 
(0.73) 
0.003  
(0.23) 
0.002**  
(0.06) 
0.001 
(0.65) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
0.0005 
(0.48) 
-0.001 
(0.86) 
0.001 
(0.63) 
-0.001 
(0.51) 
0.0004 
(0.53) 
-0.0001 
(0.79) 
Positive skewness2      1e-07  (0.99) 
4e-06   
(0.44)         
Negative skewness2     1e-05  (0.24) 
1e-05 ** 
(0.04)         
Positive skewness* Kurtosis        1e-06 (0.90) 
7e-06** 
(0.02)       
Negative skewness* Kurtosis       -1e-06 (0.89) 
-5e-06† 
(0.15)       
Positive skewness* credit           0.001 (0.34) 
0.0001 
(0.76)   
Positive skewness* credit           -0.0002 (0.76) 
0.0002 
(0.55)   
Observation (countries) 
1059(66) 
Country dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wooldridge test of 
autocorrelation:  Fstat(p-value) 113(0.00)  113(0.00)  111(0.00)  115(0.00)  112(0.00)  113(0.00)  116(0.00)  
AR(1) estimated 
autocorrelation  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08 
When possible, coefficients are rounded to three decimal places. P-values in parenthesis. † significant at 15%; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Controls not reported. Standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity. The “Kurtosis” variable refers to the 6-year kurtosis of exports when it enters in interaction with the skewness of exports, while it refers to the 16-year kurtosis when it enters in interaction 
with the standard deviation of exports. 
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v) Firm-level two-way cluster robust OLS estimations with HP-based export instability measures 
 
 
 
Eq(4.4) Eq(4.5) Eq(4.6a) Eq(4.6b) Eq(4.7) Eq(4.8a) Eq(4.8b) 
Standard deviation 
0.758*** 
(0.00) 
0.761*** 
(0.00) 
0.777*** 
(0.00) 
0.875*** 
(0.00) 
0.846*** 
(0.01) 
0.940*** 
(0.00) 
1.837*** 
(0.00) 
Standard deviation*Kurtosis     -0.0004 (0.43)   
Standard deviation*credit       -0.357 (0.22) 
Skewness -0.004*** (0.00)       
Positive skewness   -0.003 (0.32) 
-0.020* 
(0.08) 
-0.028* 
(0.07) 
-0.005 
(0.54) 
0.057  
(0.26) 
-0.002 
(0.54) 
Negative skewness  -0.004*** (0.00) 
-0.014†  
(0.13) 
0.001 
(0.91) 
-0.001 
(0.96) 
0.040  
(0.49) 
-0.010** 
(0.02) 
Positive skewness2    0.0001 (0.21)     
Negative skewness2   0.0001** (0.05)     
Positive skewness* Kurtosis     0.0001*** (0.01)    
Negative skewness* Kurtosis    -0.0001 (0.18)    
Positive skewness* credit      -0.015 (0.27)  
Positive skewness* credit      -0.013 (0.42)  
Observations 
9200 
When possible, coefficients are rounded to three decimal places. Standard errors are two-way clustered by country (23) and sector of activity (14). 
P-values in parenthesis. † significant at 15%; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Controls not reported. Time 
dummies are excluded from all equations.  The “Kurtosis” variable refers to the 6-year kurtosis of exports when it enters in interaction with the 
skewness of exports, while it refers to the 16-year kurtosis when it enters in interaction with the standard deviation of exports. 
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